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expressed by more people than just medical doctors.  
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this change resulted in more work occurring behind computer screens. This fundamental 
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workforce.  
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the next steps in my professional life. 
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solicited me for this project. I was glad to take on this challenge, because this new job 
allowed me to combine my skills in statistics and management of large databases with my 
“old love,” health economics. The result of this work was a statistical handbook, Statistik der 
obligatorischen Krankenversicherung, which has remained in use since its original 
publication in 1996. 
After this intense phase of conception, creation, and production of the new Swiss MHI 
statistics, I resolved to extend my skills further into the analysis of statistical data. In the 
1990s, I pursued postgraduate study in applied mathematical statistics and received the 
Diplôme Postgrade en Statistique from the University of Neuchâtel.  
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This master’s curriculum was not only broad and interesting but also challenging for a more-
or-less full-time professional and father to two young sons. It was only there, however, that I 
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collaborated with academics in the field from all over the world. Professor Ali Hadi from 
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Lebart, in the autumn of 2000, I completed my master’s thesis in statistics: “Multivariate 
Descriptive Statistical Analysis of the Social Health Insurance System in Switzerland.” 
At the same time, political discussions took place regarding the creation of a new institution 
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staff. The founding director of the Obsan, Professor Peter C. “Pit” Meyer, invited me to help 
cultivate the organization, staff, and the scientific competences of the institution.  
Working with Pit Meyer, now the director of the health department at Zurich University of 
Applied Sciences in Winterthur, was a satisfying and intense experience. Professor Meyer has 
been able to drive himself to realize his project despite its mammoth proportions, yet he is a 
warm-hearted and humorous person. His leadership was one of the most important factors in 
successfully establishing the Obsan in the field of Swiss empirical health data research within 
the first five years after its founding. 
In 2006, I planned one more formal continuing education degree, with a dissertation in the 
field of health economics. The project aimed to assess why large regional differences are 
present in Swiss healthcare utilization and costs. I proposed the project to Professor Claude 
Jeanrenaud from the University of Neuchâtel, who immediately agreed to support and 
supervise the project. I first executed a comprehensive literature review on the subject of 
international and national differences in regional healthcare costs. The study was published in 
2008 in an Obsan editorial series under the title: “Erklärungsansätze regionaler 
Kostenunterschiede im Gesundheitswesen.” 
Professor Jeanrenaud then proposed that I complement the thesis with three empirical appli-
cations in the form of journal essays. This work took its time, mainly because my budget was 
limited as interim director of the Obsan from 2008 to 2009. I hope the empirical essays (only 
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Executive Summary 
 
This document consists of three Parts, of which Part I provides a general introduction to the 
institutional and empirical framework around cantonal variations in costs and utilization of 
healthcare services in Switzerland (CH). Therefore, a more theoretical introduction is offered 
by presenting important aspects of the meaning of health care in the framework of health 
economic theory and a short overview about the research history of the explanation of 
different levels of healthcare costs and utilization and their temporal and spatial trends. This 
introduction is followed by a presentation of the main components comprising the 
construction, functioning and funding of the Swiss healthcare system. A short comparison of 
levels of and trends in healthcare costs to those of other Western countries reveals that the 
situation for Switzerland is not especially unique. More unique to Switzerland are the strong 
variations of regional healthcare costs per person observed within the country, as they can 
widely vary across cantons—even by factors of 2 or 3.  
Part I of the document continues with an overview on Switzerland’s health data situation and 
reveals that its most critical weaknesses exist in the areas of outpatient healthcare provision 
and of epidemiology. Part I terminates with a presentation of the literature overviewing 
international and national differences in regional healthcare costs. The review concludes that 
it is challenging for health economics to provide consistent answers to many of the important 
research questions pertaining to the field of regional healthcare cost and utilization 
differences. The most frequently cited causes of this difficulty are the complexity of the 
healthcare systems and the crucial dearth of broadly recognized theoretical models and 
available data. A recently presented model (Chandra and Skinner 2012; Skinner 2012) was 
considered to be a good starting point for a more systematic analysis of geographic variations 
in healthcare costs and utilization. 
One agreement in the literature about the methodological findings is obvious: when 
explaining regional health differences, it is advantageous to account for levels of and trends in 
healthcare costs (or utilization) simultaneously. However, one has to be aware that different 
sets of variables can influence each dimension. Thus, by being able to combine cross-section 
and time-series analyses, a panel econometric approach seems to be the most promising 
statistical-technical instrument for tackling these types of research questions.  
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Moreover, because the prices paid in the health sector (e.g., the cantonal taxpoint values in 
Switzerland), the volumes of care (e.g., the number of per capita GP consultations), and the 
medical practices applied (e.g., the average number of taxpoints used per consultation) can—
again—be influenced by different sets of factors, separate analyses of these three main 
components of healthcare costs is preferable. Moreover, the literature review identifies 
individual data (i.e., the individual patient, the individual insurance policyholder, or the 
individual healthcare provider) and geo-coded information1 as the statistical and geographical 
level that offers the most possibilities for such research. Unfortunately, the Swiss health data 
normally do not allow in-depth analysis on such individual levels.  
In Part II of the document, three essays containing concrete analyses of regional differences in 
costs and in actual and future utilization of healthcare services in Switzerland are presented; 
none of these empirical investigations goes beyond the cantonal level. The first essay 
investigates the factors associated with cantonal differences in the utilization of mandatory 
health insurance (MHI) services between 2000 and 2007 by applying panel econometric 
(fixed effects) models. For variations in utilization for each of the six largest MHI service 
provider domains—viz., general practitioners, medical specialists, hospital inpatient care, 
hospital outpatient care, medication and nursing homes—significant factors that are correlated 
with utilization frequency over time and across cantons can be identified.  
In particular, a greater density of service providers tends to be significantly associated with 
the per-capita consumption of healthcare services. On the demand side, older, more urban and 
wealthier populations with more deprivation problems summarize the principal positively 
correlated factors. Financing characteristics in the form of high deductibles or managed care 
instruments can also play a role in the utilization level of healthcare services, although some 
large difficulties2 were faced in confirming their effects empirically. Finally, the general time 
trends describing the accelerating utilization of outpatient drugs, nursing homes and 
outpatient hospitals are presented in contrast to the declining trends observed for inpatient 
hospitals, GPs, and specialist services in private practices.  
                                                 
1
  Of course, in reality, the exact research question actually determines whether individual-level data are 
needed; however, most of the time, data aggregation (if needed) is possible, but desaggregation is not.  
2
  The main methodological challenges were endogeneity problems (omitted variables and variable selection 
biases) and ecological fallacies (see Chapter 4). 
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The main contribution of the first essay of the thesis is its being the first such work to analyze 
spatial and temporal differences in quantities instead of costs of healthcare service domains in 
Switzerland. Moreover, the testing of a constant set of 12 explanatory variables across the six 
healthcare service domains allows a bi-directional interpretation of the results. In addition to 
understanding how each of the six target variables is interrelated with the whole set of 
regressors, one can learn more about how each purportedly influential factor is individually 
associated with all six healthcare service domains. 
The second essay in Part II begins by presenting the large differences in average annual per-
bed costs between individual nursing homes and between nursing homes grouped by cantons. 
The paper tries to identify empirically some explanations for these sizable per-bed cost 
variations. At the same time, the assumed existence of two-levels of explanatory factors (viz., 
individual and cantonal levels) is taken into consideration by modeling them with regression 
estimations in multilevel form. Moreover, besides the variation of total costs per bed and per 
year, the variations of the annual per-bed costs of accommodation and assistance and the 
annual per-bed costs covered by the MHI are calculated separately. 
Because the data from 2006 alone were available for the research presented in the second 
essay at the time of its conception, it was decided to approach this study with only a single 
year being analyzed in a cross-level setting. This approach clearly has its limitations, but it 
did not preclude employing more sophisticated panel data approaches at a later date. Such a 
limited model explains variations in the annual per-bed costs between cantons fairly well, but 
quite a share of variation within cantons remains unexplained. Because no ideal indicator was 
available for the data on the hotel service standards of Swiss nursing homes, this result was 
not surprising—especially regarding annual per-bed costs of accommodation and assistance. 
However, the operationalized variables—such as the number of days invoiced per bed and 
year (i.e., occupancy rate), the intensity of nursing time spent per patient and day, the 
qualification level of the personnel, the relative number of non-medical employees, and the 
cantonal wage index—were significantly correlated with all three cost indicators. 
The essay admits to the difficulty faced in deriving recommendations for policy-making 
authorities from these results. Cantons should at least monitor their nursing home costs and 
financing continuously—in particular, their costs for assistance and accommodation. Should 
increasingly large numbers of individuals and their families out of the growing number of 
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people with chronic illnesses be unable to pay these costs out of their own pockets in the 
coming years, the cantons might be forced to intervene. 
The third essay of Part II analyzes regional differences in the utilization of somatic acute care 
beds in Swiss hospitals. A description of cantonal population age structures and trends and 
hospital utilization patterns in 2010 is followed by calculations of ranges of cantonal acute 
care hospital volumes through 2030. Originally developed by researchers at the Swiss Health 
Observatory and the Statistical Office of Canton Vaud (VD) for the statistical support of 
hospital planning processes in individual cantons, a projection model is applied for the first 
time in this study for all 26 cantons simultaneously and allows a direct comparison of the 
results across cantons and with the country as a whole as well as calculations of national-level 
results for medical branches. The projection model realizes a systematic link between Swiss 
medical statistics for hospitals and official cantonal population scenarios. Various hypotheses 
on future length-of-stay (LOS) trends in Swiss acute care hospitals are simulated with the 
model.  
The most important results of the study are the following: the national number of hospital 
days required through 2030 should increase no more (or only slightly more) than the 
population increases. While an increase of hospital days between 5 percent and 13 percent is 
expected in the two “middle” scenarios of the model, the population will grow 11 percent 
between 2010 and 2030 in the official “average” demographic scenario. This rather positive 
outcome on the national level is the result of major differences between cantons. Some 
cantons will have to deal with increases of hospital days of approximately 30 percent, 
whereas in other cantons hospital days will rise less than 5 percent. Moreover, treatments 
typical for older patients, such as cardiology and vascular medicine treatments, will clearly be 
more necessary in 2030 than medical branches with very young patients, such as neonatology 
or obstetrics. 
Part III provides some specific conclusions for the Swiss healthcare system with its 
characteristics of regulated competition and strong federalist structure. As a strategy of 
analyzing and comparing healthcare cost components defined as being low aggregated (e.g., 
individual health service domains or providers and individual cost components, such as 
quantities and prices) is favored and targeted in the three empirical essays of Part II, it seems 
important that such detailed analyses should afterwards be complemented by an attempt to 
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draw an overall picture of the results. Accordingly, an applied synthesis of the results for two 
exemplary cantons—one canton with low (Obwalden OW) and one canton with high per 
capita healthcare costs (Geneva GE)—is presented in the Excursus of Part III. 
Without yet having executed the necessary empirical work, proposals are made in the 
Excursus about how cantons might be distinguished by some of their characteristics on the 
demand and supply sides of the healthcare system. On the demand side, cantons may have a 
more “integrated” or a more “globalized” population. Concrete characteristics that assign a 
cantonal population to one or the other type could be derived from their different economic 
conditions (e.g., income, assets, and their distributions), the importance of social-economic 
exclusion (e.g., unemployment, receipt of benefits), the average physical and mental health 
status, and the actual and future age structure (including future requirements of health care).  
On the supply side, two different types of cantons are proposed as well. First, there might be 
the “peripheral-type scheme” of a cantonal health provision system. Such a health system is 
focused on primary care and nursing homes, and it is characterized by a modest health 
provision infrastructure with only a few active specialists, with many health services being 
purchased in other cantons. Second, the “center-type scheme” of a cantonal health provision 
system is proposed. Such a system is characterized by a large (university or principal) hospital 
that is surrounded by many independent specialists and pharmacies. This system, in contrast, 
attracts patients from other cantons. 
The document concludes by offering a few suggestions for future research. Rather concrete 
propositions were made in the three empirical articles of the thesis. First, they were mainly 
about more sophisticated methodological approaches: the use of instrumental variables and 
two-stages least squares estimations in the first article, the use of panel data models with 
additional regressors in the second article, and the integration of additional variables such as 
sex, morbidity trends, and future changes of regional patient flows in the third article. Second, 
extensions concerning the data were required: the necessity of always working with statistical 
data on an aggregated level might be the most significant problem this thesis faces 
throughout. Moreover, more detailed domains of health service providers could be analyzed 
in the first article, a search for better variables concerning hospitality standards and cantonal 
regulations in nursing homes is proposed in the second article, and a more precise analysis of 
hospital cases with very long LOSs would be useful in the third article. As a more general 
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recommendation, more research about possible trends in the future health status of aging 
populations in Western societies was proposed. Special models to simulate such quantitative 
calculations exist and could be translated to the case presented by Switzerland.  
 
Keywords: geographical (cantonal) variations, utilization of healthcare services, healthcare 
costs, levels and trends, prices, volumes (quantities), medical practice (variations), health 
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structure, (Swiss) health data, aggregated and individual data, mandatory health insurance 
(MHI), health services provider domains, nursing home sector, costs of accommodation and 
assistance, (somatic) acute care hospitals, hospital cases, hospital days, length-of-stay in 
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Part I: General introduction and background 
 
1 General introduction 
1.1 Introduction and overview 
This document describes some of the important aspects of my work during the last six years 
in the areas of healthcare systems and regional differences in the utilization and costs of 
healthcare services. Before I start with a description of some economic aspects and 
consequences of healthcare production and consumption, I would like to discuss the term 
“health” to assist in answering the research questions posed in this document.  
The most widely known definition of health is the one established by the World Health Or-
ganization in 1946 (WHO 1948). In this framework, health is “a state of complete physical, 
mental and social well-being, and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.” It is no 
wonder that this expansive definition of health by the WHO often has been criticized, because 
it is too broad and not realizable, particularly from an economic point of view. 
However, the WHO definition seems quite useful because it points most clearly to the 
existential importance attached to health by human beings and hints at the special 
characteristics of “health as an economic good” (see Section 1.2). Moreover, the broad 
definition anticipates the modern conception of health in public health theory. Health is the 
result of an interplay of manifold health determinants, such as age, gender, genetic 
dispositions, lifestyle factors, social and communal networks, life and work conditions, and 
general conditions of the socioeconomic, cultural and physical environments (Meyer 2008). 
Consequently, it clearly expresses that the good health of populations and of individuals does 
not exclusively depend on the availability and the use of a well-developed healthcare system.  
Whenever the focus is distinctly placed on healthcare systems in this document, it should be 
kept in mind that these systems comprise only one set out of the many input factors 
influencing the complex process known as the “production of health” (Wilkinson and Marmot 
2003). Otherwise, the healthcare system is, indeed, a Western country’s most important 
“health producer,” at least if one refers to the directly measurable consumption of economic 
resources. 
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Part I of the document contains a general introduction of the institutional and empirical 
framework describing the cantonal variations of costs and utilization of healthcare services 
pertaining to Switzerland. Section 1.2 presents a few important aspects of the meaning of 
health care in the framework of health economic theory. It discusses some of the most 
important specialties of the corresponding healthcare and health insurance markets. By 
providing such a background, explanations become easier for why increased levels of 
healthcare costs3 and why their temporal and spatial trends have become major problems in 
the politics of many Western societies (Section 1.3).  
The theoretical introduction provided in Chapter 1 is followed in Section 2.1 by a brief 
presentation of a few main components and specialties concerning the construction and 
functioning of the Swiss healthcare system. In Section 2.2, an overview of the concrete 
situation concerning healthcare costs in Switzerland is presented. Statistical information about 
the levels of and trends in Swiss healthcare costs to those of other Western countries are 
compared. After that, the sectional and regional structures of Swiss healthcare costs and—in 
more detail—the costs covered by mandatory health insurance (MHI) are presented in Section 
2.3. An overview of the Swiss healthcare data system (Section 2.4) concludes the Chapter. 
Following this theoretical, institutional, and statistical background, Chapter 3 continues with a 
short presentation of a comprehensive literature review (Camenzind 2008) about the subject 
of international and national differences in regional healthcare costs. That study had been exe-
cuted in favor of creating sufficient theoretical and methodological expertise before engaging 
in personal empirical research. Separate summaries of the content and methodological 
findings of the literature review are cited in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. 
The three empirical essays presented in Part II of the document are all about differences in 
utilization or costs of health services in Switzerland. The political importance (see Section 
2.3), the availability of useful statistical data (see Section 2.4), the methodological findings 
from the international literature review (see Section 3.3), and, last but not least, proximity to 
the authors’ professional work in daily business, were important contributing elements to the 
development of the three concrete models. Part II explicitly analyzes the utilization of overall 
MHI services, the cost differences per bed in Swiss nursing homes, and the future 
                                                 
3
  I use “healthcare costs,” “healthcare expenditures,” and “healthcare expenses” as synonymous terms 
throughout the document. 
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requirements of inpatient healthcare volumes in acute care hospitals. Various methods, such 
as panel econometrics, multi-level regressions, and model simulations, are applied. 
The first empirical model in Part II investigates the factors associated with cantonal 
differences in the utilization of healthcare services in the MHI (one of the major components 
of Swiss healthcare costs) from 2000 to 2007. It uses one frequently applied variant of panel 
econometric models in the literature: the fixed-effects models. The second work in Part II 
focuses on cantonal and institutional differences of annual per-bed costs in Swiss nursing 
homes. Multilevel analysis, which is suitable for hierarchical data structures, was therefore 
adopted. The third empirical model in Part II analyses regional differences in the utilization of 
somatic acute care beds in Swiss hospitals. The perspective is changed here from historical 
investigations to a look into the future. A simulation model with projection results for the 
cantonal utilization of acute care hospitals until 2030 is presented. 
Part III gives a short overview of the document and presents an applied synthesis of the 
results for two exemplary cantons. The objective is to summarize the main findings of the 
introductory Chapters and the three empirical essays in the document for one canton with 
very low and one canton with very high per capita healthcare costs. In conclusion, a few 
potential suggestions for future research are added. 
 
 
1.2 Health care as an economic commodity 
The health economics literature (Hurley 2000) distinguishes among four bundles of particular 
characteristics marking health care as an economic commodity. First, demand for health care 
must be seen as a derived demand for health; second, the production and consumption of 
health care is accompanied by large positive and sometimes negative externalities; third, there 
exist important informational asymmetries between different players in the healthcare market; 
and fourth, significant uncertainties concerning the “real” requirements for health care and the 
effectiveness of healthcare services are present. In comparison to many standard economic 
goods described by economic theory, the commodity of “health care” is particular in the sense 
of being affected by all four of the above-mentioned characteristics, which themselves are 
also interrelated. 
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The first point, the demand for the commodity of health, becomes manifest if a household 
invests in the conservation of the health status of its members (health promotion services), the 
restoration of a disturbed health status (cure services), or in the maintenance or better dealing 
with a disturbed health status (care services). In this view, demand for health care and its ser-
vices is a derived demand for health (Grossman 1972). In other words, it is a demand 
conditional on being ill or conditional on avoiding becoming (more) ill. 
Moreover, an intervention provided by the healthcare system—such as prescribing a drug to 
treat a patient’s being overweight—is only one of the possible inputs in the process of health 
production. Other measures that might be taken to decrease weight include self-motivated 
change in nutrition or physical activity by the patient. This variety of measures that can be 
taken also illustrates one of the main reasons why it is quite difficult to assess the 
effectiveness and efficiency of professional healthcare interventions or services: perhaps 
another intervention outside the healthcare system (see Figure 1) would have been more 
effective, more efficient, or both. 
Once the decision is taken to confront a health problem using an intervention provided by the 
professional healthcare system, such a measure or treatment can be analyzed for its efficiency 
on three different dimensions (Hurley 2000). The first dimension, technical efficiency, is 
achieved when the providers of healthcare services are organized in a way that a given output 
is produced with minimal (physical) inputs. The second dimension is cost-effectiveness or 
productive efficiency and is achieved when the providers of health care organize their 
production in a way that the costs of the production of a given output are minimized. The 
third dimension, called the allocative efficiency, concerns the society and the economy as a 
whole. Here, the question is whether the levels of national or regional healthcare expenditures 
are optimal, if they are compared with other politico-economic goals of the society, such as a 
high level of education or the best possible public safety.  
The second characteristic of health care as a commodity—viz., positive or negative 
externalities appearing during the production and consumption of health care—is most 
apparent in the field of transmissible diseases. If a person is ready to bear the costs of an 
immunization against a disease or to apply a protective measure against the transmission of a 
disease, he or she also creates value for other individuals in the society.  
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Moreover, the healthcare system itself produces positive externalities by its sheer existence. 
The best example for this is the setting up of an overall-coverage emergency healthcare 
system. Such services are available at special and (from the individual’s perspective) rare mo-
ments when they are urgently needed. Finally, as an example of a negative externality in the 
healthcare sector, the medically inappropriate (over-)use of antibiotics and the consequent 
resistance phenomenon (Filippini, Masiero, and Moschetti 2006) can be mentioned. 
The third bundle of features characterizing health care as an economic commodity involves 
informational asymmetries. Economists understand this notion to reflect a situation in which 
the players on one side of the market dispose of more information about relevant aspects of 
the market transaction than the players on the other side. In real life, nearly everyone has been 
confronted with informational asymmetries between patients and physicians. With respect to 
interacting with physicians (or other health providers) in private practice or hospitals, a level-
headed evaluation of performance and price is often not possible for patients. Consequently, 
the information needed to make a fully informed choice is not available, not given to the 
patient, or is provided in a manner that is too complicated to be useful. This circumstance is 
particularly true if time is scarce, as in emergencies. In general, physicians are in much better 
positions to evaluate the necessity, the urgency, the chances of success, and the possible 
consequences of the treatment (or non-treatment) of the patient.  
This constellation can be a problem in situations in which the supplier of the healthcare 
service is exposed to incentives for which his own financial interests are optimized if he 
delivers the most numerous or the most expensive services. Particularly in healthcare systems 
with fee-for-service remuneration schemes4, physicians and other healthcare providers are 
induced to treat patients more extensively than necessary (Gosden et al. 2001). At the same 
time, the lack of information makes it difficult or impossible for patients to discover such 
behavior. Thus, because of informational asymmetries, the demand for health care, which 
should be determined by the (informed) demander in a functioning market, can turn into a 
supplier-induced demand (Carlsen and Grytten 1998, 2000).  
                                                 
4
  Under fee-for-service remuneration schemes, providers collect revenue respective to the individual services 
they provide; therefore, if fees exeed costs for services, the providers earn more as they provide more 
services (see Glied, S. 2000. “Manged Care.” In Handbook of Health Economics, edited by A. J. Culyer and 
J. P. Newhouse, pp. 707-53 Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
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Even more intensive use of healthcare services is induced if many healthcare providers in a 
limited area coexist with large insurance coverage for the healthcare costs. If patients do not 
have to face the financial consequences of their medical treatments in their private budgets, 
neither willingness nor the ability to pay sets a financial limit on their health service 
consumption.  
Demand-side policies, such as providing consumers with as much relevant information as 
possible try to reduce the gaps in interests between healthcare providers and patients, are 
plausible solutions to this problem. Different supply-side policies and alternative funding 
schemes are also conceivable. One such supply-side policy is an instrument called “agency” 
(Hurley 2000), an attempt to make the provider act more in the interest of the patient. One can 
try to reach this goal through a dual-faceted strategy based on creating a professional culture 
that focuses more on the interests of the patients and of simultaneously reducing the 
competitive market pressures on the providers.  
Better balance between the interests of service providers and patients can also be encouraged 
with particular funding schemes. A good example of this is the remuneration of providers 
with capitation5. In these schemes, service providers dispose of global budgets for every 
patient, which can depend in size on the patients’ diagnosis. In comparison to fee-for-service 
remuneration schemes, the incentives for the service providers are turned around. A limited 
budget causes the service provider to become financially advantaged when he or she manages 
to bring back the patient to good health as quickly and efficiently as possible.  
Insured patients, however, might still be interested in getting more than the optimal level of 
health care (where marginal costs equalize marginal benefits). To counter this patient-side 
incentive to a potential overtreatment, the system should be designed in terms of a double 
agency (Blomqvist 1991). Here, doctors do not act exclusively as agents for their patients but 
instead incorporate the interests of third party payers—normally, insurance companies. In 
such a role of being a “double agent,” a medical doctor is forced to balance the conflicting 
interests of the insurance companies and the patients.  
                                                 
5
  “Capitation” can be defined as the amount of health service funding to be assigned to a person with certain 
characteristics for the service in question and the time period in question, subject to any overall budget 
constraints (Rice, N. and P. Smith. 1999. “Approaches to Capitation and Risk Adjustment in Health Care: An 
International Survey.” Centre for Health Economics. York: University of York.). 
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A major concern related to flat rate funding schemes like capitation involves quality of care. 
A functioning healthcare market would include competition on the basis of quality. If patients 
would be able to assess the quality of their treatments effectively—which is difficult because 
of the aforementioned information asymmetries and also because the quality perceived by the 
patient can significantly differ from objective quality—providers delivering poor quality care 
would be eliminated through the patients’ choice.  
There also exist important informational asymmetries in the insurance market for healthcare 
services. This point is discussed with respect to the fourth characteristic of health care as an 
economic commodity: the notion of uncertainties. Uncertainties are an important issue in the 
healthcare sector because incidences of health problems often occur purely by chance for 
individuals. In many cases, these unforeseeable incidents occur in unexpected and irregular 
ways during peoples’ lives. Moreover, if a health problem actually occurs, it is often unclear 
whether the therapeutic measures applied against it are really effective.  
Uncertainties are the reason why insurance markets have replaced exclusively individual 
funding of healthcare services. Health insurance programs pool the individually unbearable 
financial consequences of health risks in insurance communities and create welfare gains for 
the society and the individuals. However, insurance markets are also confronted with a variety 
of conceptual problems. The most prominent of these challenges are called “adverse 
selection” and “moral hazard,” two phenomena that are briefly described in the following 
paragraphs. 
In the health insurance sector, adverse selection occurs when health insurance policyholders 
have better access to information about their own health status and health risks than do the 
insurance companies (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976). In unregulated insurance markets, 
policyholders who estimate themselves as good risks (i.e., believe themselves to have a small 
chance of falling ill) are more likely to withdraw from the insurance than those who estimate 
themselves as bad risks. As a consequence of this behavior, the insurance companies tend to 
underestimate the average risk of their insurance collectives falling ill.  
The result of this underestimation is that such insurers register losses in the corresponding 
business period. Therefore, in the next period, these insurers will have to increase their 
premiums in order to counter the losses. The consequence of higher premiums is a new 
withdrawal of the next segment of good risks, and the premiums must be raised again in the 
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following period. This process continues and demonstrates how adverse selection can bring 
major instability to health insurance markets. In extreme cases, adverse selection can even 
cause a collapse of such markets, and no more insurance policies are supplied. The most 
effective remedy to counter adverse selection and its consequences is to establish a 
compulsory insurance for the entire population without a possibility of individual withdrawal.  
Moral hazard, however, refers to the incitement for insured persons to take less care to avoid 
or limit illnesses or injuries than a person without health insurance. This phenomenon occurs 
because insured persons do not have to bear the financial consequences of their health 
problems directly. This behavior is called moral hazard ex ante. Moreover, the 
aforementioned incentives for insured patients to demand treatments that are too numerous or 
too expensive are called hazard ex post by health economists (Hurley 2000; Pauly 1974). 
Different instruments were developed for health insurance markets to limit such problems 
caused by moral hazard. The most important preventive measures against moral hazard ex 
ante are different forms of deductibles or co-payments. Possible countermeasures against 
moral hazard ex post are (again) the different forms co-payments by the patients and the 
remuneration of providers with capitation schemes mentioned above.  
Another group of measures relies more on the introduction of control mechanisms concerning 
patients and providers in insurance contracts and their achievement by the insurance 
companies themselves. From a theoretic point of view, the establishment of appropriate 
incentive systems—double agency and different forms of deductibles or co-payments to limit 
potential overuse by patients and capitation to limit potential overtreatment by providers, 
having been mentioned as possible instruments for this purpose above—seems more efficient 
than attempting to remove informational asymmetries by administrative controls with high 
costs of searching for information and of monitoring its appropriate application. 
 
 
1.3 The question of regionally varying healthcare costs 
The analysis of national or regional healthcare costs and utilization differences has a long tra-
dition in health economics. For four decades, researchers have employed a large variety of 
models, methods, and techniques to explain the different levels and trends in healthcare utili-
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zation and costs in Western countries. However, as will be argued when discussing the results 
of the literature review of Chapter 3, many of the conceptual difficulties of the 
macroeconomic analysis of healthcare expenditures are not yet resolved (Gerdtham and 
Jönsson 2000). To date, the scientific description of and explanation for the levels and trends 
observed in healthcare utilization and costs have always strongly relied on the intuition and 
experience of the researchers and the availability of statistical data (Martin Martin, Lopez del 
Amo Gonzalez, and Cano Garcia 2011).  
In one of the first important studies about varying national levels of healthcare costs 
(Buchanan 1966), there was a particular interest in the question of how much state 
intervention in the imperfect market for health care results in an optimal outcome for the 
population in the sense of allocative efficiency (Leu 1986). The definition and measurement 
of such an optimal outcome—the output of good quality, well-distributed health services that 
are efficiently produced and consumed in comparison with other social demand such as 
education and security—is one of the great challenges facing economic research on healthcare 
expenses and their disparities.  
The employed and consumed inputs for the production of health normally can be described 
and quantified by cost, volume, and price indicators. However, the difficulties facing the 
definition and quantification of utility or outcome of healthcare services are far from being 
mastered (Kelley and Hurst 2006; Olmsted Teisberg 2008). Without progress in solving these 
fundamental problems, it remains impossible to evaluate the technical and productive 
efficiencies of healthcare production and the allocative efficiency of a certain level of 
healthcare expenditure in a given country or region. 
These questions encourage burgeoning political interest in a market that is strongly regulated 
by public authorities and broadly financed by mandatory health insurance (MHI) premiums 
and state subsidies, at least in the cases of Switzerland and many other Western countries. 
This political interest has clearly grown over the last 20 years because of the strong or even 
disproportionate increase in healthcare expenses observed in all Western countries (see 
Section 2.2). Health economists in the field try to find more evidence for the factors 
associated with this constant growth by comparing different countries or regions with respect 
to their levels of and trends in healthcare costs. The major hope is to detect allocative, 
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distributive or productive inefficiencies in the healthcare sector and to derive evidence-based 
recommendations for cost-containment strategies for politicians. 
As mentioned previously, it might actually not be enough to examine a healthcare delivery 
system and how it functions in an isolated manner. Rather, it would be necessary to execute 
such research in a larger societal context. Figure 1 illustrates how such an attempt could be 
made by inserting the healthcare system into the framework characterizing the political 
system. The political system sets up the rules for how decisions are made in the democratic 
process. However, it can also stand for the types of priorities that are pursued by the people 
and their policy makers according to the actual balance of power. 
 
Figure 1: Factors of influence on regional differences of healthcare costs in Switzerland 
Source: (Camenzind 2008), S. 37. 
 
The interplay of all of these elements results in a certain volume of consumption and expenses 
in the healthcare system of a country or a region. Moreover, such regional differences 
between costs are divisible into three main components: the quantities, the prices, and the 
particular mix of health services consumed (i.e., “medical practice”) (OECD 2011b). 
Therefore, it is possible that one, two, or all three of these components, which can be 
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influenced by completely different factors, are responsible for varying levels of and trends in 
healthcare costs. Finally, different factors of influence again can be responsible for high 
relative levels or a relative fast growth of healthcare costs and its three components. 
In summary, important challenges in the field of empirical analysis of regional cost and 
utilization differences in the health sector—problems that are faced by many other fields of 
applied research as well—are the difficulties that face setting up a comprehensive 
macroeconomic base, different problems concerning the conception, definition, and 
measurement of the utility of health care, economic particularities of the commodity of health 
care, imperfections in health care and health insurance markets, and the enormous complexity 
and the broad interdependence of the healthcare system with other sectors of the society. This 
list can be completed by referring to the data situation that is often insufficient. 
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2 Swiss healthcare system 
2.1 Structure of the Swiss healthcare system 
2.1.1 Political and organizational structure 
As of 2009, the population of Switzerland consists of 7.8 million people living in a total area 
of 41,000 km2. The native language of two-thirds of the population is German; for 20 percent, 
it is French; and the remaining population speaks Italian and Rhaeto-Romanic or another, 
non-official language, such as Spanish, Portuguese, Turkish, Albanian, or Serbo-Croatian.  
Swiss government is administered at three statutory levels: the central government 
(“Confederation”), the cantons (26 in number), and the municipalities (2,600 in number) 
(FSO 2011b). The 26 Swiss cantons greatly differ in area, number of inhabitants, and 
socioeconomic situation6. With regard to population differences, for example, the cantons 
range from 16,000 inhabitants in Appenzell Innerhoden (AI; see Figure 2) to 1.351 million in 
Zurich (ZH). 
Basically, Switzerland’s healthcare system is organized in accordance with liberal and free-
market principles. The state’s responsibility toward this system primarily rests in its guarantee 
of a political structure in which the actors in the healthcare system operate. However, as in 
other societal domains, such as education, security or defense, the special character of health 
and health care and the imperfections in healthcare service and health insurance markets (see 
Chapter 1) result in more interventions being made by the state.  
Consequently, the Swiss healthcare system is not accurately characterized as operating within 
the “free market.” Instead, this system is better described in terms of “regulated competition” 
(Enthoven 1988). This concept reflects competition between market players wherever such 
competition seems to generate better outcomes than regulation by state authorities. In the 
Swiss healthcare system, competition is particularly relevant for mandatory health insurance 
(MHI) companies and for MHI providers, just as it is for physicians in private practices and 
for acute care hospitals within cantons7 (Hammer, Peter, and Trageser 2008).  
                                                 
6
  Because of the important role played by the Swiss cantons in the country’s healthcare system, their great 
heterogenity is emphasized. 
7
  Without special supplementary insurance, it was impossible to choose hospitalization outside one’s own 
residential canton until 2012. 
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Figure 2: Population sizes and main languages of Swiss cantons
1)
, per 1,000 population 
 
1)
  Aargau (AG), Appenzell Ausserrhoden (AR), Appenzell Innerrhoden (AI), Basel-Stadt (BS), Basel-Land-
schaft (BL), Bern (BE), Fribourg (FR), Geneva (GE), Glarus (GL), Graubünden (GR), Jura (JU), Lucerne 
(LU), Neuchâtel (NE), Nidwalden (NW), Obwalden (OW), Schaffhausen (SH), Schwyz (SZ), Solothurn 
(SO), St. Gallen (SG), Thurgau (TG), Ticino (TI), Uri (UR), Valais (VS), Vaud (VD), Zug (ZG), Zurich 
(ZH). 
Source: (FSO 2011a), personal representation. 
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of health-related state payments to inpatient hospitals and to nursing homes8. 
                                                 
8
  Seventy-nine percent of all direct state payments (by cantons and municipalities—the Confederation does not 
directly subsidize healthcare providers in Switzerland) were cantonal subsidies to inpatient healthcare 
providers (i.e., acute care hospitals and nursing homes). This share ranged from 62 percent (canton ZH) to 92 
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Otherwise, the responsibility for healthcare policy is explicitly ascribed to the Confederation. 
The central government of Switzerland has a legislative function concerning MHI and a 
supervisory function concerning the country’s 81 MHI companies9. Moreover, the 
Confederation is responsible for maintaining the educational standards and training of all 
types of healthcare personnel and is charged with the health protection of the population, the 
surveillance and management of infectious diseases, and the promotion of health sciences and 
health research.  
The most important role adopted by municipalities is to perform the tasks that are handed 
over to them by the cantons. In most cases, these tasks concern the administration and funding 
of providers either for long-term outpatient care (called “Spitex” in Switzerland) or for long-
term inpatient care (i.e., nursing homes). 
This system’s incorporation of regulated competition and a strong federalist structure 
highlights the two main characteristics of the Swiss healthcare system. The system of 
regulated competition in Swiss health care offers fertile ground for political discussion. 
Questions often arise about the optimal delimitation between free-market policies and state 
regulation for the different elements of the healthcare system. One example of such 
discussion is whether MHI insurers should remain obligated to refund services in the MHI 
benefit basket produced by all healthcare providers (i.e., the obligation of contracting).  
A qualitative assessment of the efficiency and effectiveness of such healthcare system ele-
ments might be performed by comparing them with the “ideal” model of regulated 
competition in health care (Enthoven 1988). Such a comparison would require assessing 
technical and productive efficiencies on the level of the individual actor or the individual 
institution as well as on the level of the individual medical good or service (i.e., outcome or 
output with respect to quality). Important reasons for there being only modest progress in 
these tasks are the lack of data, methodological difficulties and opposing political interests. It 
is highly probable that gains in technical and productive efficiencies are possible on these 
individual levels. Inefficiencies are strongly suspected to be related to the following important 
                                                                                                                                                        
percent (cantons SO, GL, SH, and AR), see FSO. 2012f. “Nettofinanzbedarf der Kantone und der Gemeinden 
im Gesundheitswesen.” BFS Aktuell. Neuchâtel: Swiss Federal Statistical Office (FSO).  
9
  In 2009, 81 insurance companies were active in the Swiss MHI (FOPH. 2011a. “Statistik der obligatorischen 
Krankenpflegeversicherung 2009.” Statistiken zur Krankenversicherung. Bern: Swiss Federal Office of 
Public Health (FOPH). 
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system elements in Swiss health care (Meyer 2008): the aforementioned obligation of 
contracting between MHI insurers and service providers, the prohibition of MHI contracts to 
include special insurance models that are effective for longer than one year, the prohibition of 
annual deductibles in MHI being related to the income (or even the wealth) of the insured 
persons10, the prohibition of profit-making for MHI companies, the incomplete risk 
equalization system11 in MHI, the extensive subsidization of hospitals for MHI patients by the 
cantons, and the multiple and sometimes conflicting functions of cantons when operating, 
financing, and supervising inpatient acute care hospitals.  
There also are intense political discussions about the second feature specific to the Swiss 
healthcare system: its strong federalist structure (Achtermann and Berset 2006). A federalist 
healthcare system has the advantage that its decision makers are—with respect to geography 
and common experience—closer to the local population and the local healthcare providers. 
This characteristic increases the probability that the responsible authorities will directly 
consider the expectations and needs of the local inhabitants and providers (Haari et al. 2002). 
In general, this behavior is regarded as an advantage for a culturally and topographically 
heterogeneous country like Switzerland (see Figure 2). This “proximity” is also one of the 
important contributors to the nearly universal satisfaction with the healthcare system 
repeatedly reported in several surveys (Sturny and Camenzind 2011).  
However, the federalist structure leads to greater complexity and reduces the potential for 
good governance in the Swiss healthcare system (OECD/WHO 2006, 2011). The coordination 
of the system as a whole—e.g., achieving consensus about how to concentrate the expensive 
and (from a medical point of view) impractical oversupply of several highly specialized 
medical services, such as organ transplantation, at only few hospitals across the country—is 
more difficult. A certain amount of incoherence, redundancy, and obstruction in healthcare 
regulation, particularly beyond the cantonal level, must be accepted. The first paper presented 
in Part II of this document includes results that better support the idea of smaller healthcare 
areas having lower costs than larger regions. 
                                                 
10
  The prohibition of annual deductibles being related to income or wealth might be more problematic with 
respect to equity issues in financing MHI than to problems of inefficiency. 
11
  The risk equalization system of the Swiss MHI compensates for several dimensions: the canton of residence, 
gender and age group of policyholders. Since 2012, a new element—health status, operationalized as having 
had hospital or nursing home stays of more than 3 days in the previous year—has improved the funtioning of 
the system. 
  
35
2.1.2 Mechanisms of healthcare funding 
From a macroeconomic perspective, the funding of the Swiss healthcare system of CHF 
(Swiss francs) 61.0 billion (as of 2009) falls to households, the state and firms. Within this 
framework, households bear the largest burden of the national healthcare costs at CHF 44.0 
billion (72.1 percent, see Table 1). Households pay premiums for mandatory (MHI) and 
voluntary health insurance (VHI) (CHF 26.8 billion, 43.9 percent)12, raise the co-payments for 
both types of health insurance (CHF 3.4 billion, 5.6 percent), and finance out-of-pocket 
expenses for dental care, long-term care and some other services (CHF 13.8 billion, 22.6 
percent). 
 
Table 1: Funding of Swiss health care from a macroeconomic perspective, 2009, in billions of 
CHF and in percentages of total costs 
Source: (FSO 2012a), calculations by the author. 
 
                                                 
12
  The individual and income-based subsidies of CHF 3.5 billion that help cover MHI premiums are included in 
this number. 
Households 40.5 66.3%
   Health insurance premiums 23.2 38.1%
   Cost-sharing health insurances 3.4 5.6%
   Out-of-pocket and other funds 13.8 22.6%
 State 17.2 28.2%
   Subsidies to providers 10.9 17.8%
   Premium subsidies to households 3.5 5.8%
   Health promotion and prevention, 
   other social security, administration
 Firms 3.3 5.5%
 Total costs 61.0 100.0%
2009 in billion CHF in %  of total costs
2.8 4.6%
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The state (i.e., Confederation, cantons, and municipalities) funded CHF 13.5 billion or 22.1 
percent of the nation’s total healthcare expenditures in 2009. CHF 10.9 billion (17.8 percent) 
were subsidies to healthcare providers (acute care hospitals and nursing homes in particular). 
The other CHF 2.6 billion or 4.3 percent spent by the state were subsidies to other social 
security insurance programs and expenses for health prevention activities, health promotion 
activities and system administration.  
Swiss business firms co-finance the health-related parts of accident insurance (UV), disability 
insurance (IV), and the old-age insurance (AHV). The total contributions of business firms 
amounted to CHF 3.5 billion or 5.7 percent of the total healthcare costs in 2009. This 
relatively small number points to a peculiarity of the Swiss healthcare system in comparison 
to other Western countries. Health insurance coverage in Switzerland is largely unlinked to an 
individual’s occupational status; consequently, business firms finance only a relatively small 
share of healthcare costs. The parties most responsible for Swiss health care are individual 
persons or individual households, which bear more than 70 percent of healthcare costs in the 
forms of premiums, co-payments, and out-of-pocket expenditures. 
The central element in the Swiss healthcare funding system is the program of mandatory 
health insurance (MHI). MHI places at the entire population’s disposal a basic insurance 
package protecting against the financial consequences of illnesses, accidents13, and 
motherhood. Some particular system elements in MHI can be emphasized. One important 
element is the MHI benefit basket, defined as the list14 of all treatments that are uniformly 
remunerated by all MHI insurers. New treatments are only accepted for the MHI benefit 
basket if the federal admission authority considers them to be medically effective, 
appropriate, and cost-effective. The difficulties involved in proving the cost-effectiveness of 
healthcare services and goods have elsewhere been demonstrated in the economic literature 
(Skinner et al. 2009). 
                                                 
13
  For individuals who are employed, accidents are covered via employment. For non-employed individuals 
(e.g., children, professionally inactive adults, retired persons), MHI also covers the costs associated with 
recovery from accidents. 
14
  Insurers are obligated to remunerate for all treatments appearing in the benefit basket; in contrast, they are 
prohibited from remunerating for treatments that are not in the benefit basket. 
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Another important system element of MHI is the fact that the premiums required by insurers 
for defined premium regions15 may, in principal, not vary based on the relative health risks—
i.e., gender, age, or health status—of the insured person16. The premiums of the insurers can 
vary only by three age categories17, by the level of the deductible, and for managed care 
insurance models. With this premium policy, solidarity between men and women, between 
the young and the old, and between healthy and ill persons is targeted in MHI18. 
Nevertheless, it is still possible that significant premium variations exist between different 
MHI insurers within a single premium region because the insurers have to calculate premiums 
with respect to the concrete MHI costs they faced in that region during the previous period. 
Thus, policyholders can optimize their insurance coverage by changing to an MHI insurer 
offering a lower premium in this particular region for the coming year. To maintain 
competition between insurers, MHI companies are obligated by law to accept every request 
for admission of individuals living in the corresponding premium region. Another technique 
by which policyholders can optimize annual expenses for MHI is to sign a contract offering a 
special insurance package with higher deductibles, a bonus system of insurance, or an 
insurance with a restricted choice of healthcare providers.  
                                                 
15
  For every canton, the federal authorities define a maximum of 3 different premium regions. In the following 
cantons (see also Figure 3), there is just one premium region: AG, AI, AR, BS, GE, GL, JU, NE, NW, OW, 
SO, SZ, TG, UR, ZG (FOPH. 2011b. “Prämienregionen in der OKP der Schweiz gültig ab 1.1.2011 bis 
31.12.2011.” Statistiken zur Krankenversicherung. Bern: Federal Office of Public Health (FOPH). 
16
  In reality, insurers have developed strategies for selecting individuals; for the Swiss case, see Dormont, B., 
P.-Y. Geoffard, and K. Lamiraud. 2009. “The influence of supplementary health insurance on switching 
behaviour: evidence from Swiss data.” Health Economics 18(11): 1339-56, Frank, R. and K. Lamiraud. 
2009. “Choice, price competition and complexity in markets for health insurance.” Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization 71(2): 550-62).  
17
  Viz., children up to age 18, young adults aged between 19 and 25, and adults older than 25 years. 
18
  Solidarity is one of the 3 main goals of MHI, in addition to good quality of health care and moderate changes 
in healthcare costs. To the equalization that occurs across genders, ages and health status can be added a 
fourth element: equalization between richer (and, on average, healthier) and poorer people. Because MHI 
premiums are calculated independent of the economic situation of the insured persons, equalization between 
rich and poor people only takes place in the field of expenses paid by the state for health care (except that, if 
wealthier individuals pay MHI premiums and are, in fact, healthier, they make less use of the healthcare 
system and subsidize the care of poorer individuals). These expenses for state subsidies (see Table 2) are 
imposed through progressive income taxes. To quantify the scale of the redistribution of this mechanism, 
extensive incidence analyses are necessary (see Crivelli, L. and P. Salari. 2012. “Fiscal federalism and 
income redistribution through healthcare financing: An empirical analysis for the Swiss cantons.” CEPRA 
working paper. Lugano: Center for Economic and Political Research on Aging, Università della Svizzera 
italiana, Iten, R., A. Vettori, S. Menegale, and J. Trageser. 2009. “Kosten-Wirksamkeit ausgewählter 
Präventionsmassnahmen in der Schweiz - eine gesundheitsökonomische Untersuchung: Schlussbericht.” 
VIPS. Zürich: INFRAS Forschung und Beratung, Müller, A., T. Schoch, and E. Kraft. 2013 (unpublished). 
“Umverteilungseffekte in der obligatorischen Krankenversicherung.” Experten-/Forschungsberichte zur 
Kranken- und Unfallversicherung. BAG. Bern: ECOPLAN Forschung und Beratung in Wirtschaft und 
Politik.). 
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The cost-sharing mechanism in Swiss MHI tries to counter the problems of moral hazard 
(both ex ante and ex post). The first element of cost-sharing is the deductible. The amount of 
this deductible is CHF 300 by default, but it can reach CHF 2,500 in favor of a limited 
premium reduction. Insured persons pay out of pocket for all healthcare goods and services 
consumed within one year and up to the limits given by this deductible. The second element is 
the co-payment. MHI policyholders must bear ten percent of the costs that exceed the 
individual deductible. The maximum amount the insured persons have to pay for co-payment 
is limited per year to CHF 700 for adults and to CHF 350 for children under 18 years. 
One additional important characteristic of MHI is the system of individual premium subsidies. 
In this context, “individual” means that the system aims to specifically reduce MHI premiums 
for individuals with limited economic resources. Cantonal authorities define their own models 
linking income and assets to households’ claims to individual premium subsidies. Fifty-one 
percent (CHF 1.8 billion in 2009) of transferred subsidies devolve from the Confederation 
budget, and 49 percent (CHF 1.7 billion) devolve from the cantonal budgets. In 2009, 2.3 
million persons or 29 percent of the Swiss population received individual MHI premium 
subsidies (FOPH 2011a). The fact that premium subsidies add up to CHF 3.5 billion (see also 
Table 1) means that one out of six Swiss francs for MHI premiums in Switzerland is imposed 
via taxes and five out of six francs are directly paid from private households to MHI 
companies. 
 
 
2.2 Swiss healthcare costs compared to selected OECD-member 
countries 
Figure 3 shows the level of healthcare costs in a selection of thirteen Western European 
OECD-member countries, including Switzerland and two North American OECD-member 
countries, Canada and the US. The level of healthcare expenditures of these fifteen countries 
is expressed as a percentage of the annual gross domestic product (GDP) for each country. 
The US spent by far the highest share of GDP for health care: 17.4 percent. One major 
explanation for such high healthcare costs is that the US has unusually high prices for 
healthcare services compared to other Western countries (Marmor, Oberlander, and Joseph 
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2009). The level of 17.4 percent of GDP for the US is 6 percentage points more than the 
corresponding values for Switzerland and Canada (11.4 percent). Nevertheless, these latter 
two countries still find themselves in the group of most “expensive” countries, together with 
the Netherlands (12.0 percent), France (11.8 percent), Germany (11.6 percent), and Denmark 
(11.5 percent).  
 
Figure 3: Levels of healthcare costs in 15 selected OECD-member countries, 2009, as 
percentages of GDP 
 
Source: (OECD 2011a); as of 7/13/2011, calculations by the author. 
 
The other Western European countries spent 11.0 percent (Austria) or less of their GDP on 
health care in 2009: Finland: 9.2 percent; Italy: 9.5 percent; Spain: 9.5 percent; Norway: 9.6 
percent; the United Kingdom: 9.8 percent; Sweden: 10.0 percent; and Belgium: 10.9 percent. 
This indicator depends on two economic indicators: the absolute value of the countries’ 
expenses for health care and the countries’ economic prosperity, expressed in terms of GDP. 
Switzerland’s somewhat larger growth of GDP over the last few years resulted in “losing” the 
former second position behind the US in the above ranking. 
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The next Figure—Figure 4—which contains the same fifteen countries as Figure 3, shows 
that the average annual growth rate of healthcare expenditures during the last 20 years ranges 
between 7.5 percent (Norway) and 4.5 percent (Italy). Figure 4 also confirms that—compared 
to the other selected countries—Switzerland showed an average growth of its total healthcare 
costs over the last 20 years. The average annual growth of Swiss healthcare expenditures—
calculated in US dollars and adjusted for purchasing power parity—was 5.0 percent, the same 
rate experienced by Canada. Only Italy (4.5 percent), Sweden (4.6 percent), Finland (4.6 
percent), and Germany (4.7 percent) showed smaller average growth rates of healthcare 
expenses over the observed period.  
 
Figure 4: Annual growth rate
1)
 of healthcare costs: 15 selected OECD-member countries, 
1990-2009, in percentages 
 
Source: (OECD 2011a); as of 7/13/2011, calculations by the author. 
1)
 Average annual growth at current prices and adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP) per capita, in %. 
 
These international comparisons prove that neither the level (as shares of GDP) nor the 
growth of total Swiss healthcare costs has been truly exceptional. Instead, the changes 
experienced by Switzerland reflect a phenomenon experienced by all Western countries over 
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the last twenty years and seems to be more-or-less independent of the concrete organizational 
or institutional structure of the country’s healthcare system19. With average annual growth 
rates for healthcare expenditures between 4.5 percent and 7.5 percent over the last two 
decades, almost all of the observed Western countries are approaching or have passed the ten 
percent mark for healthcare’s share of GDP. Topping the mark of 12 percent seems, for most 
of these countries, only a question of time. 
Projections in general and predictions of the future development of healthcare costs in parti-
cular face manifold difficulties. Without further exploring these problems, the results of two 
newer studies for Switzerland (Colombier 2012; Vuilleumier, Pellegrini, and Jeanrenaud 
2007) are cited. The earlier of the two studies (Vuilleumier et al. 2007) offers estimates of 
total Swiss healthcare expenditures from 2004 to 2030. In one scenario, assuming a certain 
improvement in health status development because of medical progress and a healthier 
lifestyle in the population, Swiss healthcare costs are expected to go up from 11.420 percent to 
15.4 percent (an increase of 4.0 percentage points) of the GDP by 2030. In the other scenario, 
where an aging population21 leads to an increase in the average morbidity, healthcare costs 
could rise to a share of 16.7 percent of the GDP by 2030—an increase of 5.3 percentage 
points. 
The study by Colombier (2012) covers an even longer time period: from 2009 to 2060. The 
share of GDP, starting at 11.3 percent in 200922, is anticipated to increase to 15.8 percent (plus 
4.5 percentage points) by 2060 in the reference scenario. Seven additional variants to the 
reference scenario are estimated. The seven alternative scenarios vary in their assumptions 
concerning the future morbidity of the population, future developments in the labor market 
for healthcare personnel, future developments and consequences of international migration, 
                                                 
19
  The OECD proposes 6 groups of countries sharing broadly similar institutions: 1. Gemany, Netherlands, 
Switzerland; 2. Belgium, Canada, France; 3. Austria; 4. Sweden; 5. Denmark, Finland, Spain; 6. Italy, Nor-
way, the United Kingdom. Not grouped in the OECD-paper was the United States of America (see OECD. 
2010. “Health care systems: Getting more value for money.” OECD Economics Department Policy Notes. 
pp. 1-11. Paris.) 
20
  The revised statistics of the FSO indicate a 10.2 percent share of GDP in 2007, 10.3 percent in 2008, 11.0 
percent in 2009, and 10.9 percent in 2010 (FSO. 2013b. “Kosten und Finanzierung des Gesundheitswesens 
(provisorisch) 2011.” BFS Aktuell. Neuchâtel: Swiss Federal Statistical Office (FSO).) 
21
  The two important causes for the aging population observed in Western societies are the following. First, a 
population becomes older if its life expectancy increases. Second, aging of the population results from large 
age cohorts (e.g., the “baby boomer generation”) becoming older and being followed by smaller cohorts of 
young people (i.e., a shrinking society in the long run). 
22
  See footnote 20. 
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and political developments concerning the future relationships to the European Union. 
Without going into the study’s details, the study contains no scenario projecting a share of 
healthcare costs as a proportion of GDP less than 13.8 percent (plus 2.6 percentage points) or 
more than 17.1 percent (plus 5.9 percentage points). Compared to (Vuilleumier et al. 2007), 
the work of (Colombier 2012) uses clearly more optimistic assumptions. Even in the most 
pessimistic scenario (17.1 percent in 2060), the projection for 2030 is 13.5 percent, 3 
percentage points less than in Vuilleumier and colleagues’ work (Vuilleumier et al. 2007). 
 
 
2.3 Sectional and regional structures of Swiss healthcare costs 
2.3.1 The sectional structure of healthcare costs in Switzerland 
Table 2: The costs and financing of health care by service providers and direct payers, 2009, 
in billions of CHF 
Source: (FSO 2012a), calculations by the author. 
 
Table 2 presents the costs financed by direct payers cross-referenced against the costs 
connected to various service providers for health care in Switzerland in 2009. Concerning 
direct payers, CHF 36.7 billion or 60.2 percent of the total of CHF 61.0 billion accounted for 
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“socialized” healthcare costs (Crivelli et al. 2008): in other words, the costs funded by 
mandatory health insurance (MHI, CHF 21.4 billion, 35.1 percent), by state subsidies to 
healthcare providers (CHF 11.8 billion, 19.4 percent)23, and by other social insurance 
programs (without MHI, CHF 3.5 billion, 5.8 percent)24. The other CHF 24.3 billion or 39.8 
percent were “free market” expenditures of private households (CHF 18.9 billion, 31.0 
percent) and of private health insurers (CHF 5.4 billion, 8.8 percent). 
Concerning healthcare service providers, outpatient care (excluding outpatient hospitals) was 
responsible for CHF 18.6 billion or 30.5 percent of the total healthcare costs. Inpatient and 
outpatient hospitals accounted for CHF 21.7 billion or 35.6 percent of all healthcare 
expenditures, whereas nursing homes accounted for CHF 10.5 billion or 17.2 percent and 
retail trade (in drugs and medical aids) accounted for CHF 5.5 billion or 9.0 percent of the 
total health costs. The remaining expenditures were administrative costs and expenditures for 
prevention and health promotion by the state (CHF 1.4 billion, 2.4 percent) and administrative 
costs of the social and private health insurance companies (CHF 2.6 billion, 4.3 percent). 
The cross-tabulation of direct payers and health service providers in Table 2 allows a few 
more features of the Swiss healthcare system to be highlighted. The importance of the 
aforementioned cantonal subsidies to inpatient hospitals (CHF 7.8 billion) becomes obvious. 
Compared to that figure, the subsidies paid for long-term inpatient care (i.e., nursing homes) 
appear modest. The municipalities finance a large share of these CHF 2.1 billion nursing 
home subsidies. 
MHI is most important as direct payer for inpatient and outpatient hospital healthcare services 
(CHF 8.2 billion) and outpatient healthcare services (CHF 7.4 billion, here without outpatient 
hospitals). A large part of the latter is spent on general practitioners and specialists in private 
practices. Retail trade, totaling CHF 3.0 billion, accounts for a relatively smaller share of 
costs associated with Swiss MHI; the same is true for nursing homes, with “only” CHF 1.6 
billion financed by MHI. State subsidies (CHF 2.1 billion) and out-of-pocket funding by 
private households (CHF 6.7 billion) are more important for this service than is MHI. The 
                                                 
23
  This number includes CHF 0.9 billion in adminstration costs for the state. However, the state subsidies 
concerning the individual premium subsidy scheme for MHI (3.4 billion CHF, 2009) are not visible in this 
CHF 11.8 billion. The latter are direct payments of the state to healthcare providers.  
24
  These are the health-related parts of accident insurance (UVG), disability insurance (IV), old-age insurance 
(AHV) and military insurance (MV).  
  
44
CHF 6.7 billion spent by private households represents the lion’s share of long-term inpatient 
care in Switzerland—the costs for accommodation and assistance in nursing homes—that are 
not covered by the social health insurance system (see Chapter 5).  
Notable among the figures for private households are the high out-of-pocket expenditures for 
outpatient care (CHF 7.4 billion). This large number is the result of dental care not being 
covered by MHI or other social insurance in Switzerland. Almost half of this CHF 7.4 
billion—approximately CHF 3.2 billion (Weber 2010)—is spent for dental care services. The 
other half of these out-of-pocket expenditures goes to outpatient providers producing services 
that are not included in the MHI benefit basket. One example of this is psychotherapy from 
non-medical professionals (i.e., psychologists). Such psychotherapy is only covered when 
administered by a qualified specialist (i.e., a qualified general practitioner or psychiatrist) and 
performed in the practice rooms of the prescribing specialist (i.e., “delegated” 
psychotherapy). If these services also are not covered by private insurance, they must be paid 
out of pocket by the patients. 
 
2.3.2 The regional structure of healthcare costs in Switzerland 
The per capita calculations illustrated in Figure 5 show the sum of cantonal expenditures for 
MHI, state subsidies to providers, and estimations for private households’ out-of-pocket 
expenses. These three sources cover more than 85 percent of all Swiss healthcare costs (MHI: 
35.1 percent; state subsidies: 19.4 percent; out-of-pocket expenses: 31.0 percent; see Table 2). 
No cantonal data are actually available with respect to health-related social insurance 
expenditures aside from MHI25 (5.8 percent) and expenses related to voluntary private health 
insurance (8.8 percent). 
 
  
                                                 
25
  These are the health-related parts of accident insurance (UVG), disability insurance (IV), old-age insurance 
(AHV) and military insurance (MV).  
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Figure 5: MHI costs, state subsidies, and out-of-pocket expenditures per capita, by canton, 
2007, in CHF 
 
Sources: (EFV 2011a; santésuisse 2011a; Stadelmann 2011); calculations by the author; for detailed data: 
Appendix, Part I, Table 4. 
 
According to Figure 5, approximately CHF 5,200 was spent per capita in 2007 for the three 
categories of healthcare expenditures in Switzerland (CH). Adding 15 percent for the other 
social insurance (beside MHI) and the voluntary private health insurance, this value rises to 
CHF 6,000 per capita annually26. The canton with the highest dependitures is Geneva (GE, 
CHF 7,500); this is approximately two and half times as much per capita as in the cheapest 
canton, Appenzell Innerrhoden (AI, CHF 3,200). Basel-Stadt (BS) stands out, with costs of 
CHF 6,900, which is CHF 1,300 more than the cantons of Vaud (VD), Bern (BE), and Ticino 
(TI), with CHF 5,600 each. 
It must be mentioned that all cantonal comparisons are based on nominal spending for 
healthcare goods and services. Therefore, they do not take into account the cantonal or 
                                                 
26
  CHF 6,000 per capita annually, multiplied by 7.6 million inhabitants, results in CHF 45 billion of healthcare 
costs, whereas the official number provided for total healthcare costs in 2007 is CHF 55 billion. This diffe-
rence of CHF 10 billion stems mainly from underestimating the average out-of-pocket expenses incurred by 
private households (approximately CHF 9 billion in Figure 5). Otherwise, the effective average total 
healthcare costs per Swiss inhabitant shown in Figure 5 would be approximately CHF 7,200. 
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regional differences in price levels or in costs of living. Unfortunately, no official statistics 
are available in Switzerland for such average cantonal price levels or average cantonal costs 
of living27. To approximate the magnitude of these differences between cantons, one could 
compare the regional level of salaries paid in the healthcare branch. The average value of this 
indicator for Switzerland in 2010 is CHF 5,958 (FSO 2013a) and varies between CHF 5,590 
(-6.2 percent less than the national average) for the greater region (and canton) of TI and CHF 
6,294 (+5.6 percent) for the greater region (and canton) of ZH28.  
 
Figure 6: Mandatory health insurance costs and state subsidies for providers per capita, by 
canton, 2007, in CHF 
 
Source: (EFV 2011a; santésuisse 2011a), calculations by the author; for detailed data: Appendix, Part I, Table 4. 
 
Figure 6 plots the correlation of per capita cantonal MHI expenditures with per capita state 
subsidies. Calculating a simple correlation coefficient results in a high coefficient of 0.83 for 
cantonal MHI expenditures and state subsidies. This result is to be expected: the largest 
portions of state subsidies are contributions by cantons to inpatient hospital care services 
                                                 
27
  Three cantons (BS, GE, and ZH) regularly publish general price level indices for their geographical areas.  
28
  The corresponding values for the other 5 greater regions are as follows: Lake Geneva area: CHF 5,993 (+0.6 
percent); Espace Mittelland: CHF 5,884 (-1.2 percent); Northwestern Switzerland: CHF 5,990 (+0.5 percent); 
Eastern Switzerland: CHF 5,816 (-2.4 percent); Central Switzerland: CHF 5,786 (-2.9 percent). 
AI
OWGLURNW
TG
AG
JUAR
LUSZ
S
VS FRGR
SH
SO
ZH BL
CH
ZG
NE
TI
BE
VD
BS
GE
0
500
1'000
1'500
2'000
2'500
1'500 2'000 2'500 3'000 3'500 4'000
S
ta
te
 s
u
b
s
id
ie
s
 f
o
r 
p
ro
v
id
e
rs
 (
2
0
0
7
, i
n
 C
H
F
)
Mandatory health insurance (2007, in CHF)
  
47
included in the MHI benefit basket. Thus, if MHI expenditures for this type of treatment are 
high, the complementary expenditures of the state have to follow. 
 
Figure 7: Index of cantonal resources, 2011, and annual out-of-pocket expenditures per 
capita, by canton, 2006, in CHF 
Source: (EFV 2011b; Stadelmann 2011), calculations by the author; for detailed data: Appendix, Part I, Table 4. 
 
The out-of-pocket expenditures are mostly spent on services that are not contained in the MHI 
benefit basket. Such expenses depend on individual households’ resources (after paying MHI 
premiums, taxes, and other costs of living) and preferences. One can examine this hypothesis 
by calculating a correlation with a coefficient expressing the financial power of the cantons 
(e.g., the index of cantonal resources29) (EFV 2011b). The resulting correlation index, 0.52, as 
well as the graphical representation in Figure 7, confirm this hypothesis. 
 
                                                 
29
  The index of cantonal resources is made up of the taxable income and assets of natural persons and the 
taxable profits of legal entities. If the cantonal per capita value is compared with the corresponding Swiss 
average, the result is the resource index. It would make more sense to compare out-of-pocket expenditures 
with average houshold income per canton. Unfortunately, only cantonal GDP numbers including the 
revenues from private companies are published in the official Swiss statistics.  
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The expenses for MHI-covered services have been a focus of the political discussions on 
healthcare costs in Switzerland. This focus is not surprising, because the entire population is 
concerned about MHI. If not paid by premium subsidies, rising MHI costs are directly 
transmitted to private households in the form of higher MHI premiums. The cantonal 
differences of MHI costs are presented in more detail. 
 
Figure 8: MHI costs per capita by domains of service providers and cantons, 2007, in CHF 
 
Source: (santésuisse 2011a),  calculations by the author; for detailed data, see Appendix. Part I, Table 5. 
 
Figure 8 shows 2007 MHI costs per capita for the cantonal populations. The national average 
(CH) amounts to CHF 2,900 (see also Figure 5). Four categories30 of outpatient health care—
physicians in private practice (18 percent), drugs (23 percent), other outpatient care (Spitex, 
physiotherapy, etc., 10 percent), and outpatient hospitals (16 percent)—account for two-thirds 
                                                 
30
  Datenpool santésuisse (santésuisse. 2011a. “Datenpool santésuisse: Daten zu Kosten und Inanspruchnahme 
in der obligatorischen Krankenpflegeversicherung OKP.” Solothurn: SASIS AG.) allows the distinction of up 
to 8 domains of different outpatient services (e.g., general practitioners, specialists, psychiatrists, drugs sold 
by private practitioners, drugs sold by pharmacies, outpatient long-term care, other outpatient care, outpatient 
hospitals) and up to 8 domains of different inpatient service providers (central general hospitals, regional 
general hospitals, psychiatric clinics, rehabilitation clinics, other hospitals, specialized hospitals, nursing 
homes for elderly and chronically ill, nursing homes for handicapped and others).  
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(67 percent) of MHI costs on average. One-third (33 percent) are inpatient acute care (24 
percent) or long-term inpatient care costs (9 percent).  
In addition, Figure 8 shows the cantonal differences of total MHI costs and of the six 
individual domains of service providers. The most expensive canton BS had MHI costs of 
CHF 3,800 per cantonal inhabitant in 2007, whereas in the cheapest canton, Appenzell 
Innerrhoden (AI), these costs amounted to CHF 1,900.31  
 
Figure 9: Average annual changes in outpatient, inpatient, and total MHI costs per capita, by 
canton, 2000-2007, in percent 
 
Source: (santésuisse 2011a), calculations by the author; for detailed data: Appendix, Part I, Table 6. 
 
The levels of cantonal MHI healthcare costs differ significantly; the changes of these costs 
over time also are not at all uniform. Figure 9 shows the average annual changes in inpatient, 
outpatient, and total MHI healthcare costs per capita for cantonal inhabitants between 2000 
and 2007. The national average (CH) shows 4 percent growth for the three selected indicators. 
                                                 
31
  Another possibility for a graphical analysis of the cantonal MHI cost differences concerning expenditures for 
different service provider domains is shown in Appendix, Part I, Figure 10. 
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For individual cantons, the annual rise of total MHI costs per capita is between 2 percent in 
the canton Neuchâtel (NE) and more than 5 percent in the cantons of Zug (ZG), Solothurn 
(SO), Bern (BE), Schwyz (SZ), and Uri (UR). In all these cantons, faster growing inpatient 
healthcare costs of 6 percent up to 8 percent—together with an average growth of outpatient 
care at 4 percent—were responsible for this high increase in total MHI costs.  
Figure 9 also identifies cantons with reversal tendency. In NE, VD, GE, or Jura (JU) the 
annual increase of inpatient healthcare costs was rather modest at 1 percent up to 2 percent. 
Outpatient healthcare costs grew somewhat faster, with increases of 3 percent up to 4 percent 
being observed in these cantons. The result was an increase in total MHI costs of 2 percent up 
to 3 percent for NE, VD, GE, or JU in the last decade.  
For the interpretation of these results, a technical element known as the base effect32 and real 
events in cantonal healthcare sectors should be distinguished. A base effect likely occurred 
for the inpatient healthcare costs of the above-mentioned four cantons with modest percentage 
increases in total MHI costs (viz., NE, VD, GE, JU). The costs for inpatient health care per 
capita in these four cantons had been among the highest in 2000, whereas the absolute 
increases of inpatient healthcare costs between 2000 and 2007 were relatively small. The 
same, but with a reverse sign, was true for the cantons with the largest relative increases per 
capita of total MHI costs (viz., ZG, SO, BE, SZ, UR). These five cantons had low inpatient 
healthcare costs per capita in 2000 but faced relatively large absolute inpatient healthcare cost 
increases between 2000 and 2007. 
For outpatient healthcare costs, the situation was somewhat different. Again, the costs for 
outpatient healthcare per inhabitant in 2000 were among the highest for the four cantons with 
relatively large increases of total MHI costs (NE, VD, GE, JU). Only two of these cantons, JU 
and NE, enjoyed even modest increases in absolute numbers of per capita outpatient 
healthcare costs. Conversely, the two cantons of VD and GE experienced quite large absolute 
increases in outpatient healthcare costs per capita between 2000 and 2007. So here, a base 
effect seems most likely to be responsible for the modest increases (i.e., less than in the 
national average) of outpatient healthcare costs for VD and GE. 
                                                 
32
  The fact that a relative growth rate does not only depend on the development of a certain indicator, but also 
on the level of the starting point of this indicator, is called “base effect”. 
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Moreover, outpatient healthcare costs had been rather modest in 2000 in all cantons with 
large increases of total MHI costs per capita (ZG, SO, BE, SZ, UR). However, only for one 
canton (SO) was the absolute increase in outpatient costs relatively large (i.e., no important 
base effect). In the other four cantons (UR, ZG, BE, SZ), the absolute increase in outpatient 
healthcare costs was less than the national average. In other words, one part of the relatively 
large rise in their outpatient healthcare costs is due to the base effect.  
If the base effect is not important, real events in the cantons’ healthcare sectors are 
responsible for particular changes in average cantonal costs. Further investigations could 
reveal whether cost differences between cantons were accentuated or reduced in the last 
decade. And if, indeed, reductions in cantonal MHI cost differences could be observed—this 
is actually the case in Switzerland—it poses a question about the reasons for this trend: why 
did the healthcare costs in formerly “cheap” cantons grow more quickly than in formerly 
“expensive” cantons? Was there an undersupply in formerly “cheap” cantons that is about to 
be compensated? Or, was there an oversupply in the formerly “expensive” cantons that is 
about to be reduced? Were there actually (more) cost containment programs initiated in 
formerly “expensive” cantons? What types of programs were these, and did they start to have 
effects on the costs? Politicians and citizens expect answers to these questions from health 
economists and statisticians. To do so, one must rely on a sufficient base of statistical data. 
The following discusses the concrete health data situation in Switzerland. 
 
 
2.4 Switzerland’s health data situation 
A large variety of health- and healthcare-related statistical data sources exist in Switzerland. 
A comprehensive overview of sources offering data on the national level has been made 
available in a publication of the Swiss Health Observatory (Roth and Schmidt 2010b). The 
assessment of the national healthcare information system provided by this publication 
parallels the model showing the factors influencing Switzerland’s regional differences in 
healthcare costs in Figure 1. In this model, a distinction is made between the three main 
components of a healthcare system: the demand-side (i.e., the resident population and 
patients), the supply-side (healthcare production system), and the financing-side (healthcare 
funding system). 
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The Swiss Population Census (SPC) can be used to describe the demand-side (population and 
patients) component (FSO 2011h). The SPC collects various types of socioeconomic data 
about every inhabitant of the country. Performed every ten years, the SPC was last taken in 
2010. Based on the SPC, annually actualized statistics are available about the population on 
the municipality level, including annual variations in areas such as births, immigrations, 
emigrations, and deaths (FSO 2011b). The SPC can also be linked to the Cause of Death 
Statistics (CDS), (FSO 2011e)33. By combining these two sources at the level of the 
individual, the Swiss National Cohort (SNC) database was created (SNSF 2011). There are 
cantonal cancer registries covering the populations of 22 cantons and approximately 68 
percent of the total population (Bouchardy et al. 2011). The ability of these cancer registries 
to interpret the observed variations in prevalence across time and geographical areas is said to 
be limited. 
Aside from these cancer registries, epidemiological data in Switzerland is rather scarce34. 
Most additional information is collected in the Swiss Health Survey (SHS) (FSO 2011f). The 
SHS is administered every five years; the next wave will commence in 2017. Because the 
information collected in this survey is self-reported, only a few, rather uncomplicated clinical 
syndromes can be compiled. Another problem with the SHS is its sample size: with 
approximately 19,000 interviewees, it actually is too small for use in calculating significant 
indicators for most variables within a geospatial dimension (i.e., cantons or smaller regions). 
A third problem is the SHS’s complete exclusion of people in nursing homes or hospitals, 
which was corrected in 2008 and 2009 by establishing an additional survey (FSO 2011g) for 
this part of the population. 
In addition to the SHS, two other important panel data sources can be mentioned: the Swiss 
Household Panel (SHP) (FORS 2013) and the Survey of Health, Aging and Retirement in 
Europe (SHARE) (IEMS 2013). The SHP is a yearly panel study (administered since 1999) 
that has longitudinally followed a random sample of households in Switzerland. It covers a 
broad range of topics in the social sciences by including questions about the health status, 
health-relevant behaviors and health utilization of the interviewees. The SHP is operated by 
                                                 
33
  The Cause of Death Statistics is a comprehensive survey based on data from civil registries and death certifi-
cates issued by medical doctors. It contains the causes of death (ICD-10) by age, sex, civil status, occupation, 
municipality of residence and nationality. 
34
  There are also some reproductive statistics and newborn health data (e.g., prematurity, weight at birth, 
multiple births, infant mortality and prenatal mortality) collected by the FSO. 
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the Swiss Centre of Expertise in the Social Sciences (FORS). The other panel data source, 
SHARE, is a multidisciplinary and cross-national panel database of micro data on the health, 
socioeconomic status and social and family networks of more than 85,000 individuals from 
19 European countries (including Switzerland and Israel) aged 50 or over. It is designed to be 
consistent with the U.S. Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and the English Longitudinal 
Study of Aging (ELSA). The responsibility for the Swiss part of the survey falls upon the 
Institute of Health Economics and Management (IEMS) of the University of Lausanne. 
With respect to the second component of the healthcare system, the supply-side or healthcare 
production system, data collection for inpatient and outpatient service providers is 
differentiable in Switzerland. Since 1998, the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (FSO) has 
provided exhaustive data from inpatient acute care hospitals (FSO 2011c) and from inpatient 
nursing homes and homes for handicapped persons (FSO 2011d). Although the data on 
nursing homes (see Chapter 5) and homes for the handicapped are much more institution-
oriented,35 the statistics on acute hospital care (see Chapter 6) are institution-oriented and 
patient-oriented at the same time. This latter combination means that, for every inpatient 
hospital case, the socio-demographic information about the patient, his diagnoses, and his 
treatments are collected. Not available in these exhaustive statistics are the individual costs of 
an inpatient case. For this purpose, the FSO provides the statistics of diagnosis-related costs 
of hospital cases, produced with the cases of a sample of 40 voluntarily participating acute 
care hospitals in Switzerland (FSO 2011k). 
Concerning outpatient providers, the information system is still much less developed. There 
exist institution-oriented statistics on long-term and post-acute outpatient care (Spitex) (FSO 
2011l). However, there remains a complete lack of access to national data on diagnoses, 
treatments, and outcomes for patients in private medical practices and in outpatient hospitals. 
Attempts to improve this situation are underway at the Federal Statistical Office, but political, 
financial, and structural difficulties have thus far made these attempts ineffective.  
The financing-side of the healthcare system is statistically more developed, in particular for 
the MHI-funded services. There are at least four data sources to be mentioned in the MHI 
sector, of which the individual invoices of the health service providers are always the starting 
                                                 
35
  Since 2006, the statistics of socio-medical institutions (SOMED) also have provided some individual 
information available on residents and personnel in nursing homes (see Chapter 5). 
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point. These invoices covered by the MHI are sent to health insurance companies by the 
health service provider or by the patient36. The MHI companies aggregate the information on 
the invoices into groups of patients differentiated by age, gender, and residence 
(municipality); then, it is sent to santésuisse, the Swiss association of health insurers. There, 
the “Datenpool santésuisse” (DPS, see Section 4.3) (santésuisse 2011a) is produced, which 
organizes MHI costs by groups of patients and by canton and service provider. The DPS also 
details the quantities of MHI services delivered (see Chapter 4), including the numbers of 
consultations in medical practices and outpatient hospitals and numbers of days spent in 
hospitals and nursing homes. 
Outpatient treatment in Switzerland is regulated by a nationwide scheme of tariffs, called 
TARMED. This information is collected the same way as the DPS statistics. The corre-
sponding database is called the Tarifpool santésuisse (TPS) (santésuisse 2011b). TPS can be 
used in investigations of quantity structures in outpatient care covered by the MHI. The third 
data source in the MHI sector is very similar to the TPS and is called Datenpool Newindex 
(DPN) (Newindex 2011). The main difference is that independent medical practitioners 
(hospitals do not participate in the DPN) input their TARMED information via so-called 
“Trust Centers” and create their own statistical dataset. The DPN contains the invoices of all 
services delivered by the medical practices regardless of whether they are covered by health 
insurance. The fourth data source (Statistik der obligatorischen Krankenpflegeversicherung) 
is similar to the DPS, but aggregated information alone is transferred from the insurance 
companies to the Federal Office of Public Health (FOPH). The FOPH uses this information 
for its surveillance of the MHI companies and produces a database and statistical outputs 
(FOPH 2011a). 
These four MHI databases allow a good overview of the cost and quantity structures in the 
areas of Swiss health care financed by the MHI. Their greatest disadvantage is that they are 
only available in aggregated form and do not contain information about diagnoses, treatments, 
or outcomes. Moreover, the services covered by the MHI include only 35 percent of all 
healthcare costs in Switzerland (see Table 2). For healthcare services funded by the other 
                                                 
36
  If the patient does not transfer the invoice to the insurer (e.g., because of a high deductible), the information 
is lost from the statistics. 
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sources—viz., out-of-pocket expenditures, state subsidies, and private health insurers—no 
convincing cantonal or regional statistics are available. 
In summary, the Swiss health data situation can be described as “average.” The strengths of 
the statistical information system lie in the data that cover inpatient healthcare provision— 
acute care hospitals in particular and nursing homes to a somewhat smaller degree. Regarding 
healthcare funding, there is rather detailed (albeit aggregated) cost and service structure 
information accessible for the health sector funded by MHI; only the insurance companies 
compile individual MHI data at present. On the demand side of the healthcare system, the best 
data sources are the Swiss Population Census, the Cause of Death Statistics, the Swiss 
National Cohort, the Swiss Household Panel, the Survey of Health, Aging and Retirement in 
Europe, and the Swiss Health Survey. Limited sample sizes and limited regional validity is 
always an issue in the three surveys last-mentioned. 
The most important weaknesses of the information system last in the sector of outpatient 
healthcare provision. The lack of individual-level and diagnosis-related information on the 
financing side of health care provided by MHI must be stressed. Missing as well are useful 
regional data for all other payers, such as private households, the state, and private health 
insurance. Finally, epidemiological data on the demand side is excellent for the measurement 
of mortality (FSO 2011e), but insufficient for morbidity (Bouchardy et al. 2011; FSO 2011f, 
2011g). In an aging society with growing prevalence of chronic disease, this lack of morbidity 
statistics will become especially significant in the near future. 
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3 Findings from an international empirical literature 
review 
3.1 Methodology 
The presentation of the empirical literature about regional cost differences in Chapter 3 is 
mostly based on a comprehensive literature review published in 2008 (Camenzind 2008). The 
following research questions were adressed in this literature review.  
• Are there recognized theoretical and empirical models for the explanation of differences in 
regional healthcare cost and regional health service utilization? 
• Are there possibilities for integrating concrete—national or regional—health system 
elements into such models? 
• Are there proven effects on regional cost and utilization differences? Are there changes in 
such effects over time? 
• Is there an optimal level of functional aggregation of healthcare costs? 
• Do the same effects cause differences in levels and differences in trends of healthcare 
costs? 
• How does the current state of statistical data in Switzerland compare to those of other 
Western countries? 
• Is there an optimal geographical level of analysis? What are the interrelations of the spatial 
dimension with data and methods? 
• What are the methodological approaches for empirical models applied to Switzerland? 
Based on these research questions, search indices were defined37 to detect the relevant 
publications in the following electronic libraries: Econlit, the Cochrane Database of Syste-
matic Reviews, Medline, HSTAT, RePEc, and the Internet (Google Scholar). The concrete 
work of the literature review was completed in the spring and summer of 2007.  
                                                 
37
  See Camenzind, P. A. 2008. “Erklärungsansätze regionaler Kostenunterschiede im Gesundheitswesen.” 
Arbeitsdokument 30. Obsan. Neuchâtel: Swiss Health Observatory. S. 24 f: cantonal, cross-national, cross-
provincial, cross-state, disparities, expenditures-on-health-(care), federalism, federal-state, (multi-level)-go-
vernance, (national)-government-expenditures-and-health, health-care, health-care-expenditure(s), (analysis-
of)-health-care-markets, health-care-services, health-care-utilization, health-costs, health-economics, health-
expenditures, health-government-policy, health-income-growth, health-inequalities-decomposition, health-
insurance, health-policy, inequality, panel-data, provincial, (cross)-regional, state-and-local-government-
(health), regional-policy, state-and-local, Switzerland, Swiss. 
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This methodology pulled several hundred articles that were subsequently reduced to 
approximately 300 papers by reading the abstracts. The 300 selected papers were classified 
into three groups of approximately 100 papers each with respect to their potential to answer 
the research questions. The 100 studies with the greatest estimated potential were studied in 
full text and documented in a scheme representing the research questions (Camenzind 2008). 
Since the beginning of this formal research in 2007, the scientific literature has been 
continuously observed, and repeated Internet searches were executed. 
 
 
3.2 Theoretical findings 
The results of the myriad trials to create theories or theoretical models to describe precisely 
how healthcare costs come into existence are not really satisfying. A comprehensive review 
from 1965 to 1998 by Gerdtham and Jönsson (2000) reveals this theoretical basis problem; 
this is even more convincingly revealed in the work of Martin et al. (2011) for the period 
from 1998 to 2007. Both sets of authors agree that healthcare systems are too complex38 to 
develop complete or satisfactory theoretical models. 
A recent article in the 2012 edition of the Handbook of Health Economics (Skinner 2012) is 
more optimistic and offers an additional promising step: it discusses the causes and 
consequences of regional variations in health care systematically on the basis of the 
theoretical economic model. Mathematical formulations regarding the demand and supply 
sides of the healthcare system are given39, and a typology of three categories of healthcare 
services is presented40. 
                                                 
38
  See Chapter 1 of the document. 
39
  For a complete derivation of the model, see Chandra, A. and J. Skinner. 2012. “Technology Growth and 
Expenditure Growth in Health Care.” Journal of Economic Literature 50(3): 645–80.) 
40
  The first of the 3 categories consists of highly effective treatments, such as antibiotics for infections and beta 
blockers for heart attack patients. The second category exhibits considerable heterogeneity in benefits across 
different types of patients. An example here is back surgery, which may be very effective for one diagnosis 
(e.g., spinal stenosis) but for which much less may be known about its value for other patients (e.g., those 
without any organic cause for the back pain). The third category consists of treatments that are little or poorly 
supported by the evidence. Arthroscopy of the knee is one such example cited in the aricle by Skinner 
(2012). 
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The demand-side formulation of the model is a simplified two-period model of consumption 
and leisure in which perceived quality of life is influenced (solely, as there are no “health 
stocks”) by medical spending. The utility of the individual is maximized subject to a budget 
constraint. The author derives a function of individual demand for an extra quality-adjusted 
year of survival, which can vary across regions for the following reasons: income, risk 
aversion, and time preferences of the individuals. 
For the supply side of the model, it is assumed that healthcare providers maximize the value 
of their patients’ health subject to their own financial considerations (i.e., income), resource 
capacity, ethical judgments, and patient demand (expressed in the demand-side function 
described above). The combination of constraints (viz., income, resource capacity, and ethics) 
is summarized by a “shadow price”41. Using this formulation, the model is able to describe 
regional variations in costs and utilization of healthcare services through two distinct classes 
of such variations across regions.  
First, if all healthcare providers are subject to the same production function, regional 
variations in the utilization of healthcare services occur because of variations in the shadow 
price (i.e., in the combination of the different constraints). This outcome can be caused by 
variations in marginal financial incentives arising from differences in reimbursement rates 
and prices for services across regions and varying sensitivities of providers to such financial 
incentives. It can also be caused by variations in capacity (e.g., regional density of providers) 
or ethical constraints, by patient price or access (e.g., insurance coverage and distance to 
providers), and by malpractice risks. Second, the production function is allowed to differ 
across regions and providers; this occurs because of regional differences in the health status 
of the population or higher productivity, better skills, different approaches to treatments, or 
systematically different organizational structures of the providers. 
The model (Chandra and Skinner 2012; Skinner 2012) seems to offer a good starting point for 
a more systematic analysis of geographic variations in healthcare costs and utilization. 
However, as with all other studies of international or intra-national healthcare cost and 
utilization differences, the simplified model of Skinner (2012) still faces the difficulty that 
only a limited set of features of the healthcare system and its influencing factors can be 
                                                 
41
  For example, if financial incentives for the physician to do more are offset by ethical standards to do no harm 
to the patient, the shadow price is zero. 
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modeled. Nevertheless, if the model can be further developed, it might help researchers to be 
less obliged to rely on their intuitions and their professional and personal experiences 
(Gerdtham and Jönsson 2000). 
 
 
3.3 Empirical findings 
In international comparisons42, a nation’s aggregate income seems to be the most important 
factor in explaining variations in healthcare expenditures (Gerdtham and Jönsson 2000). Not 
definitively answered is whether the estimated income elasticity is smaller or larger than 
unity. Thus, it is still an open question—albeit of more academic than concrete political 
interest—whether health care shares some of the features of a luxury good.  
Moreover, in many of these international studies, aging populations, technical progress and 
territorial centralization have been found to be the main drivers of healthcare expenditures. 
Those findings notwithstanding, the empirical evidence for some of these factors is still “not 
too solid” (Martin Martin et al. 2011). The same can also be said for variables such as higher 
densities of general practitioners (GPs) and specialists in private practice or the existence of 
more beds per capita in acute care hospitals.  
Researchers have found some evidence for the cost-containing effects of organizational 
reforms of healthcare systems. One such element is the regulation of access and the 
organization of the “patient walks” through the healthcare system by GPs, also called 
gatekeeping43 or case management44. Other elements refer to the financing of health care by 
diagnoses’ specific global budgets or flat rates (capitation45). The discussion about the general 
funding of the healthcare system is still controversial. To present, Buchanan’s (1965) or Leu’s 
                                                 
42
  These results are mostly obtained by cross-sectional regression methods or by combined cross section-time 
series (i.e., panel econometric) approaches. 
43
  Gatekeeping is understood here as the specific coordination of healthcare provision by a specially qualified 
medical doctor (usually, a GP). In the cases of illness or accident (not in emergencies), this GP 
(“gatekeeper”) is always the first point of contact for the patient in the healthcare system, and the gatekeeper 
guides the patient along the medical supply chain. 
44
  Case management stresses the coordination function and guidance of the patient in the healthcare system. 
Compared to gatekeeping, the case manager is normally not the first point of contact and not a medical 
doctor (it is often a collaborator supplied, in the case of Switzerland, by an insurance company or an HMO). 
45
  See footnote 5. 
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(1986) hypothesis of a higher share of public funding leading automatically to greater health 
consumption has neither been confirmed nor rejected. 
On the demand side of healthcare system, higher educational levels of populations seem to 
have cost-cutting effects. In Switzerland, this is at least true in the area of mandatory health 
insurance (MHI) and for inpatient healthcare services (Bisig and Gutzwiler 2004; Schellhorn 
2002), whereas for private healthcare spending and for outpatient healthcare services, it may 
be the reverse. Additionally, good integration into the labor market seems to have the same 
effects on positive health outcomes as higher educational levels (Fasel, Baer, and Frick 2010).  
The results found in studies of intra-national healthcare cost differences in Canada, Spain, 
France, and the US—and sporadically, too, in the UK, Italy, Denmark, and Germany—were 
very similar to those found in international comparisons46. Cost-driving effects on health care 
were found to be related to, in particular, higher income levels, a greater share of elderly 
people and women, greater unemployment, lower educational levels, more persons with poor 
health status, higher densities of physicians in private practice, more hospital beds per capita, 
better health insurance coverage, higher subsidies of the central state authority to the member 
states and—often most important—the general medical-technical progress.  
The advantage of intra-national studies is that they have to fight less with the problem of large 
differences in the organization and funding of the healthcare system compared to international 
studies. However, intra-national studies often suffer from few observation points that come 
from a limited number of member states (e.g., provinces, cantons, Bundesländer), and the 
problem of missing data on detailed regional levels is omnipresent.  
The problems mentioned for international and intra-national studies are also relevant for ana-
lyses of cantonal differences in levels of and trends in healthcare costs in Switzerland. Addi-
tionally, the broad heterogeneity in area size and population of the Swiss cantons (see Section 
1.3) and the almost complete lack of data (see Section 2.4) on smaller regional levels, such as 
districts or municipalities, limits the validity of such empirical investigations. Under these 
restrictions, the intra-national (i.e., cantonal) empirical literature (Crivelli et al. 2008; Crivelli, 
Filippini, and Mosca 2003a; Haari et al. 2002; Reich et al. 2011; Rüefli and Vatter 2001; 
Schleiniger, Slembeck, and Blöchlinger 2007; Stadelmann 2011; Wildi, Unternährer, and 
                                                 
46
  Additionally, these intra-national studies are mostly based on cross-sectional regression or panel econometric 
methods. 
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Locher 2005) for Switzerland finds cost driving effects from aging populations and larger 
shares of women, urban populations structures, lower education levels, higher unemployment 
rates, a Latin language and culture “effect” (i.e., French-, Italian-, and Rhaeto-Romanic-
speaking parts of the country), higher density of physicians in private practice, more 
pharmacies per capita and medical-technical progress in general.  
In contrast to findings from international comparisons, no agreement has been reached 
regarding the effect of average cantonal income per capita and per capita healthcare 
expenditures. Studies suggesting positive or negative associations both exist. Other factors 
influencing Swiss healthcare costs in an empirically significant way also exist, although they 
are found less regularly. Such factors include cantonal mortality rates, the growth of the 
nominal wages, the density of acute care hospital beds, the share of specialized hospitals 
among all acute care hospitals, the quantity of drugs sold in physicians’ practices, the prices 
of healthcare commodities, the share of socially destitute persons, and the share of foreigners 
in the resident cantonal populations (Camenzind 2008; Crivelli et al. 2008; Crivelli, Filippini, 
and Mosca 2003; Haari et al. 2002; Reich et al. 2011; Rüefli and Vatter 2001; Schleiniger, 
Slembeck, and Blöchlinger 2007; Stadelmann 2011; Wildi, Unternährer, and Locher 2005). 
To summarize, the international and national health economic literature still faces some 
difficulties providing consistent answers to important research questions (see Section 3.1) in 
the field of regional healthcare cost differences. The origins of these serious weaknesses 
definitely stems from the lack of broadly recognized empirical explanatory models available 
to the field. This situation, also described as the “quest without a compass” for explanatory 
factors (Culyer 1988), has continued to the present, but promising advances are underway 
(Chandra and Skinner 2012; Skinner 2012). With regard to the second serious weakness, the 
lack of available data, the field has progressed over the last 20 years: the development of 
health statistics information systems is underway, both internationally and in Switzerland. 
 
 
3.4 Methodological findings 
The methodological questions in the literature review pertained to the different meanings of 
levels and trends of healthcare costs and utilization, the best statistical-technical approaches to 
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be applied to the analysis of the Swiss healthcare system, the optimal statistical and 
geographical aggregation levels for such an analysis, and the current state of statistical data in 
Switzerland (see Section 2.4). As was the case in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, only a short summary 
of the methodological findings is given here. For more detailed information, please refer to 
the complete work (Camenzind 2008). 
The review of the empirical health economic literature revealed that, in older studies from 
1960 until 1990, researchers mainly tried to explain different national levels (and not trends) 
of healthcare costs (and utilization). The methods they principally used for that purpose were 
descriptive statistics, bivariate correlation analyses, or cross-sectional regressions. Since then, 
the foci of international scientific papers has increasingly turned to trends in healthcare costs 
and utilization, without losing the former interest in explaining differences in national levels. 
Such a turn towards the simultaneous investigation of trends and levels of healthcare costs 
(and utilization) seems to be attributable to at least three sources. 
First, during the 1990s, politicians in many Western countries became aware of the growing 
trends in healthcare expenditures in the preceding decades. These politicians started to clamor 
about whether and how these trends could continue into the future and what political 
measures could stop or slow down these trends. Second, most Western countries developed 
their statistical information systems, and broader and more detailed statistical data became 
available. Moreover, continuous data collection resulted in more detailed time series of data 
being ready for researchers’ use. Technological progress made storage and access to such 
databases easier and less expensive. Third, instruments designed to simultaneously analyze 
differences in the levels of and trends in the indicators became available. These instruments 
were continuously integrated into newly developed software packages. With such advances, it 
was no wonder that panel econometric approaches became the standard method to be applied 
when explaining differences (simultaneously in level and trends) in national or regional 
healthcare costs and health services utilization.  
Two approaches using panel econometric models are most often applied to the studies of 
interest. These include models with unobservable fixed linear effects (FE-models) and models 
with unobservable random linear effects (RE-models). One main difference between the two 
families of models is how they treat the cross-sectional effects of the observations—in our 
case, the specific influences of the different countries, cantons, or regions. RE-models make 
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the assumption (to produce unbiased estimators) that the random effects have to be 
uncorrelated with the independent variables. Adherence to this assumption—together with the 
research question and the availability and characteristics of statistical data—determines the 
choice of the model. Various statistical tests47 support this choice from a mathematical 
perspective.  
Quite solid answers to two of the initial research questions (see Section 3.1) can be given with 
these findings of the literature review. It is, indeed, an advantage to take into account varying 
levels of and varying trends in healthcare costs, because different sets of cost drivers can 
influence these two dimensions. Panel econometric approaches, with their capacity to 
combine cross-sectional and time-series analyses, are the ideal statistical-technical approach 
for tackling this type of research question. An example of a panel-econometric application for 
the Swiss healthcare system is presented in the first article of Part II (see Section 4).  
The other initial research questions pertained to the optimal statistical and geographical 
aggregation levels applicable to the analysis and the existence of realizable models 
considering the data situation in Switzerland. From a theoretical point of view, the statistical 
and geographical levels of data that offer the most possibilities are individual and geo-coded 
data (i.e., the individual patients or the individual healthcare providers). With every 
aggregation step during the analysis, some of the variation between the individual 
observations is eliminated. Moreover, separate analyses of three main components of 
healthcare costs—the quantities used, the prices paid, and the medical practice applied 
(OECD 2011b)—should be favored.  
It would have been desirable to work on a regional level well under the cantonal territories. 
Unfortunately, the Swiss health data do not permit working with more homogenous 
geographical units such as political districts or even municipalities. As consequence, the three 
empirical investigations in Part II do not fall under the cantonal level; however, further 
research efforts should aim to facilitate movement in the direction of smaller and more 
homogenous geographical units.  
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  A standard test used to choose between FE- and RE-models is the Hausman test (see Chapter 4, Part II). 
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Appendix, Part I 
Table 3: Healthcare costs as a share of GDP and life expectancy at birth in selected OECD-
member countries, 2009, in percentages 
 
Source: OECD Health Data Base; as of 08/24/2011 (OECD 2013). 
 
Austria 10.4 80.4
Belgium 10.1 80.0
Canada 10.3 80.7
Denmark 10.3 79.0
Finland 8.4 80.0
France 11.1 81.0
Germany 10.7 80.3
Italy 9.0 81.8
Netherlands 9.9 80.6
Norway 8.6 81.0
Spain 9.0 81.8
Sweden 9.2 81.4
Switzerland 10.7 82.3
United Kingdom 8.8 80.4
United States 16.4 78.2
2009
Health care costs as 
share of GDP in %
Life expectancy at 
birth in years
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Table 4: MHI costs, state subsidies, and out-of-pocket expenditures per capita, by canton, 
2007, in CHF 
 
Sources: (1): Datenpool santesuisse (santésuisse 2011a); (2): State subsidies (EFV 2011a); (3): Out-of-pocket 
expenditures (Stadelmann 2011); (4): Resources index (EFV 2011b); calculations by the author. 
AI 1,871 496 848 3,215 80.5
OW 2,291 803 497 3,591 74.0
GL 2,400 780 790 3,969 65.4
UR 2,368 774 883 4,025 57.2
NW 2,214 823 1,036 4,073 124.5
TG 2,447 491 1,301 4,238 73.1
AG 2,571 566 1,180 4,316 84.5
JU 2,853 967 513 4,333 62.3
AR 2,222 1,017 1,123 4,362 74.1
LU 2,378 716 1,343 4,436 74.1
SZ 2,414 697 1,417 4,528 140.1
SG 2,365 807 1,393 4,564 73.6
VS 2,595 1,079 1,130 4,805 64.3
FR 2,691 1,068 1,083 4,842 68.1
GR 2,510 1,054 1,340 4,904 76.9
SH 2,718 1,186 1,001 4,906 95.9
SO 2,795 965 1,192 4,952 76.5
ZH 2,811 912 1,319 5,042 127.8
BL 2,978 899 1,234 5,111 98.2
CH 2,860 1,085 1,235 5,180 100.0
ZG 2,394 1,270 1,585 5,249 246.1
NE 2,981 1,334 1,138 5,453 94.1
TI 3,366 1,185 1,067 5,618 95.4
BE 3,087 1,351 1,205 5,643 74.9
VD 3,239 1,270 1,134 5,643 120.1
BS 3,755 1,986 1,162 6,903 144.7
GE 3,737 2,174 1,542 7,454 146.9
Cantons
Mandatory 
health insu-
rance costs 
2007 (1)
State subsidies               
2007 (2)
Out-of-Pocket 
2006 (3)
Total costs          
(1) + (2) + (3)
Resources 
index 2011 (4)
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Figure 10: Index of MHI costs per capita by domains of service providers for selected cantons, 
2007, in percentages (CH = 100 percent) 
 
Source: Datenpool santesuisse, calculations by the author (see Table 5). 
Comment: In Figure 10, the indices for the total costs and the six provider domains are calculated so that the 
average value for Switzerland (CH) is always set at 100 percent. The results of only four cantons are 
demonstrated and discussed in the following paragraphs: the two most expensive cantons, BS and 
GE; the least expensive canton, Appenzell Innerrhoden (AI); and the fourth-least expensive canton, 
Obwalden (OW, see the Excursus in Part III of the thesis).  
 For BS and GE, the average total MHI costs are at an index of 131 percent, meaning total MHI costs 
for these two cantons are 31 percent higher than for the country on average. The cantons AI and OW 
have indices here of 65 percent and 80 percent, respectively, meaning that the expenses for services 
covered by the MHI are 35 percent less in AI and 20 percent less in OW than the national level. 
 Concerning the individual domains of service provider costs, some differences in the composition of 
the MHI costs of the two cantons BS and GE can be discussed. In particular, the high total average 
MHI costs in canton BS are caused by high costs for outpatient hospital care (138 percent), for drugs 
(135 percent), for inpatient hospital care (143 percent), and for nursing homes (127 percent). In 
canton GE, high costs for outpatient hospital care (130 percent) and for drugs (137 percent) 
principally contribute to high MHI costs. However, unlike in BS, the other two important “cost-
drivers” in GE are the physicians (private practitioners; 155 percent) and other outpatient care (e.g., 
Spitex, physiotherapy; 152 percent).  
 For the least expensive canton, AI, not only the total average MHI costs per capita of inhabitants but 
also the average MHI costs for all six selected domains of service providers are well below the 
Swiss average. These average costs amount to only 50 percent for nursing homes, as the lowest 
comparison group, to 72 percent for outpatient hospital care as the highest comparison group. For 
OW, the index for hospital outpatient costs (98 percent) is almost equal to the country’s average; the 
other five service domains cost between 28 percent (physicians) and 15 percent (nursing homes) less 
than the Swiss average. 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
140%
160%
Total 2007
Physicians
Drugs
Other out-patient 
care
Hospital out-patient
Hospitals in-patient
Nursing homes
CH
GE
BS
AI
OW
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Table 5: Index of MHI costs per capita by domains of service providers, by canton, 2007, in 
percentages 
 
Source: Datenpool santesuisse (santésuisse 2011a), calculations by the author. 
 
 
AI 65% 67% 63% 64% 72% 67% 50%
NW 77% 73% 73% 91% 86% 76% 73%
AR 78% 76% 70% 69% 87% 80% 92%
OW 80% 72% 74% 84% 98% 79% 85%
SG 83% 86% 81% 79% 80% 83% 85%
UR 83% 76% 76% 72% 91% 87% 104%
LU 83% 78% 78% 80% 88% 83% 107%
ZG 84% 90% 74% 83% 79% 87% 92%
GL 84% 81% 82% 89% 89% 77% 105%
SZ 84% 92% 80% 82% 79% 81% 95%
TG 86% 78% 72% 83% 93% 101% 85%
GR 88% 79% 89% 94% 87% 90% 95%
AG 90% 86% 96% 81% 92% 98% 67%
VS 91% 87% 103% 87% 87% 91% 80%
FR 94% 95% 98% 87% 86% 94% 105%
SH 95% 90% 104% 91% 96% 91% 104%
SO 98% 95% 99% 100% 100% 106% 70%
ZH 98% 116% 94% 94% 89% 89% 109%
JU 100% 77% 112% 99% 110% 101% 115%
CH 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
BL 104% 115% 101% 107% 107% 108% 62%
NE 104% 87% 121% 121% 85% 95% 155%
BE 108% 92% 98% 103% 104% 129% 128%
VD 113% 110% 121% 124% 146% 92% 95%
TI 118% 106% 124% 125% 101% 129% 125%
GE 131% 155% 137% 152% 130% 105% 93%
BS 131% 116% 135% 124% 138% 143% 127%
Index other 
out-patient 
care
Index 
hospital out-
patient
Index 
hospitals in-
patient
Index 
nursing 
homes
Cantons
Total index 
2007 (CH = 
100)
Index 
physicians
Index drugs
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Table 6: MHI costs per capita by domains of service providers, by canton, 2007, in CHF 
 
Source: Datenpool santesuisse (santésuisse 2011a), calculations by the author. 
 
AI 441 366 186 305 461 111 1,871
NW 476 425 264 365 524 161 2,214
AR 495 407 198 367 550 204 2,222
OW 470 430 242 416 545 189 2,291
SG 564 473 229 337 572 189 2,365
UR 499 444 209 385 600 232 2,368
LU 511 455 232 371 572 237 2,378
ZG 590 429 241 335 597 203 2,394
GL 531 475 256 375 530 232 2,400
SZ 605 465 238 335 561 211 2,414
TG 512 421 239 391 694 188 2,447
GR 520 516 271 368 624 212 2,510
AG 564 558 236 389 677 148 2,571
VS 570 601 253 366 627 178 2,595
FR 623 570 252 364 650 233 2,691
SH 587 603 264 405 627 232 2,718
SO 620 577 289 424 730 154 2,795
ZH 759 549 272 375 615 241 2,811
JU 502 650 285 467 695 254 2,853
CH 655 582 289 423 689 222 2,860
BL 751 588 308 452 742 137 2,978
NE 568 705 350 361 653 344 2,981
BE 603 572 297 438 892 284 3,087
VD 718 704 359 615 632 210 3,239
TI 692 721 361 427 888 277 3,366
GE 1,018 799 439 550 724 207 3,737
BS 763 785 358 585 984 281 3,755
Hospital out-
patient 
(16% )
Hospitals in-
patient 
(24% )
Nursing 
homes (9% )
Total (100% )Cantons
Physicians 
in private 
practice 
(18% )
Drugs: 
physicians 
& pharma-
cies (23% )
Other out-
patient care 
(10% )
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Table 7: Average annual changes in MHI costs per capita by domains of service providers, 
by canton, 2000–2007, in percentages 
 
Source: Datenpool santesuisse (santésuisse 2011a), calculations by the author. 
 
  
Cantons
Total of MHI 
health care 
costs
Total of MHI 
out-patient 
care costs
Total of MHI 
in-patient 
care costs
Costs of 
physicians 
in private 
practice
Costs for 
drugs by 
physicians 
& pharma-
cies
Costs for 
other out-
patient care
Costs for 
hospital out-
patient
Costs for 
hospitals in-
patient
Costs for 
nursing 
homes
NE 2.0% 2.7% 0.7% 2.9% 3.2% 4.0% 0.7% -0.5% 3.5%
VD 2.8% 3.5% 0.8% 2.9% 3.5% 3.2% 4.5% 0.7% 1.3%
GE 2.8% 3.0% 2.0% 2.1% 3.6% 2.9% 4.2% 3.0% -1.0%
JU 2.8% 3.2% 2.0% 2.8% 3.4% 2.1% 4.3% 0.7% 6.1%
BS 3.4% 4.2% 2.2% 1.6% 5.8% 1.2% 8.4% 1.0% 7.5%
SH 3.5% 4.1% 2.3% 2.6% 4.2% 4.1% 6.2% 2.0% 3.3%
TI 3.5% 3.1% 4.4% 1.6% 3.0% 3.3% 5.9% 4.1% 5.4%
GL 3.6% 3.4% 4.0% 1.6% 2.1% 7.1% 6.0% 2.6% 7.7%
TG 3.7% 3.7% 3.6% 2.7% 3.1% 4.0% 5.9% 4.0% 2.4%
ZH 3.8% 3.8% 3.8% 2.3% 4.3% 4.2% 6.0% 4.1% 2.8%
AI 3.8% 4.7% 2.1% 2.9% 4.9% 5.5% 6.7% 1.3% 6.0%
CH 4.0% 3.9% 4.3% 2.8% 3.6% 3.9% 6.3% 4.4% 3.9%
AR 4.1% 4.0% 4.4% 2.7% 3.4% 4.9% 6.0% 3.6% 6.6%
FR 4.2% 4.0% 4.5% 3.6% 2.6% 3.8% 7.8% 4.3% 5.0%
BL 4.2% 4.4% 3.9% 2.5% 4.2% 4.4% 8.5% 3.4% 6.6%
VS 4.3% 4.3% 4.2% 3.9% 3.4% 3.4% 7.7% 3.1% 9.1%
GR 4.6% 4.9% 3.9% 2.3% 3.8% 4.3% 13.1% 2.5% 8.8%
AG 4.6% 4.5% 4.9% 3.2% 3.9% 5.1% 7.0% 5.6% 2.1%
SG 4.7% 4.7% 4.6% 3.5% 3.7% 4.7% 9.1% 4.2% 6.0%
NW 4.7% 4.6% 5.2% 3.1% 4.8% 5.2% 5.9% 5.0% 5.8%
OW 4.8% 4.4% 5.8% 2.3% 5.1% 3.3% 7.1% 5.6% 6.2%
UR 5.0% 4.0% 7.1% 2.8% 2.8% 5.3% 6.5% 5.4% 13.1%
SZ 5.1% 4.7% 6.0% 3.8% 4.0% 4.1% 8.8% 5.1% 8.7%
LU 5.2% 5.1% 5.3% 4.6% 4.0% 4.3% 8.3% 4.7% 7.0%
BE 5.2% 3.7% 8.1% 3.0% 2.5% 4.3% 6.4% 10.0% 3.5%
SO 5.3% 4.8% 6.4% 3.3% 4.3% 5.7% 7.7% 7.2% 3.1%
ZG 5.3% 4.2% 7.9% 4.0% 4.1% 3.6% 5.2% 7.2% 10.3%
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Part II: Empirical Essays 
 
 
4 Explaining regional variations in healthcare utilization across the 
Swiss cantons using panel econometric models48 
 
 
 
5 Cost differences in Swiss nursing homes: a multilevel analysis 
 
 
 
6 Demography and future requirements of inpatient acute care in 
Swiss hospitals 
  
                                                 
48
  A former version of the article has been published in BioMedCentral Health Services Research Journal: 13 
March 2012: see: http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/12/62/abstract. 
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4 Explaining regional variations in healthcare utilization 
across the Swiss cantons using panel econometric 
models 
 
Abstract 
There exist large cantonal variations in volumes of healthcare services in Switzerland. In this 
article, the important factors interrelated with these regional differences are examined. Using 
a selected set of these factors, individual panel econometric models are calculated to explain 
variations in utilization for each of the six largest healthcare service domains: general 
practitioners, specialist doctors, inpatient hospitals, outpatient hospitals, medications, and 
nursing homes participating in the Swiss mandatory health insurance (MHI) program. The 
main data source is “Datenpool santésuisse,” a database of Swiss health insurers. For all six 
healthcare service domains, significant factors influencing utilization frequencies over time 
and across cantons are found. A greater supply of service providers tends to strongly correlate 
with per capita consumption of MHI services. On the demand side, older populations and 
higher population densities afford the clearest positive associations. 
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4.1 Background 
Switzerland is a small Western European country with a population of 7.8 million persons (as 
of 2009) who live on a total area of 41,000 km2. The country consists of 26 cantons, which 
greatly differ in terms of area, numbers of inhabitants, population density, socioeconomic 
situation, and language (see Figure 2).  
 
Table 8: Swiss “market” for mandatory health insurance (MHI), 2007 
Main actors / compo-
nents 
Number 
of ac-
tors 
Number 
of beds 
Owner-
ship 
MHI 
costs 
(billions 
of CHF) 
General remarks 
MHI companies 87 − private − 
MHI companies authorized by the 
Confederation and obligated to contract 
with service providers (“contract 
General practitioners in 
private practices (GP) 
5,915 − private 
2.0 
(10.6 %) 
Calculated full-time employees for general 
practitioners, pediatricians and 
gynecologists in private practices (MHI 
Specialist doctors in 
private practices 
3,244 − private 
1.9 
(10.2 %) 
Calculated full-time employees for 
specialized physicians in private practices 
(MHI services) 
Inpatient hospitals 321 41,910 
public & 
private 
4.8 
(26.3 %) 
General hospitals and specialized clinics 
for psychiatry and rehabilitation 
(MHI services) 
Outpatient hospitals > 130 − 
public & 
private 
2.8 
(14.9 %) 
General hospitals (130) normally supply 
outpatient care; but this is not known for 
all specialized clinics (181) 
Drugs 
1,700 / 
~ 4,000 
− private 
3.6 
(19.5 %) 
Number of pharmacies: 1,700; 
number of self-dispensing physicians:  
~ 4,000 (MHI services) 
Long-term care nursing 
homes 
1,509 87,960  
public & 
private 
1.6  
(8.7 %) 
Nursing homes (excluding homes for the 
disabled, for addicts and persons with 
psychosocial problems, MHI services) 
Total of MHI services 
delivered 
− − − 
18.5 
(100 %) 
Other providers account for the rest of 
CHF 1.8 billion (9.8 percent); MHI 
premium subsidies are not included here 
Sources: (FOPH 2011a; FSO 2011c, 2011d; Roth 2010a), calculations by the author. 
 
The responsibility of government is divided into three state levels: the central government 
(i.e., “Confederation”), the 26 cantons, and approximately 2,600 municipalities. The three 
levels also characterize the Swiss healthcare system, which is normally described as a system 
of “regulated competition” (Enthoven 1988). Briefly said, “regulated competition” implies 
competition between healthcare market players wherever competition seems to generate better 
outcomes than regulation by state authorities. Some important characteristics of healthcare 
market players are described in Table 8. In particular, outpatient health service providers in 
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Switzerland operate mainly on a private basis, while private- and public-owned institutions 
are responsible for the provision of inpatient services. 
Although regulatory responsibilities and public funding of Swiss health care are shared by 
three state levels49, the 26 cantons are mostly responsible for the implementation of health po-
licy. This responsibility includes the mission to guarantee the sufficient supply of inpatient 
and outpatient services for their populations and to contribute the largest part of the payments 
provided by the state. Moreover, a moratorium (i.e., a “necessity clause”) was introduced in 
2002. This moratorium, giving cantons the power to regulate the establishment of new 
outpatient service providers, was in place for GPs through 2009 and for specialist physicians 
and pharmacists until 2011. Reintroducing the necessity clause for specialists and pharmacists 
(but not for GPs) occured in July 2013. 
The Confederation, however, has more legislative functions in the area of MHI and 
supervisory functions for the MHI insurance market. It is responsible for the nationwide 
healthcare legislation—specifically, the definition of the national MHI benefit basket. Other 
federal responsibilities include the setting of standards of education and training of healthcare 
personnel, health protection for the population, surveillance and management of 
communicable diseases, and health sciences and research. 
Finally, the municipalities see their most important role as performing the tasks handed over 
to them by the cantons. In most cases, these tasks involve the operation and funding of pro-
viders, either in outpatient or long-term inpatient care settings (i.e., formal care at home and 
in nursing homes) (Weaver et al. 2009b). 
The two important characteristics of the Swiss healthcare system mentioned above—
regulated competition and a federalist structure—are intensively discussed in Swiss health 
politics. In spite of the clear advantages the system offers, such as efficiency gains and 
proximity to the local populations and their requirements (Haari et al. 2002), there are also 
major obstacles to overcome in the system. Therefore, the system has an enormous 
complexity, and good governance in Swiss health care seems difficult (OECD/WHO 2011). 
                                                 
49
  Direct subsidies of the Confederation to healthcare providers are negligible. With regard to the overall 
funding of health care of CHF 61 billion in 2010 (including the Confederations’ and cantons’ premium 
subsidy payments), the shares of the 3 state levels were as follows: Confederation, 5.9 percent; cantons, 21.6 
percent; and municipalities, 4.2 percent, see FSO. 2012f. “Nettofinanzbedarf der Kantone und der 
Gemeinden im Gesundheitswesen.” BFS Aktuell. Neuchâtel: Swiss Federal Statistical Office (FSO). 
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Certain amounts of incoherence, redundant processes, and obstructions in healthcare 
regulation beyond the national or cantonal level have to be accepted. 
Empirically, it has never consistently been demonstrated whether, all in all, such a system 
leads to higher—or lower—healthcare costs than in other, comparable countries (Martin 
Martin et al. 2011). However, the system of regulated competition and strong federalism 
forms the basis for the existence of large variations in healthcare utilization and costs across 
geographical areas (for Switzerland, see Figure 2, and Appendix, Table 12). 
Important work to identify reasons for growing and varying healthcare expenditures—and 
utilization—in Western countries began approximately 50 years ago (Buchanan 1966). In this 
research, tax-financed healthcare systems provide “free” healthcare services to users; 
therefore, greater shares of public financing lead to higher spending on health in such 
societies. In the “model of unbalanced growth” (Baumol 1967), the nominal wages in the 
healthcare sector must be increased, even without progress in productivity, which causes 
more spending on health care as the economy grows. In later studies (Leu 1986; Newhouse 
1977), combinations of higher national income and greater shares of public financing were 
suspected to have driving effects on both the demand and the supply of health care. 
Many more models with the potential to determine which factors influence healthcare costs 
and utilization have been developed and tested (Clemente et al. 2004; Gerdtham et al. 1998). 
As mentioned earlier by internationally recognized researchers (Culyer 1988; Gerdtham and 
Jönsson 2000; Gerdtham et al. 1998), it is very difficult to establish a widely accepted 
theoretical base upon which to consistently explain international or regional differences in 
levels and growth of healthcare expenditures (Martin Martin et al. 2011). This circumstance is 
due to the great complexity and heterogeneity of the organization and the financing of 
healthcare systems, the multiplicity of actors involved, the specific nature of “health” as an 
economic good (Hurley 2000), and, partly, the lack of available data. A new model, recently 
presented in international journals (Chandra and Skinner 2012; Skinner 2012), seems to offer 
a good starting point for a more systematic analysis of geographic variations in healthcare 
costs and utilization. 
The available literature of interest continues to focus on finding factors to explain interna-
tional or intra-national differences in levels and growth of healthcare costs and related com-
ponents. One actual literature review about the subject (Martin Martin et al. 2011) finds rising 
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incomes, aging populations, technological progress, and territorial decentralization as the 
main healthcare cost drivers in Western economies. 
A Swiss study on the subject explains the regional differences in levels and growth rates of 
healthcare costs across the country by applying separate cross-sectional regressions for both 
dimensions: levels and growth rates (Rüefli and Vatter 2001). This study identified significant 
correlations between higher healthcare costs and greater social disintegration, higher 
unemployment, higher concentration of physicians, more specialized clinics, and a Latin-
speaking (i.e., French- and Italian-speaking; see Figure 2) population. Later studies using 
panel econometric approaches (Crivelli et al. 2003; Crivelli, Filippini, and Mosca 2006; Wildi 
et al. 2005) found significant influences from higher income levels, older populations, higher 
mortality rates, denser populations, and a time trend. 
“New” significant factors found in another Swiss study using cross-sectional regressions 
(Schleiniger et al. 2007) were higher numbers of women in the population and more 
pharmacies per capita. In a more recent study (Crivelli et al. 2008) applying exactly the same 
methods but with more recent data (Crivelli et al. 2006), a greater number of small children in 
the population and higher prices for MHI services were identified as significant explanatory 
factors for cantonal cost differences. Additionally, using econometric panel models, the most 
recent Swiss study to be identified (Reich et al. 2011) suggested the significant cost driving 
effects of a higher number of drug-dispensing physicians and more foreigners in the 
population, whereas more managed care-oriented models tend to contain healthcare costs. 
Most of these studies that compare and try to explain varying healthcare expenditures at the 
international level work with the largest possible aggregates of costs (Gerdtham and Jönsson 
2000; Martin Martin et al. 2011). This approach seems reasonable because the (sometimes) 
large differences in the structure of healthcare provision and funding systems in different 
(Western) countries makes it very difficult to define, construct and compare disaggregated, 
but cross-nationally still coherent, cost aggregates. However, the agglomeration of largest 
possible health cost aggregates does not solve the problem that such comparative analyses 
implicate an increased risk of endogeneity50 due to unobserved differences across countries. 
                                                 
50
  Endogeneity describes the situation where one or more dependent variables of a regression model (X) are 
correlated with the error term (ε). The most important causes for endogeneity in a model are the following: 1) 
omitting relevant regressors that are correlated with independent variable X; 2) simultaneous causality 
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Furthermore, some studies on regional variations in healthcare costs in Switzerland (Crivelli 
et al. 2008; Crivelli et al. 2003; Crivelli et al. 2006; Reich et al. 2011; Rüefli and Vatter 2001) 
have put much effort into creating the broadest possible cost aggregates. Other studies 
(Camenzind 2008; Schleiniger et al. 2007; Wildi et al. 2005) argue that higher aggregated 
cost units often compensate one another; therefore, the existing variations being (just) visible 
in the disaggregated units are more likely to “disappear” statistically. The conclusion drawn 
from this fact in the present work is that the factors responsible for cost differences should be 
scrutinized at the highest level of detail. 
The research interest in this paper follows the cited literature: it aims to empirically consoli-
date important factors for varying healthcare utilization on the supply side, the demand side, 
the financing side, and the political-cultural side of the Swiss healthcare system (Camenzind 
2008; Crivelli et al. 2006). On the supply side, it is the link between supply and utilization of 
healthcare services (Carlsen and Grytten 1998, 2000; Crivelli and Domenighetti 2003b) that 
can be examined in particular. Because most MHI services in Switzerland are remunerated in 
a fee-for-service system in the observed time period, and because most service providers have 
clear incentives to bring their incomes to targeted levels (Busato and Künzi 2008; Crivelli and 
Domenighetti 2003b; Gosden et al. 2001), it is reasonable to suppose that higher densities of 
GPs, specialists, hospital beds, and hospital outpatient care services might lead to higher 
consumption levels in the four corresponding service domains as well as in outpatient 
medication. 
On the demand side, it will be tested whether higher proportions of older people with greater 
morbidity and mortality (Felder, Meier, and Schmitt 2000), larger population densities indica-
ting urban regions with fewer social barriers to seeing health professionals rather quickly 
(Schellhorn 2002), and higher unemployment associated with more social deprivation 
(Marmot 2005) are indeed positively interrelated with the use of MHI health services. Also 
analyzed is whether higher average income—normally related with better health status, better 
health behavior, and more supplemental (private) health insurance (Crivelli et al. 2008)—is 
associated with a decrease in the utilization of MHI health services. 
                                                                                                                                                        
between X and Y; 3) measurement errors in the independent variables; and 4) variable selection biases (see: 
Antonakis, J., S. Bendahan, P. Jacquart, and R. Lalive. 2010. “On making causal claims: A review and 
recommendations.” The Leadership Quarterly 21: 1086 - 120.). 
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Concerning the financing of health care, this paper attempts to prove empirically whether 
high deductibles—the standard deductible in MHI is Swiss francs (CHF) 300 by default, but it 
can be raised to CHF 2,500 in favor of a limited premium reduction and health commodities 
consumed within one year, and up to these amounts have to be paid out of pocket by 
policyholders—are interrelated with retained MHI services consumption. One will have to 
interpret these results with much caution, because the decision for a higher deductible is 
certainly motivated by relatively high MHI premium levels in the cantons (or the premium 
regions of the cantons), combined with the knowledge of the individuals about the 
development of their own health status in the near future. Higher deductibles might also go 
together with higher out-of-pocket expenditures and more healthcare service utilization 
outside the MHI. 
The other indicator for healthcare financing, the share of alternative health insurance plans—
containing institutional requirements and financial incentives such as gatekeeping, limited 
access to providers, and capitation schemes—is expected to be associated with larger 
utilization of GPs (Felder et al. 2000; Gosden et al. 2001), more cost-conscious consumption 
of drugs (Gerfin and Schellhorn 2006), and reduction of the use of specialists, outpatient 
hospitals, inpatient hospitals, and nursing homes.  
With regard to political-cultural variables, the Latin-speaking part of Switzerland51 is often 
said to gravitate toward an increased utilization of services of specialists, inpatient hospitals, 
outpatient hospitals, and higher drug consumption, but with less frequent use of GPs and 
nursing home services (Crivelli et al. 2008; Crivelli et al. 2006; Rüefli and Vatter 2001). 
Unfortunately, no time-varying data were available for this indicator, and the variable 
ultimately could not be used in the applied fixed-effect regressions (see Section 4.2.2). 
 
 
                                                 
51
  It is important to notice that the Latin-speaking part of Switzerland has an in average higher population 
density than the German-speaking part. 
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4.2 Methods 
4.2.1 Data 
The main data source for the six dependent variables (see Appendix, Table 13) is “Datenpool 
santésuisse” (DPS) of the Swiss Association of Health Insurers (santésuisse 2011a). DPS has 
been in existence since 1997, but the complete sets52 of quantity (and cost) indicators of MHI 
services used here have only been recorded every year since 2000. The canton-level analysis 
conducted here with DPS allows for MHI costs for age and gender groups of the resident 
(cantonal) population to be related to the different domains of service providers. The latter 
can be located in the same canton in which the user of the service resides, or they can be 
situated in another canton. Therefore, the analysis in this article always focuses on the 
residential canton of the healthcare users; whether goods and services used by these residents 
were provided in their “own” canton or were “imported” from other cantons is not of interest 
here. 
In addition to the costs, DPS also details the quantities of services delivered: the number of 
consultations (including home visits) of GPs and specialists, the number of consultations in 
outpatient hospitals, the number of hospital days, the number of days stayed in nursing homes 
and the costs for drugs. Quantities—and costs for drugs53—are calculated per capita (i.e., per 
capita of the cantonal population). To get these numbers, the average resident populations 
according to population statistics (ESPOP) (FSO 2011b) of the Swiss Federal Statistical 
Office (FSO) are used. 
DPS and ESPOP statistics are also used to calculate several of the independent variables (see 
Table 10 for descriptive statistics and Appendix, Table 13 for definitions and sources): the 
densities of GP (GRU) and of specialists (SPZ), the percentage of outpatient hospital MHI 
costs compared to the total outpatient MHI costs (PAM), the share of people with deductibles 
higher than CHF 300 compared to the total number of insured people in the MHI program 
                                                 
52
  DPS contains information only on those people who actually sent their bills to their health insurance 
provider. Thus, bills that were not sent, for reasons such as a high deductible, are not included in DPS. The 
actual amount of such “hidden” MHI services and costs are not known. 
53
  The missing quantity indicator for consumed drugs (MED) is a minor problem. Because prices for MHI-
remunerated drugs are determined by federal authorities on the national level, differences in drug costs can 
be caused only by differences in consumed quantities or a varying medical use of medicines (Roth, S. and F. 
Moreau-Gruet. 2011. “Consommation et coûts des médicaments en Suisse entre 1992 et 2009.” Obsan 
Rapport 50. Neuchâtel: Swiss Health Obervatory (Obsan). 
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(FRA), the share of alternative MHI plans compared to the total number of MHI insurance 
contracts (MOD), and the share of the population over 65 years of age compared to the total 
population (ALT65). Additionally, the share of the population over 85 years of age (ALT85) 
is calculated to explain nursing home utilization (Wildi et al. 2005). 
ESPOP is also employed as an “auxiliary variable” with three other independent variables: the 
FSO data sources “Medical Statistics of Hospitals” (MS) (FSO 2011c) to calculate the density 
of hospital beds (BED), “Areal Statistics” (FSO 2011i) to calculate the population density per 
canton (POP), and “Statistics of Registered Unemployment” (SECO 2011) produced by the 
State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) to calculate the cantonal unemployment rates 
(ALQ). The cantonal incomes per capita (VEL) come from the “Statistics on National 
Accounts” (FSO 2011j). Finally, the proportion of the Latin-speaking resident population as a 
percentage of the resident population with “major language non-German” (LAT) is calculated 
from the federal population census of 2000 (FSO 2000). 
 
4.2.2 Data analysis 
As explained in the background Section, an approach of “identification of influential factors 
on disaggregated target variables” is emphasized in this work. Therefore, individual analyses 
on the cost “sub-component quantity” of the “subdomains of MHI services” (separately 
provided by general practitioners, specialist doctors, inpatient hospitals, outpatient hospitals, 
medication and nursing homes) are performed. 
“Quantity” delineates the annual number of consultations (including home visits) per capita 
with GPs (AZG) and specialists (AZS), the annual number of consultations per capita in 
outpatient hospitals (AMB), the annual number of days per capita in the hospital (HOS), and 
the annual number of days per capita in nursing homes (SOM). For consumed drugs, annual 
costs per capita (MED) are used. 
As suggested by the literature (see Figure 1), supply-side, demand-side, financing, and 
political-cultural variables create the influencing factors of the models. Thus, indicators for 
the four most important suppliers of healthcare services are used (see Table 8). These include 
the “density of GP” (GRU), the “density of specialists” (SPZ), the “density of hospital beds” 
(BED), and “proportions of outpatient hospital care” (AMB). The four most cited indicators 
on the demand side in the literature—more elderly individuals (ALT65), higher average 
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incomes (VEL), larger population densities (POP), and social deprivation (operationalized as 
higher rates of unemployment (ALQ)54) in the canton—are retained in the model. 
From the two available financing variables, both the share of low deductibles (FRA) and the 
share of alternative health insurance plans (MOD) are retained in the models. Finally, a linear 
trend variable (TRD) that records medical-technical progress and general tendencies for every 
group of services that are not yet contained in the other explanatory factors is added. 
One has to admit that the proposed model in the article misses a precise theoretical foundation 
(Skinner 2012). The choice of explaining variables was made by a “balanced”55 selection of 
the most cited variables in similar Swiss and international studies that were available. As 
already indicated during the description of the regressors, one price to pay for proceeding in 
the above manner is its clear risk of introducing endogeneity into the regression models. The 
variables ALQ and FRA, in particular, are merely proxy indicators for other phenomena, such 
as social deprivation or relatively high out-of-pocket expenses. However, as mentioned 
above, other variables, such as AGE6556 (cf. AGE85) or POP57, are “masking” the real causes 
for the utilization of healthcare services.  
Moreover, the observational data58 used in the models are not randomly assigned to all 
individuals of the population. They focus only on users of the six healthcare provider 
domains. The consequence of this is what researchers call a “selection bias problem” 
(Heckman 1979), where the right-hand side variables impact the probability of the dependent 
variable (the probability of healthcare use in the six models). Although, in reality, the whole 
population has access to healthcare services, only a share of the population actually receives a 
                                                 
54
  Unemployment is in health services research a accepted proxy variable for social deprivation-motivated 
utilization of healthcare services (see: Fasel, T., N. Baer, and U. Frick. 2010. “Dynamik der 
Inanspruchnahme bei psychischen Problemen: Soziodemographische, regionale, krankheits- und 
systembezogene Indikatoren.” Obsan Dossier 13. Obsan. Neuchâtel: Swiss Health Observatory.). 
55
  The model is “balanced” (originally 4 supply, 4 demand, 2 funding, and 1 political variables) with respect to 
the “model of effects“ in Figure 1. 
56
  Higher age is confounded with sex (more women) and related to higher morbidity and mortality (see also the 
discussion about the “red herring” argument, e.g., Werblow, A., S. Felder, and P. Zweifel. 2007. “Population 
aging and health care expenditure: a school of ‘red herrings’?” Health Economics 16(10): 1109-27.). 
57
  Higher population density (or more urbanity) is, among others, confounded with an shorter average distance 
to healthcare providers. 
58
  In an experimental design, one could work with two randomly selected groups (where both groups have an 
expected value of the dependent variable (e.g., AZG), that is statistically identical for all individuals before 
exposure to the influence variable (e.g., GRU). Here, one could test the causal influence of GP density on GP 
utilization. 
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treatment59. This circumstance makes it more likely to erroneously attribute a causal effect to 
the variable of influence when comparing the difference between the influenced and the non-
influenced groups after assignment60. 
Finally, our models open the door for so-called ecological (inference) fallacies61. An 
ecological fallacy happens in the interpretation of statistical data wherein inferences about the 
behavior of individuals are deduced from inference for the group (means) to which those 
individuals belong. The problem here is even more accentuated, because one cannot work 
here with individual observations on the first level of the analysis. The dependent variables in 
the model are mean values of age-gender-canton groups that are approximately normally 
distributed (see Appendix, Figure 11); it is well-known that the individual observations used 
to calculate these mean values are not (Sommer and Biersack 2006). 
With the goal of a simultaneous explanation of the regional variations in levels and the 
evolution in time of MHI services, panel econometric regressions that combine longitudinal 
and cross-sectional observations are chosen. The indices “i” for 26 cantons and “t” for eight 
years give expression to this combination in Formula (1). 
 
Yit = ƒ (GRUit, SPZit, BEDit, PAMit, ALT65/85it, POPit, ALQit, VELit, FRAit, MODit, 
LATi, TRDt); 
where: Yit = AZGit or AZSit or HOSit or AMBit or MEDit or SOMit; 
and: i = 1,2, …, 26; t = 2000, 2001, …, 2007.  (1) 
 
                                                 
59
  Even for GPs, with whom the average person in the population consults approximately four consultations 
annually, not every individual of the population consults a GP every year.  
60
  If units were not randomly assigned to the groups, such a potential for endogeneity bias can be addressed 
using instrumental variables. This is an alternative to attempting to identify and control for all possible 
factors that might be correlated with both the regressor and the outcome variable of interest. Instrumental 
variables must only be correlated with the independent variable. 
61
  An ecological fallacy (or ecological inference fallacy) is a logical fallacy in the interpretation of statistical 
data where inferences about the nature of individuals are deduced from inference for the group to which 
those individuals belong (see Kramer, G. H. 1983. “The Ecological Fallacy Revisited: Aggregate- versus 
Individual-level Findings on Economics and Elections, and Sociotropic Voting.” The American Political 
Science Review 77(1): 92-111.). 
  
84
The statistical examination of the six dependent variables Yit shows that they are distributed 
in a continuous form62, normally distributed63 (see Appendix, Figure 11), and do not contain 
any outliers; thus, the use of a parametric linear model is appropriate (Bryan 2008). Fixed-
effects models (FEMs) and random-effects models (REMs) are suitable for this purpose64.  
REMs make use of variances both within groups and between groups of observations. More 
information is used in this case; consequently, REMs are generally more efficient than FEMs. 
However, REMs claim that the panel unit- (i.e., canton-) specific errors and the right-hand-
side variables (i.e., regressors) are uncorrelated. If this assumption is violated—basic 
knowledge about the reality of the federalist Swiss healthcare system makes such non-
correlation seem improbable—the REMs become inconsistent65. 
The (less efficient) FEMs have the limitation of only taking into account the variation within 
groups of observed individuals, which is why the effects of time-invariant variables66 on 
dependent variables cannot be calculated. FEMs estimate individual cantonal parameters in 
addition to those of the explanatory variables. Therefore, with limited observations, and to 
retain as much explanatory power as possible, it makes sense to estimate FEMs by a within-
transformation of the model (i.e., adjusting every variable with respect to the cantonal mean). 
Using the corresponding “FEM-within routine” (Bryan 2008)67, all coefficients are estimated. 
                                                 
62
  Most of the dependent variables in the model—the number of outpatient consultations or inpatient days per 
person and year—are count variables on the level of individual persons (and cannot, therefore, be negative, 
for example). However, because the variables actually used in the model are the calculated annual averages 
of these frequencies per capita of the cantonal population, a linear model—instead of a statistical count data 
model—was chosen. 
63
  To obtain better fit to the normality assumption of the dependent variable, the natural logarithms of HOS 
(i.e., LHOS) and AMB (i.e., LAMB) were used in the regression equations. 
64
  Pooled regression models (PRM) for panel data would be theoretically applicable as well. However, because 
PRMs neglects heterogeneity across observations (by assuming the same coefficients for all observations), 
those effects unique to each observation are all subsumed in the error terms (εit). If such treatment is not 
appropriate, the explanatory variables are no longer uncorrelated with εit, and the exogeneity assumption is 
no longer satisfied. Thus, the estimates from pooled OLS regression are biased and inconsistent, and 
compared to FEM and REM, they are also inefficient. 
65
  “Consistency” indicates that the estimate regarding the presumed relationship converges to the correct 
population parameter as the sample size increases (Antonakis, J., S. Bendahan, P. Jacquart, and R. Lalive. 
2010. “On making causal claims: A review and recommendations.” The Leadership Quarterly 21: 1086 - 
120.)  
66
  LAT is dropped from the FEMs. 
67
  The within-estimator for FEM substracts from every variable in the equation its individual specific mean 
value. This eliminates the individual effects that are time-invariant in FEM (see previous footnote). The 
transformed equation can now be calculated using OLS (which again demands strict endogeneity of the 
regressors). 
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The Hausman test can be used to check whether FEM and REM are consistent (see Appendix, 
Table 15). For two of the six models (viz., dependent variables AZG and LAMB), the 
Hausman test indicates that REM estimators are inconsistent; FEMs are preferred in this 
situation. For three dependent variables (viz., AZS, LHOS, and SOM), the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected, and the Hausman test fails for another of the variables (MED). 
Consequently, to favor consistency versus efficiency, to maintain better comparability 
between the six estimated models and to respond to theoretical aspects of the (federalist) 
Swiss healthcare system and to the characteristics of the (observational) data used, it is 
decided to calculate FEMs alone68. F-tests are applied to verify individual and joint linearity 
of the estimated parameters. All calculations and tests were performed with STATA11® 
software (see Appendix, Table 14). 
Moreover, previous studies (e.g., (Crivelli et al. 2003; Reich et al. 2011)) have used a log-log-
transform (i.e., logarithms of all variables on both sides of the regression equation) of the 
models they are estimating. This approach has the advantage of allowing an elasticity 
interpretation of the estimated coefficients. In this article, the linear form of the models has 
been retained, and the coefficients are estimators of the marginal effects of the independent 
variables.  
 
 
4.3 Results 
Submitting data to the DPS is optional for Swiss health insurance companies; thus, its 
coverage in 2007 (in 2000) applies “only” to 98 percent (92 percent) of all insured people. To 
estimate complete values (100 percent), the data are extrapolated using the statistics of the 
“Common Institution under the Federal Health Insurance Act” (GE-KVG 2011). The 
“Common Institution” runs the risk equalization system in the MHI; thus, its aggregated 
indicators cover all insured persons (i.e., the entire Swiss population). The extrapolation 
assumes that the missing 2 percent (8 percent) of persons in DPS have the same cost structure 
as the 98 percent (92 percent) of insured people who are included in DPS in 2007 (in 2000). 
All calculations presented hereafter are based on the extrapolated values of DPS. 
                                                 
68
  See the REM results in Appendix, Table 14. 
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Table 9 contains different indicators to describe the cantonal differences in levels and growth 
of the six dependent variables, which cover more than 90 percent of MHI health services (see 
Table 8). The average annual number of consultations of GP per capita (AZG) between 2000 
and 2007 is 3.7, and it varies between 2.3 contacts (cantons Geneva GE and Jura JU) and 4.7 
contacts (Glarus GL); this corresponds to an extreme quotient (EQ-)ratio of approximately 
1.6. The same indicators for specialists (AZS) are 1.2 (mean) and show fluctuations between 
0.7 contacts (Nidwalden NW, Obwalden OW and Uri UR) and 2.1 contacts in Basel-Stadt 
BS; the EQ for specialist services is greater at 3.2, indicating that larger differences between 
cantons occur for this domain than for GPs. 
 
Table 9: Dependent variables: levels
1
and trends
2
, 2000-2007 
MHI service domains: per-
capita utilization 
n 
(CAN-
TON
3
) 
T 
(YEAR) 
N 
(OBS) 
MEAN
4
 
STD
4
 MIN
4
 MAX
4
 EQ
4
 
∆ per-
cent 
2000-
2007
2
 
General practitioners: 
consultations (AZG) 
26 8 208 3.7 0.5 2.9 4.7 1.6 -0.2 % 
Specialist doctors: 
consultations (AZS) 
26 8 208 1.2 0.3 0.7 2.1 3.2 -0.9 % 
Inpatient hospital: hospital 
days (HOS) 
26 8 208 1.9 0.5 1.3 3.5 2.7 -0.5 % 
Outpatient hospital: 
consultations (AMB) 
26 8 208 0.9 0.5 0.6 2.7 4.5 7.1 % 
Outpatient drugs: 
costs (MED) 
26 8 208 420 89 287 572 2.0 3.2 % 
Nursing homes: 
days of stay (SOM) 
26 8 208 3.4 1.0 2.2 5.9 2.6 6.6 % 
Source: (santésuisse 2011a), calculations by the author. 
1) Average absolute numbers of per capita services, days and costs between 2000 and 2007. 
2) Average annual growth rates in percent of per capita services, days and costs between 2000 and 2007 (∆ 
percent 2000-2007). 
3) See Figure 2 and the full names and additional characteristics of cantons in Appendix, Table 12. 
4) MEAN = arithmetical mean; STD = standard deviation; MIN = minimal value; MAX = maximal value; EQ = 
extreme quotient = MAX/MIN. 
 
Hospital days (HOS) are 1.9 days per 1,000 persons and year. The cantonal variations range 
from 1.3 days (Nidwalden NW, Obwalden OW and Zug ZG) to 3.5 days (Basel-Stadt BS), 
which results in an EQ-ratio of 2.7. The consultations in outpatient hospitals (AMB) are at 0.9 
per capita annually. They fluctuate between 0.6 contacts (Schwyz SZ) and 2.7 contacts 
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(Basel-Stadt BS), and the ratio between these two extreme values is actually 4.5. This is the 
largest inter-cantonal variation across the six dependent variables. 
The average annual costs per capita for outpatient medication (MED) are CHF 420 and range 
from CHF 287 (Appenzell Innerrhoden AI) to CHF 572 (Basel-Stadt BS), with an EQ-ratio of 
2.0. Finally, there is an annual average of 3.4 nursing home days per capita (SOM) 
remunerated in the MHI program; this number varies between 2.2 (Valais VS) and 5.9 
(Appenzell Ausserhoden AR). Here, the result is an EQ-ratio of 2.6. 
The last indicator in Table 9 describes the general cantonal trends in the six variables during 
the observed period of eight years (∆ percent 2000–2007). The tendencies for the utilization 
of consultations of GPs per capita (AZG; −0.2 percent for the whole country) between 2000 
and 2007 are non-uniform: one half of the cantons show rising trends, and the other half show 
decreasing trends for this indicator. The result is also geographically non-uniform for the 
utilization of specialists (AZS; −0.9 percent), but particularly large cantons (see Figure 2) 
show decreasing trends. For the annual number of hospital days per capita (HOS; −0.5 
percent), some more cantons with decreasing trends can be found as well. 
The other three dependent variables—the consultations in outpatient hospitals (AMB; +7.1 
percent), the costs for outpatient medication (MED; +3.2 percent), and the number of nursing 
home days (SOM; +6.6 percent)—show expanding tendencies across all cantons. There is 
only one exception from this general trend: in canton Basel-Stadt (BS), the annual number of 
consultations in outpatient hospitals per capita (AMB) declined from 3.1 in 2000 to 2.5 in 
2007 (−3.0 percent annually). 
The descriptive statistics of the 12 independent variables in Table 10 are commented upon 
only very briefly (for information on data sources and definitions, see Appendix, Table 13). 
The densities of GPs (+0.2 percent annually) and specialists (+1.3) increased, as did the share 
of outpatient hospital costs relative to total outpatient costs (+2.4). The density of hospital 
beds (-2.4) declined, however. All demand-side variables (ALT65/85, POP, ALQ, and VEL) 
show increasing trends of +0.2 to +7.5 percent annually between 2000 and 2007. The share of 
higher deductibles grew by +0.2 percent in the same period, much less than the share of 
alternative MHI plans at +27.2 percent. 
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Table 10: Independent variables: descriptive statistics 
Independent variables 
n 
(CAN-
TON
1
) 
T 
(YEAR) 
N 
(OBS) 
MEAN
2
 STD
2
 MIN
2
 MAX
2
 EQ
2
 
∆ per-
cent 
2000-
2007
3
 
Density of general 
practitioners (GRU) 
26 8 208 76.9 9. 8 53.1 101.4 1.9 +0.2 % 
Density of specialists (incl. 
psychiatrists) (SPZ) 
26 8 208 35.73 16.3 4.48 89.0 19.9 +1.3 % 
Density of hospital beds 
(BED) 
26 8 208 556.9 227.3 219.9 1336.9 6.1 -2.4 % 
Share of outpatient hospital 
costs (PAM) 
26 8 208 21.7 2.9 13.8 29.5 2.1 +2.4 % 
Population 65+ / 85+) 
(ALT65 / ALT85) 
26 
/ 26 
8 / 
8 
208 
/ 208 
162.4 
/ 22.3 
19.0 
/ 4.4 
122.4 
/ 14.1 
218.6 
/ 36.6 
1.8 
/ 2.6 
+1.1 % 
/ +2.0 % 
Population density 
(POP) 
26 8 208 4.6 9.7 0.3 50.7 194.1 +0.6 % 
Unemployment rate 
(ALQ) 
26 8 208 13.6 6.8 1.4 37. 9 27.6 +7.5 % 
Average cantonal income 
(VEL) 
26 8 208 10. 8 0.2 10.4 11.7 1.1 +0.2 % 
Higher deductibles 
(FRA) 
26 8 208 369.1 104.3 154.0 611.6 4.0 +0.5 % 
Alternative MHI-plans 
(MOD) 
26 8 208 93.6 79.5 1.4 338.0 241.9 +27.2 % 
Latin-speaking population 
(LAT) 
26 1 26 331.9 348.4 65.0 960.7 14.8 ̶ 
Trend variable (linear) 
(TRD) 
1 8 8 7.5 2.3 4 11 2.8 +15.5 % 
Sources: see Appendix, Table 13, calculations by the author. 
1) See Figure 2 and the full names and more characteristics of cantons in Appendix, Table 12. 
2) MEAN = arithmetical mean; STD = standard deviation; MIN = minimal value; MAX = maximal value; EQ = 
extreme quotient =MAX/MIN. 
3) Average annual growth rates in percent between 2000 and 2007 (∆ percent 2000-2007). 
 
Table 11 gives an overview of the results of the multivariate estimates for the six explanatory 
FEMs (see complete results in Appendix, Table 14). The cantonal and time-related variations 
of the utilization of GP services per capita (AZG) are significantly and positively linked with 
higher densities of general practitioners (GRU) and specialists (SPZ), a larger share of 
outpatient hospital costs (PAM), a greater population density (POP), a higher average 
cantonal income (VEL), and a larger share of high deductibles (FRA). However, a negative 
relationship exists between GP utilization and a greater hospital bed density (BED), a higher 
unemployment rate (ALQ), and more alternative MHI insurance plans (MOD). 
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Table 11: Multivariate estimation results (FEM and GLS estimators) 
Dependent 
Variables 
Independent 
Variables 
General. 
practi-
tioners 
consul-
tations 
AZG 
Specialist 
doctors 
 
consul-
tations 
AZS 
Inpatient 
hospitals 
 
hospital 
days 
LHOS 
Outpatient 
hospitals 
 
consulta-
tions 
LAMB 
Outpatient 
drugs 
 
costs 
 
MED 
Nursing 
homes 
 
days of 
stay 
SOM 
Density of general 
practitioners GRU 
0.042*** 
(0.0036) 
0.002 
(0.0022) 
-0.001 
(0.0027) 
-0.008** 
(0.0036) 
1.379*** 
(0.4920) 
0.014 
(0.0110) 
Density of specialist 
doctors SPZ 
0.013*** 
(0.0038) 
0.020*** 
(0.0024) 
0.004 
(0.0028) 
0.003 
(0.0038) 
1.322** 
(0.5218) 
-0.016 
(0.0112) 
Density of hospital 
beds BED 
-0.0001** 
(0.0002) 
-0.00007 
(0.0001) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.00004 
(0.0002) 
0.022 
(0.0257) 
0.001 
(0.0005) 
Share of outpatient 
hospital costs PAM 
0.012** 
(0.0057) 
0.004 
(0.0036) 
0.002 
(0.0043) 
0.056*** 
(0.0058) 
-0.935 
(0.7881) 
-0.058*** 
(0.0170) 
Population 65+/ 85+
1)
 
ALT65 / ALT85* 
0.004 
(0.0033) 
0.002 
(0.0021) 
-0.001 
(0.0005) 
0.010*** 
(0.0034) 
-0.644 
(0.4610) 
0.185***
1)
 
(0.0300) 
Population density 
POP 
0.259*** 
(0.0772) 
0.116** 
(0.0486) 
-0.037 
(0.0582) 
0.216*** 
(0.0788) 
-22.629** 
(10.6982) 
0.071 
(0.2287) 
Unemployment rate 
ALQ 
-0.019*** 
(0.0031) 
-0.015*** 
(0.0020) 
0.007*** 
(0.0023) 
-0.090*** 
(0.0032) 
1.348*** 
(0.4308) 
0.019** 
(0.0096) 
Average cantonal 
income VEL 
0.390*** 
(0.1416) 
0.083 
(0.089) 
0.143 
(0.1067) 
-0.048 
(0.1445) 
14.903 
(19.6131) 
0.836** 
(0.4224) 
Share of higher deduc-
tibles FRA 
0.001*** 
(0.0004) 
0.001*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0001 
(0.0027) 
0.002*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.132*** 
(0.0487) 
0.004*** 
(0.0010) 
Alternative MHI plans  
MOD 
-0.001** 
(0.0004) 
0.0003 
(0.0002) 
0.0001 
(0.0003) 
-0.0002 
(0.0004) 
-0.213*** 
(0.0511) 
0.0002 
(0.0011) 
Trend variable 
TRD 
-0.016 
(0.0105) 
-0.021*** 
(0.0066) 
-0.017** 
(0.0079) 
0.043*** 
(0.0107) 
15.121*** 
(1.4550) 
0.137*** 
(0.0307) 
Source: calculations by the author. 
Legend: Standard errors in parentheses. *** Significant at 0.01 percent, ** significant at 0.05 percent  
omitted = FEM can only estimate coefficients for variables that vary over time. 
1) To estimate the utilization of nursing homes, the population 85 years and older is used. 
 
The utilization of more specialist services per capita (AZS) is significantly linked with a 
higher density of specialists (SPZ), a higher population density (POP), and a larger share of 
high deductibles (FRA). Otherwise, lower unemployment rates (ALQ) and the trend variable 
(TRD) accompany reduced utilization of specialists. 
The (logarithmic) number of (inpatient) hospital days per capita of population (LHOS) shows 
one significant positive correlation to the unemployment rate (ALQ) and one significant 
negative correlation to the trend variable (TRD); the latter expresses the general downward 
trend in the per-capita utilization of inpatient hospitals. 
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For the differences in the (logarithmic) quantities of outpatient hospital utilization (LAMB), 
the estimates show significant positive correlations with larger shares of outpatient hospital 
services (PAM), older populations (ALT65), higher population densities (POP), more high 
deductibles (FRA), and the trend variable (TRD). Significant negative associations occur with 
a greater supply of GPs (GRU) and a higher unemployment rate (ALQ), with all other factors 
proving themselves to be insignificant. 
The variation in drug costs per capita (MED) is highly significant and positively associated 
with a higher density of GPs (GRU) and specialists (SPZ), the cantonal unemployment rate 
(ALQ), and the trend variable (TRD). A greater population density (POP), a larger share of 
high deductibles (FRA), and a larger proportion of alternative MHI plans (MOD) are 
significantly and negatively related with drug costs per capita (MED). 
Finally, the following factors are shown to be significantly and positively related to the per 
capita differences in nursing home utilization (SOM): a larger share of the population being 
older than 85 years (ALT85), a higher unemployment rate (ALQ), a higher average cantonal 
income (VEL), a larger share of high deductibles (FRA), and the general trend (TRD). In 
contrast, negative interrelations of the utilization of nursing homes per capita (SOM) are 
found for a greater share of hospital outpatient services (PAM). 
 
 
4.4 Discussion 
The results’ Section described how the interplay of the independent variables influences the 
utilization of every individual domain of MHI services. Due to having used exactly the same 
set of independent variables for all six models, the perspective can now be changed: the in-
terrelation of every independent variable with the six domains of MHI services can be 
discussed simultaneously by comparing them across these domains. 
Higher densities of general practitioners (GRU) are significantly correlated with greater per 
capita use of their own services and a higher rate of using drugs. A higher potential supply of 
specialists (SPZ) is also significantly associated with a more intense use of their own services, 
more intense utilization of GP services and greater consumption of drugs. No significant 
positive correlation is found for more hospital beds (BED). Finally, a higher share of hospital 
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outpatient services on total outpatient services (PAM) goes hand in hand with more intense 
per-capita utilization of such services, including GP services. 
Three of the four supply-side variables show one significantly negative predictor. More GPs 
(GRU) are negatively correlated with the utilization of—relatively expensive—outpatient 
hospitals. This issue could be further analyzed in terms of stabilizing healthcare costs. Finally, 
more hospital beds (BED) accompanies less frequent utilization of GPs. The function of GPs 
warrants their supply for health services in remote areas of the country (i.e., those without 
hospitals); this circumstance could explain this negative association. 
Caution is warranted in directly suspecting that supplier inducement explains the association 
between higher population-physician ratios and more extensive utilization of medical services 
(Carlsen and Grytten 1998, 2000; Crivelli and Domenighetti 2003b; Gosden et al. 2001). This 
relationship could simply reflect an effect of supply response to variations in health status or 
improved availability. Conversely, in healthcare systems, where service providers are mainly 
remunerated by fee-for-service schemes and have clear incentives to bring their income to a 
targeted level, the existence of over-supply and supplier inducement is more probable. 
Moreover, effects presented regarding the supply-side factors may partly be an expression of 
the two different types of cantonal health delivery schemes, as they were described in a 
former Swiss study using qualitative approaches (Haari et al. 2002). On the one hand, they 
may show a “center-type scheme”, in which high (inpatient and outpatient) hospital and 
specialist density and use accompany intensive supply and utilization of hospital and 
specialist services. On the other hand, they may reflect the “peripheral-type scheme” of a 
cantonal health system, which is more focused on primary care and nursing homes, in which 
supply and utilization of specialists and hospital services are restrained. 
Significant positive associations between the use of healthcare providers and all four tested 
factors on the demand side are found. Higher age (ALT65 or ALT85) is interrelated with 
more intense utilization of outpatient hospitals and nursing homes. This result makes sense in 
the nursing home branch, but the relationship between higher age and more intense outpatient 
hospital utilization is rather unexpected69. Higher population densities (POP) are positively 
correlated with more intense utilization of both types of physicians and with outpatient 
                                                 
69
  Higher age was introduced as being correlated with greater morbidity and mortality, as well as with gender 
(more women). Moreover, it is correlated with higher population density. 
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hospitals; proximity to providers and fewer social barriers in urban areas to seeing a health 
professional quickly might be responsible for this as well. High unemployment (ALQ), a 
proxy variable for more people living in difficult economic or social conditions, is positively 
associated with the consumption of drugs and with more frequent or longer stays in hospitals 
and nursing homes. Finally, a higher average cantonal income (VEL) is significantly positive 
correlated with higher levels of utilization of per capita GP services and nursing homes. The 
problem of ecological fallacy (see paragraph 4.2.2) seems to be present here (see also the 
following paragraph). 
Among the demand-side variables, the “proxy indicator” for deprivation, the unemployment 
rate (ALQ), shows significant negative interrelations with per capita outpatient consultations 
with GPs, specialists, and hospitals. This result is certainly “polluted” by ecological fallacy. 
The financial difficulties of individuals living in impoverished circumstances, could still 
explain partly this finding and merits special attention. It could suggest that poorer people 
avoid outpatient treatments but go through greater drug consumption and more or longer 
unavoidable stays in hospitals or nursing homes. An undersupply of such groups of 
vulnerable people in the outpatient sector (Bisig and Gutzwiler 2004) could have serious 
medical, social, and financial consequences. 
The negative association between the population density (POP) and the costs for outpatient 
pharmaceutical treatment per capita was unexpected. Ignoring the ecological fallacy, an 
explanation could be that a higher number of (outpatient) hospital activities in urban areas 
partially substitute provision of drugs delivered by pharmacies and physicians—i.e., which 
would otherwise be contained in the indicator MED. It could also indicate that people in 
urban areas show a tendency to pay more out of pocket for drugs, particularly in combination 
with higher deductibles. 
Regarding the two indicators of health services financing, one would expect slowing effects 
from higher deductibles (FRA) on all domains of health services. However, as indicated 
earlier in the article, the interrelation of FRA with the dependent variables is problematic in 
different ways: FRA “masks” other (omitted) variables, is exposed to a selection bias, and 
makes committing an ecological fallacy very probable. Keeping this in mind, the results in 
Table 11 show that higher deductibles actually correspond to more intense utilization of GPs 
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(GRU), specialists (SPZ), outpatient hospital services (PAM), and nursing homes (SOM), but 
lower medication costs per capita (MED).  
Slowing effects could also be expected by greater availability of alternative MHI plans 
(MOD) in the population for all health service provider domains, except for GPs given their 
coordination functions in alternative MHI plans (Seematter-Bagnoud et al. 2008). In fact, a 
negative association between more MOD and GP utilization (AZG), as well as for outpatient 
drugs (MED), is found. Therefore, the assumption of higher utilization because of the 
coordination function of GPs in such plans is not confirmed, which could connect to the 
limitation that only the frequencies of contacts are measured in the models. Better 
coordination by GPs does not necessarily mean more frequent use of the services of this 
domain of providers.  
The trend variables (TRD) can explain additional variance of the dependent variables in the 
six models. The results obtained for TRD in Table 11 seem reasonable: increasing trends 
observed in the descriptive statistics (see Table 9) for hospital outpatient services (AMB), 
drugs (MED), and nursing homes (SOM) are again visible in the significantly positive 
coefficients attached to the regression results of LAM, MED, and SOM. The same is true for 
the declining trends in inpatient hospital utilization (LHOS) and the per capita use of 
specialists (AZS) and GPs (AZG, not significant).  
Whereas declining trends for GP and inpatient hospital utilization are broadly expected in 
Switzerland (Wildi et al. 2005), most people would not expect such a reduction for specialist 
doctors who have constantly rising costs. However, this finding can be further explained with 
a limitation in the dependent “quantity” variables. Because one can only count the number of 
consultations in the outpatient sector (and the number of days in the inpatient sector), changes 
in medical practices (Borowitz 2010; OECD 2011b) that occur across cantons and over time 
cannot be seen. Thus, for specialist doctors in Switzerland, there exists a trend toward fewer 
(but more intense) consultations per capita during the observed time period. 
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4.5 Conclusions 
The new and impactful points in this work are as follows: differences in healthcare utilization 
in space and time are investigated on a detailed level—quantity indicators for six individual 
service domains within MHI. At the same time, the variation in these detailed six variables is 
tested with an identical set of 12 influence factors that represent explanatory models 
containing supply-side, demand-side, and financing-side variables. The testing of such a 
constant set of 12 explanation variables across the six models allows a bidirectional 
interpretation of the results. In addition to understanding how each of the six target variables 
is interrelated with the whole set of regressors, one can learn more about how each individual 
influence factor is associated with all six healthcare service domains. 
Concerning methodology, larger problems appeared during the analysis: one important 
methodological problem is the obvious existence of endogeneity in the regression models, 
caused by omitted variables and selection bias. In addition to refraining from the use of REM, 
the results for the six FEMs are limited in the sense that no direct causal inferences for any 
individual regressor should be made in such a situation. This circumstance is particularly true 
for regressors such as ALQ and FRA, where the endogeneity problem is most obvious. 
Another important problem comes from the fact that one cannot work with individual 
observations on the first level of the analysis. The dependent variables in the model are mean 
values of age-gender-canton groups that are approximately normally distributed. However, 
the individual observations used to calculate these mean values are not at all normally 
distributed. 
Concerning data, the article also could have been better in a few ways: a closer look at more 
detailed domains of health service providers, such as different types of hospitals or different 
types of outpatient specialists, could have been possible. With respect to the spatial 
dimension, analyses of variations on a more detailed level as well—e.g., at the level of 
districts or even municipalities in Switzerland—could have been productive. However, the 
lack of access to these types of disposable data did not allow this. Primarily for data 
protection reasons, DPS only aggregates patients by age-group, gender, and canton, leading to 
the consequences mentioned above. As a result, individual data sources on healthcare service 
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utilization, including the sociodemographic characteristics70 of patients, would certainly allow 
further validation of the results of this article. 
The findings of this paper confirm that consumption and cost-containment strategies in health 
care should integrate several supply-side, demand-side, and financing elements (Camenzind 
2008). First, the cantonal structure of the healthcare supply system seems to be a crucial 
element. High densities of healthcare suppliers are interrelated—at least in their combination 
with fee-for-service remuneration, target incomes, and contracting obligation for insurers—in 
more intense utilization per capita of most domains of healthcare services and in greater drug 
consumption (Gosden et al. 2001). Whether or not this happens through supplier-induced de-
mand, health policy authorities should be made aware of this fact. 
Among these supply-side elements, special attention should be paid to the growing amounts 
of relatively expensive outpatient hospital services (Strunk, Ginsburg, and Gabel 2002)71. The 
results in the models show that higher densities of GPs might have a negative correlation with 
hospital outpatient use, thereby suggesting that a geographically well-distributed supply of 
primary care services is important. Moreover, it seems that a greater supply of specialized and 
relatively costly outpatient healthcare services might be associated with a lower intensity of 
nursing home utilization (Norton 2000). What is beneficial for older patients, who normally 
try to avoid institutionalization (with its relatively large out-of-pocket and relatively small 
MHI funding in Switzerland) as long as possible, can cause more costs elsewhere in the MHI. 
Furthermore, the extent of potentially drivers of healthcare services and costs on the demand 
side—viz., aging population, urbanization, and social deprivation of certain groups appearing 
together with rising average incomes (i.e., greater economic inequalities)—seem to contribute 
to regional variations in consumption and costs of healthcare services. Political strategies to 
counter such factors could be developed on the cantonal or national levels. Many other 
political and social areas would benefit from the development of an active strategy against 
problems including social isolation, poverty, unemployment, educational deficits, and 
language deficits.  
                                                 
70
  Among other advantages, this would reduce the problem of committing “ecological fallacies.” 
71
  Compared to the health services provided by physicians in medical practices, the production process for a 
given health problem in outpatient hospitals is considered to be at relatively great expense. However, it is 
possible that the price (i.e., the TARMED taxpoint value in Switzerland) for an identical individual service 
item is higher for medical practices than for oupatient hospitals (e.g., in canton Ticino).  
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Appendix, Chapter 4 
• List of abbreviations used (see Table 12 for the acronyms of the Swiss 
cantons and Table 13 for the acronyms of the tested variables) 
MHI: mandatory health insurance; GP: General practitioner; FEM: fixed-effects regression 
models; REM: random-effects regression models; PRN: pooled-regression models; DPS: 
Datenpool santésuisse; ESPOP: Swiss population statistics; FSO: Swiss Federal Statistical 
Office; MS: Swiss medical statistics of hospitals; AVAM: labor placement and statistics 
system; SECO: Swiss state secretariat for economic affairs; VZ 2000: Swiss population 
census 2000; CHF: Swiss francs.  
 
  
97
• Additional Tables and Figures 
Table 12: Swiss cantons: an overview 
Name of cantons Acronyms 
Surface 
area
1
 in km
2
 
Population 
in million 
persons
2
 
(2009) 
Population 
density 
(persons per 
km
2
) 
Resources 
index
3
 
2004/2005 
MHI costs 
per capita
4
 
2007 
Aargau AG 1,404 0.600 427 87.8 2,167 
Appenzell Innerrhoden AI 173 0.016 93 82.7 1561 
Appenzell Ausserhoden AR 243 0.053 218 79.8 1,869 
Bern BE 5,959 0.974 163 74.0 2,663 
Basel-Landschaft BL 518 0.273 363 110.2 2,508 
Basel-Stadt BS 37 0.188 7,378 148.6 3,291 
Fribourg FR 1,671 0.273 163 74.9 2,286 
Geneva GE 282 0.453 1,604 155.4 3,238 
Glarus GL 685 0.039 57 96.1 2,032 
Graubünden GR 7,105 0.192 27 84.9 2,141 
Jura JU 839 0.070 83 66.5 2,450 
Lucerne LU 1,493 0.373 250 77.0 2,026 
Neuchâtel NE 803 0.172 214 91.0 2,577 
Nidwalden NW 276 0.041 149 124.6 1,862 
Obwalden OW 491 0.035 71 67.0 1,937 
St. Gallen SG 2,026 0.475 235 77.0 1,993 
Schaffhausen SH 298 0.076 255 92.9 2,301 
Schwyz SZ 790 0.145 183 75.8 2,381 
Solothurn SO 908 0.253 279 135.6 2,027 
Thurgau TG 991 0.245 247 76.5 2,070 
Ticino TI 2,812 0.336 119 102.8 2,892 
Uri UR 1,077 0.035 33 67.0 1,991 
Vaud VD 3,212 0.702 219 96.7 2,777 
Valais VS 5,224 0.307 59 61.6 2,216 
Zug ZG 239 0.111 465 204.0 2,019 
Zurich ZH 1,729 1.351 781 132.1 2,381 
Switzerland CH 41,285 7.786 189 100.0 2,443 
1) Source: (FSO 2011i). 
2) Source: (FSO 2011b). 
3) The resources index is an indicator for the financial power of a canton calculated from the amount of tax 
revenues per capita of the cantonal population. (see Eidgenössische Finanzverwaltung, Verordnung vom 
7.11.2007 über den Finanz- und Lastenausgleich (FiLaV, SR 613.21, 
http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/6/613.21.de.pdf). 
4) Source: (santésuisse 2011a). 
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Table 13: Dependent and independent variables 
Variables tested Acronym 
Sources
1
 (Institu-
tion) 
Years Definition 
Dependent Variables     
General practitioners (GP): 
consultations 
AZG DPS / ESPOP  
(santésuisse / FSO) 
2000 – 2007 MHI consultations (GP)  
per capita 
2
  
Specialist doctors: 
consultations 
AZS DPS / ESPOP  
(santésuisse / FSO)  
2000 – 2007 MHI consultations (specialists)  
per capita  
Inpatient hospitals: 
hospital days 
HOS DPS / ESPOP  
(santésuisse / FSO) 
2000 – 2007 MHI hospital days (inpatient) per capita 
Outpatient hospitals: consul-
tations 
AMB DPS / ESPOP  
(santésuisse / FSO) 
2000 – 2007  MHI consultations (outpatient)  
per capita  
Outpatient drugs: 
costs 
MED DPS / ESPOP  
(santésuisse / FSO) 
2000 – 2007 MHI costs
3
 for drugs (outpatient)  
per capita in CHF 
Nursing homes: 
days of stay  
SOM DPS / ESPOP  
(santésuisse / FSO) 
2000 – 2007 MHI days of care (nursing homes)
4
 per 
capita  
Independent Variables     
Supply-side     
Density of general  
practitioners (GP) 
GRU DPS / ESPOP  
(santésuisse / FSO) 
2000 – 2007 Number of GP (equivalents full-time) 
per 100,000 population 
Density of specialists 
(including psychiatrists) 
SPZ DPS / ESPOP  
(santésuisse / FSO) 
2000 – 2007 Number of specialists (equivalents full-
time) per 100,000 population 
Density of hospital beds BED MS / ESPOP (FSO) 2000 – 2007  Number of beds (K11 +12 +21 +22 
+23) per 100,000 population 
Share of hospital  
outpatient costs 
PAM DPS (santésuisse) 2000 – 2007  MHI share of costs hospital outpatient 
on total outpatient costs CHI 
Demand-side     
Population 65+/85+ ALT65 / 
ALT85 
ESPOP (FSO) 2000 – 2007 Share of people 65+ / 85+ years per 
1,000 population 
Population density  POP Areal statistics / ESPOP 
(FSO) 
2000 – 2007 Number of inhabitants per canton 
(persons per hectare) 
Unemployment rate ALQ AVAM / ESPOP (SECO 
/ FSO) 
2000 – 2007 Registered unemployed persons 
(Ø year) per 1,000 population  
Average cantonal income
5
 VEL Statistics on National 
Accounts (FSO) 
1998 – 2005 Log. transform. of cantonal income
6
 
per capita of population in CHF 
Financing     
Higher deductibles FRA DPS (santésuisse) 2000 – 2007 MHI share of insured with deductible  
> CHF 300 on total of 1,000 insured 
Alternative MHI-plans  MOD DPS (santésuisse) 2000 – 2007 MHI share of insured alternative plans 
on total of 1,000 insured  
Politics / various     
Latin-speaking population LAT VZ 2000 (FSO) 2000 Share of primary language “non-
German” per 1,000 population 
Bevölkerung Trend variable (linear) TRD - 2000 - 2007 2000 = 1, 2001 = 2, etc. 
1) Sources: (FSO 2000, 2011b, 2011c, 2011i, 2011j; santésuisse 2011a; SECO 2011) 
2) Residence rule: utilization of providers located in the same canton or of providers located in other cantons by 
the resident population of the canton. 
3) Drugs are administered by outpatient physicians and pharmacies. 
4) Total social-medical institutions (for the elderly, the chronically ill, and disabled individuals). 
5) After checking the distributional characteristics of all dependent and independent variables, it was decided to 
transform the average cantonal income per capita (VEL) into its logarithmic form. 
6) Per capita sum of income that residential units (private households, firms, public households) of a canton 
receive for their productive activity for the economy inside or outside the canton. 
 
  
  
99
Figure 11: Normality tests of the dependent variables AZG, AZS, LHOS, LAMB, MED, and 
SOM 
pnorm AZG 
 
pnorm AZS 
 
pnorm LHOS 
 
pnorm LAMB 
 
pnorm MED 
 
pnorm SOM 
 
Source: Source: (santésuisse 2011a).; calculations by the author. 
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Table 14: Detailed results of the multivariate estimation results: fixed effects (fe) and random 
effects (re) models for AZG, AZS, LHOS, LAMB, MED, and SOM 
xtreg azg gru spz bed pam alt65 pop alq vel fra mod lat trd, fe 
note: lat omitted because of collinearity 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       208 
Group variable: reg                             Number of groups   =        26 
R-sq:  within  = 0.7215                         Obs per group: min =         8 
       between = 0.0024                                        avg =       8.0 
       overall = 0.0038                                        max =         8 
                                                F(11,171)          =     40.28 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9823                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         azg |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         gru |   .0418876   .0035522    11.79   0.000     .0348759    .0488994 
         spz |   .0134024    .003767     3.56   0.000     .0059667    .0208382 
         bed |  -.0004486   .0001859    -2.41   0.017    -.0008155   -.0000817 
         pam |   .0116055   .0056899     2.04   0.043     .0003741    .0228369 
       alt65 |   .0038879   .0033285     1.17   0.244    -.0026824    .0104581 
         pop |   .2585142   .0772388     3.35   0.001     .1060499    .4109785 
         alq |  -.0185646   .0031104    -5.97   0.000    -.0247044   -.0124249 
         vel |   .3899042   .1416027     2.75   0.007     .1103899    .6694186 
         fra |   .0012681   .0003519     3.60   0.000     .0005735    .0019627 
         mod |  -.0009535   .0003691    -2.58   0.011    -.0016822   -.0002249 
         lat |  (omitted) 
         trd |  -.0160249   .0105046    -1.53   0.129    -.0367603    .0047105 
       _cons |   -6.01164   1.568309    -3.83   0.000    -9.107378   -2.915901 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  2.7179603 
     sigma_e |  .09900062 
         rho |  .99867501   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(25, 171) =    42.68             Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
 
xtreg azg gru spz bed pam alt65 pop alq vel fra mod lat trd, re 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       208 
Group variable: reg                             Number of groups   =        26 
R-sq:  within  = 0.6975                         Obs per group: min =         8 
       between = 0.6614                                        avg =       8.0 
       overall = 0.6588                                        max =         8 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(12)      =    417.29 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         azg |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         gru |   .0410743   .0032251    12.74   0.000     .0347532    .0473955 
         spz |   .0066046   .0034101     1.94   0.053     -.000079    .0132882 
         bed |  -.0002446   .0001739    -1.41   0.159    -.0005854    .0000961 
         pam |   .0099005   .0058625     1.69   0.091    -.0015897    .0213907 
       alt65 |   .0070761   .0025977     2.72   0.006     .0019848    .0121675 
         pop |  -.0090607   .0070614    -1.28   0.199    -.0229008    .0047793 
         alq |  -.0145792   .0030327    -4.81   0.000    -.0205232   -.0086353 
         vel |   .3477151   .1291551     2.69   0.007     .0945757    .6008544 
         fra |    .000902   .0003366     2.68   0.007     .0002422    .0015617 
         mod |  -.0007522   .0003624    -2.08   0.038    -.0014626   -.0000418 
         lat |  -.0008229    .000193    -4.26   0.000    -.0012011   -.0004446 
         trd |  -.0171358   .0099782    -1.72   0.086    -.0366926    .0024211 
       _cons |   -4.25949   1.471093    -2.90   0.004    -7.142778   -1.376201 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |   .2649882 
     sigma_e |  .09900062 
         rho |  .87751638   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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xtreg azs gru spz bed pam alt65 pop alq vel fra mod lat trd, fe 
note: lat omitted because of collinearity 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       208 
Group variable: reg                             Number of groups   =        26 
R-sq:  within  = 0.6800                         Obs per group: min =         8 
       between = 0.5833                                        avg =       8.0 
       overall = 0.5524                                        max =         8 
                                                F(11,171)          =     33.04 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9811                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         azs |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         gru |   .0021977   .0022334     0.98   0.327     -.002211    .0066063 
         spz |   .0202506   .0023685     8.55   0.000     .0155753    .0249258 
         bed |   -.000071   .0001169    -0.61   0.545    -.0003016    .0001597 
         pam |   .0038578   .0035775     1.08   0.282     -.003204    .0109196 
       alt65 |   .0023832   .0020928     1.14   0.256    -.0017478    .0065143 
         pop |    .116347    .048564     2.40   0.018     .0204848    .2122092 
         alq |  -.0152459   .0019557    -7.80   0.000    -.0191062   -.0113855 
         vel |   .0833328   .0890329     0.94   0.351    -.0924124    .2590779 
         fra |   .0013068   .0002212     5.91   0.000     .0008701    .0017435 
         mod |   .0003101   .0002321     1.34   0.183     -.000148    .0007682 
         lat |  (omitted) 
         trd |  -.0209927   .0066048    -3.18   0.002    -.0340301   -.0079553 
       _cons |   -1.67962   .9860771    -1.70   0.090    -3.626071    .2668315 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |   1.161147 
     sigma_e |  .06224681 
         rho |  .99713441   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(25, 171) =    20.05             Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
 
xtreg azs gru spz bed pam alt65 pop alq vel fra mod lat trd, re 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       208 
Group variable: reg                             Number of groups   =        26 
R-sq:  within  = 0.6594                         Obs per group: min =         8 
       between = 0.8769                                        avg =       8.0 
       overall = 0.8580                                        max =         8 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(12)      =    523.13 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         azs |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         gru |   .0035493   .0016939     2.10   0.036     .0002293    .0068692 
         spz |   .0179159   .0017924    10.00   0.000      .014403    .0214289 
         bed |   .0001633   .0000951     1.72   0.086    -.0000232    .0003498 
         pam |    .000259   .0035082     0.07   0.941     -.006617     .007135 
       alt65 |    .000894   .0012578     0.71   0.477    -.0015713    .0033593 
         pop |   .0004654   .0030521     0.15   0.879    -.0055166    .0064474 
         alq |  -.0135017   .0017584    -7.68   0.000    -.0169481   -.0100552 
         vel |   .0991667   .0679205     1.46   0.144    -.0339551    .2322885 
         fra |   .0010549   .0001927     5.48   0.000     .0006773    .0014325 
         mod |   .0003776    .000204     1.85   0.064    -.0000222    .0007774 
         lat |  -.0000548   .0000828    -0.66   0.508     -.000217    .0001074 
         trd |  -.0140069   .0055643    -2.52   0.012    -.0249127   -.0031011 
       _cons |  -1.114498   .7810555    -1.43   0.154    -2.645339    .4163425 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .10195682 
     sigma_e |  .06224681 
         rho |  .72847203   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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xtreg lhos gru spz bed pam alt65 pop alq vel fra mod lat trd, fe 
note: lat omitted because of collinearity 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       208 
Group variable: reg                             Number of groups   =        26 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1750                         Obs per group: min =         8 
       between = 0.2329                                        avg =       8.0 
       overall = 0.1931                                        max =         8 
                                                F(11,171)          =      3.30 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9017                        Prob > F           =    0.0004 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        lhos |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         gru |   -.001152   .0026774    -0.43   0.668    -.0064371    .0041332 
         spz |   .0037698   .0028394     1.33   0.186     -.001835    .0093745 
         bed |   .0001374   .0001401     0.98   0.328    -.0001392    .0004139 
         pam |   .0018571   .0042888     0.43   0.666    -.0066086    .0103229 
       alt65 |  -.0005237   .0025089    -0.21   0.835    -.0054761    .0044286 
         pop |  -.0369658   .0582189    -0.63   0.526    -.1518861    .0779544 
         alq |   .0072861   .0023445     3.11   0.002     .0026583     .011914 
         vel |   .1432328   .1067333     1.34   0.181    -.0674518    .3539173 
         fra |   .0001171   .0002652     0.44   0.659    -.0004064    .0006407 
         mod |   .0001409   .0002782     0.51   0.613    -.0004083    .0006902 
         lat |  (omitted) 
         trd |   -.017481   .0079179    -2.21   0.029    -.0331104   -.0018517 
       _cons |  -.8764016   1.182116    -0.74   0.459    -3.209821    1.457018 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .45472293 
     sigma_e |  .07462193 
         rho |  .97377604   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(25, 171) =    11.79             Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
 
xtreg lhos gru spz bed pam alt65 pop alq vel fra mod lat trd, re 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       208 
Group variable: reg                             Number of groups   =        26 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1349                         Obs per group: min =         8 
       between = 0.7884                                        avg =       8.0 
       overall = 0.7180                                        max =         8 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(12)      =    110.91 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        lhos |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         gru |   .0009023   .0018183     0.50   0.620    -.0026616    .0044662 
         spz |   .0009728   .0019231     0.51   0.613    -.0027964     .004742 
         bed |   .0001607   .0001046     1.54   0.124    -.0000442    .0003657 
         pam |   .0004262   .0040339     0.11   0.916    -.0074802    .0083325 
       alt65 |   .0051321   .0013091     3.92   0.000     .0025664    .0076978 
         pop |   .0029516   .0031079     0.95   0.342    -.0031399     .009043 
         alq |   .0081571   .0019925     4.09   0.000      .004252    .0120623 
         vel |   .0597786   .0727087     0.82   0.411    -.0827279    .2022851 
         fra |  -.0000655   .0002164    -0.30   0.762    -.0004897    .0003586 
         mod |   .0002001   .0002263     0.88   0.376    -.0002433    .0006436 
         lat |   .0001042   .0000843     1.24   0.216    -.0000611    .0002695 
         trd |  -.0258708   .0061853    -4.18   0.000    -.0379939   -.0137477 
       _cons |  -1.040902   .8385915    -1.24   0.215    -2.684511    .6027072 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .10025233 
     sigma_e |  .07462193 
         rho |  .64348256   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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xtreg lamb gru spz bed pam alt65 pop alq vel fra mod lat trd, fe 
note: lat omitted because of collinearity 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       208 
Group variable: reg                             Number of groups   =        26 
R-sq:  within  = 0.8196                         Obs per group: min =         8 
       between = 0.6577                                        avg =       8.0 
       overall = 0.4975                                        max =         8 
                                                F(11,171)          =     70.64 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9919                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        lamb |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         gru |  -.0081572   .0036249    -2.25   0.026    -.0153127   -.0010018 
         spz |   .0025811   .0038442     0.67   0.503     -.005007    .0101693 
         bed |   .0000404   .0001897     0.21   0.832     -.000334    .0004148 
         pam |   .0564835   .0058065     9.73   0.000      .045022    .0679451 
       alt65 |   .0096344   .0033967     2.84   0.005     .0029295    .0163393 
         pop |   .2161235   .0788214     2.74   0.007     .0605352    .3717118 
         alq |  -.0189968   .0031741    -5.98   0.000    -.0252623   -.0127312 
         vel |  -.0478249   .1445042    -0.33   0.741    -.3330665    .2374168 
         fra |   .0015754   .0003591     4.39   0.000     .0008665    .0022842 
         mod |   .0000213   .0003767     0.06   0.955    -.0007222    .0007649 
         lat |  (omitted) 
         trd |   .0429393   .0107199     4.01   0.000      .021779    .0640996 
       _cons |  -3.559731   1.600444    -2.22   0.027    -6.718902   -.4005604 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  1.9907066 
     sigma_e |  .10102916 
         rho |  .99743101   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(25, 171) =    13.70             Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
 
xtreg lamb gru spz bed pam alt65 pop alq vel fra mod lat trd, re 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       208 
Group variable: reg                             Number of groups   =        26 
R-sq:  within  = 0.8018                         Obs per group: min =         8 
       between = 0.7500                                        avg =       8.0 
       overall = 0.7607                                        max =         8 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(12)      =    748.34 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        lamb |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         gru |  -.0025789   .0026336    -0.98   0.327    -.0077406    .0025829 
         spz |   .0021997   .0027858     0.79   0.430    -.0032604    .0076598 
         bed |   .0002553   .0001501     1.70   0.089    -.0000389    .0005495 
         pam |   .0481411   .0056932     8.46   0.000     .0369826    .0592995 
       alt65 |   .0066271   .0019168     3.46   0.001     .0028701     .010384 
         pop |   .0152953   .0045817     3.34   0.001     .0063154    .0242753 
         alq |  -.0141545   .0028272    -5.01   0.000    -.0196957   -.0086134 
         vel |   .0397545   .1054437     0.38   0.706    -.1669113    .2464202 
         fra |   .0010564   .0003081     3.43   0.001     .0004525    .0016603 
         mod |   .0003421   .0003238     1.06   0.291    -.0002925    .0009766 
         lat |   .0000835   .0001242     0.67   0.502      -.00016     .000327 
         trd |   .0481895   .0088395     5.45   0.000     .0308645    .0655145 
       _cons |  -3.407736   1.214923    -2.80   0.005    -5.788941   -1.026532 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .14587274 
     sigma_e |  .10102916 
         rho |  .67582505   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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xtreg med gru spz bed pam alt65 pop alq vel fra mod lat trd, fe 
note: lat omitted because of collinearity 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       208 
Group variable: reg                             Number of groups   =        26 
R-sq:  within  = 0.8519                         Obs per group: min =         8 
       between = 0.1829                                        avg =       8.0 
       overall = 0.1204                                        max =         8 
                                                F(11,171)          =     89.44 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9463                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         med |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         gru |   1.378749   .4920021     2.80   0.006     .4075694    2.349929 
         spz |   1.321651   .5217574     2.53   0.012     .2917364    2.351566 
         bed |   .0220579   .0257445     0.86   0.393    -.0287601    .0728759 
         pam |  -.9348937   .7880914    -1.19   0.237    -2.490534    .6207467 
       alt65 |  -.6441417   .4610244    -1.40   0.164    -1.554173      .26589 
         pop |   -22.6289   10.69818    -2.12   0.036    -43.74639   -1.511405 
         alq |   1.348102   .4308164     3.13   0.002     .4976988    2.198505 
         vel |   14.90346   19.61308     0.76   0.448    -23.81146    53.61838 
         fra |  -.1324062   .0487381    -2.72   0.007    -.2286119   -.0362004 
         mod |  -.2132569   .0511291    -4.17   0.000    -.3141823   -.1123315 
         lat |  (omitted) 
         trd |    15.1214   1.454971    10.39   0.000     12.24939    17.99342 
       _cons |   261.0969    217.223     1.20   0.231     -167.687    689.8808 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  260.42331 
     sigma_e |  13.712357 
         rho |  .99723521   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(25, 171) =    20.75             Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
 
xtreg med gru spz bed pam alt65 pop alq vel fra mod lat trd, re 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       208 
Group variable: reg                             Number of groups   =        26 
R-sq:  within  = 0.8334                         Obs per group: min =         8 
       between = 0.8652                                        avg =       8.0 
       overall = 0.8610                                        max =         8 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(12)      =   1023.40 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         med |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         gru |   .9471212   .3994433     2.37   0.018     .1642268    1.730016 
         spz |   1.364308   .4227078     3.23   0.001     .5358162      2.1928 
         bed |  -.0163581    .022289    -0.73   0.463    -.0600438    .0273276 
         pam |  -.6769937   .8110909    -0.83   0.404    -2.266703    .9127153 
       alt65 |   .6405659   .2996403     2.14   0.033     .0532816     1.22785 
         pop |   1.717353   .7337674     2.34   0.019     .2791955    3.155511 
         alq |   1.762917   .4083524     4.32   0.000     .9625608    2.563273 
         vel |   3.463371   16.02272     0.22   0.829    -27.94058    34.86732 
         fra |  -.0403764   .0448412    -0.90   0.368    -.1282635    .0475107 
         mod |   -.116167   .0476307    -2.44   0.015    -.2095214   -.0228125 
         lat |   .1312491   .0199025     6.59   0.000      .092241    .1702572 
         trd |   10.67425   1.299501     8.21   0.000     8.127272    13.22122 
       _cons |   51.66802   184.0607     0.28   0.779    -309.0843    412.4203 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  23.897383 
     sigma_e |  13.712357 
         rho |  .75230489   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
  
  
105
xtreg som gru spz bed pam alt85 pop alq vel fra mod lat trd, fe 
note: lat omitted because of collinearity 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       208 
Group variable: reg                             Number of groups   =        26 
R-sq:  within  = 0.7672                         Obs per group: min =         8 
       between = 0.1562                                        avg =       8.0 
       overall = 0.2238                                        max =         8 
                                                F(11,171)          =     51.23 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.7378                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         som |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         gru |   .0136964    .011014     1.24   0.215    -.0080445    .0354374 
         spz |  -.0158793   .0112088    -1.42   0.158    -.0380047     .006246 
         bed |   .0005268   .0005474     0.96   0.337    -.0005537    .0016074 
         pam |  -.0584322   .0169821    -3.44   0.001    -.0919538   -.0249106 
       alt85 |   .1847287   .0300356     6.15   0.000     .1254405     .244017 
         pop |   .0711415   .2286573     0.31   0.756    -.3802129    .5224958 
         alq |   .0189382   .0095521     1.98   0.049     .0000829    .0377934 
         vel |   .8360026   .4224486     1.98   0.049      .002117    1.669888 
         fra |   .0038857   .0010319     3.77   0.000     .0018489    .0059225 
         mod |   .0002489   .0011077     0.22   0.822    -.0019376    .0024354 
         lat |  (omitted) 
         trd |   .1369511   .0307237     4.46   0.000     .0763046    .1975976 
       _cons |  -12.30743   4.682011    -2.63   0.009    -21.54941   -3.065454 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  1.3115911 
     sigma_e |  .29540486 
         rho |  .95172209   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(25, 171) =    19.68             Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
 
xtreg som gru spz bed pam alt85 pop alq vel fra mod lat trd, re 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       208 
Group variable: reg                             Number of groups   =        26 
R-sq:  within  = 0.7652                         Obs per group: min =         8 
       between = 0.6851                                        avg =       8.0 
       overall = 0.7075                                        max =         8 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(12)      =    615.12 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         som |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         gru |    .020164   .0081009     2.49   0.013     .0042866    .0360414 
         spz |  -.0225219   .0086087    -2.62   0.009    -.0393945   -.0056492 
         bed |   .0009177   .0004342     2.11   0.035     .0000666    .0017688 
         pam |  -.0595905   .0159483    -3.74   0.000    -.0908486   -.0283325 
       alt85 |   .1748434   .0217513     8.04   0.000     .1322117    .2174751 
         pop |  -.0253544   .0158925    -1.60   0.111    -.0565032    .0057944 
         alq |   .0197508   .0083428     2.37   0.018     .0033992    .0361024 
         vel |   .7145723   .3265637     2.19   0.029     .0745193    1.354625 
         fra |   .0029802   .0008849     3.37   0.001     .0012458    .0047146 
         mod |   6.56e-06   .0009527     0.01   0.995    -.0018606    .0018738 
         lat |  -.0015082    .000429    -3.52   0.000     -.002349   -.0006675 
         trd |    .152803   .0254548     6.00   0.000     .1029125    .2026935 
       _cons |  -10.05462   3.662627    -2.75   0.006    -17.23324   -2.876006 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .58610949 
     sigma_e |  .29540486 
         rho |  .79743178   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table 15: Correlation matrix of regressors and the results of the Hausman tests (dependent 
variables: AZG, AZS, LHOS, LAMB, MED, and SOM) 
 
corr   gru spz bed pam alt65 vel pop alq fra mod trd (obs=208) 
      |    gru    spz     bed    pam     alt65     vel    pop     alq     fra      mod    trd 
------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  gru |  1.0000 
  spz |  0.2083  1.0000 
  bed |  0.0581  0.5123  1.0000 
  pam | -0.2815 -0.3476 -0.0926  1.0000 
alt65 |  0.2661  0.4899  0.5778  0.0606  1.0000 
  vel | -0.1567  0.0700 -0.2265  0.1012 -0.2138  1.0000 
  pop |  0.0470  0.6719  0.6190 -0.0433  0.4700  0.0111  1.0000 
  alq | -0.0981  0.5947  0.2150 -0.0826  0.2092  0.1962  0.3259  1.0000 
  fra | -0.2123  0.3988 -0.1059 -0.0240  0.1398  0.0820  0.0481  0.5591  1.0000 
  mod |  0.1627  0.0092  0.3321  0.2138  0.1748 -0.0142  0.1313 -0.0726 -0.5756  1.0000 
  trd |  0.0145  0.0325 -0.1326  0.4295  0.1921  0.1489  0.0040  0.3340 -0.0029  0.3400 1.0000 
 
 
Model AZG 
chi2(11) =       32.74 
Prob>chi2 =      0.0006 
 
 
Model AZS 
chi2(11) =        7.31 
Prob>chi2 =      0.7735 
 
 
Model LHOS 
chi2(11) =        4.95 
Prob>chi2 =      0.9337 
 
 
Model LAMB 
chi2(11) =       32.74 
Prob>chi2 =      0.0006 
 
Model MED 
chi2(11) =  -188.18 
chi2<0 ==> model fitted on these data 
fails to meet the asymptotic assumptions 
of the Hausman test 
 
Model SOM 
chi2(11) =      4.25 
Prob>chi2 =      0.9622 
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5 Cost differences in Swiss nursing homes:  
a multilevel analysis 
 
Abstract 
Swiss nursing homes provide important services to the population and cost several billion 
Swiss francs every year. Statistical data show large annual per-bed cost differences between 
individual nursing homes and among cantons. The present article aims to empirically identify 
the factors explaining these sizable variations. The duality of potential explanatory factors at 
the individual nursing home and the cantonal levels is captured through multilevel regression 
modeling. The multilevel regression models explain a substantial part of the annual per-bed 
cost variation among values when grouped by cantons. However, a large part of the variation 
within the cantons remains unexplained, especially for the annual per-bed costs for 
accommodation and assistance. 
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5.1 Introduction 
In 2006, the long-term inpatient care market in Switzerland included approximately 1,500 
nursing homes, provided approximately 86,000 beds and costed an annual 6.8 billion Swiss 
francs (CHF). This volume corresponds to a share of 13 percent of the total Swiss healthcare 
expenditures in 2006, CHF 52.8 billion (FSO 2008a), and it underscores the economic 
importance of the sector. The average annual costs per available bed in Swiss nursing homes 
varied greatly both between individual facilities and cantons. The 2006 annual per-bed cost 
ranged from CHF 20,000 to CHF 162,000 per nursing home and from CHF 51,000 to CHF 
123,000 per canton (see Figure 12 and Table 16).  
There were extended speculations about the reasons for these large intra-cantonal and inter-
cantonal differences in the Swiss media. The large variation in the occupancy rates of beds in 
different nursing homes and different cantons was assumed to be one of the main reasons. 
Other important factors that might explain the observed variations were the characteristics of 
the patients (case-mix) and the qualification levels of the nursing home staff: sicker patients 
and more qualified employees are expected to contribute to higher annual costs per available 
bed. Different nursing homes in Switzerland would also attract different clienteles by offering 
accommodation and assistance services at higher or lower standards. 
Moreover, Swiss nursing homes are characterized by a strong federalist organization and 
regulation (Achtermann and Berset 2006; Camenzind 2008; Crivelli, Filippini, and Lunati 
2002; Farsi, Filippini, and Lunati 2008; Filippini 1998). Differences in cantonal salaries and 
capital costs may also play a role. Another important factor is the possible existence of 
inefficiencies in the “production” of nursing home care. This point has been researched 
extensively in empirical Swiss studies (Crivelli et al. 2002; Farsi et al. 2008; Filippini 1998; 
Marti 2007); thus, it is not explored in this study.  
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the evidence-based explanation that have been 
posited for the variations in the annual per-bed costs of Swiss nursing homes. In particular, 
the model explores whether it is possible to explain such differences with a set of indicators at 
the level of individual nursing homes and at the level of nursing homes grouped by canton. 
This question is approached by applying a particular statistical method and by using the Swiss 
federal statistics on socio-medical facilities (SOMED) as the central data source. The applied 
statistical method, multilevel modeling, enables the simultaneous quantitative determination 
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of nursing home-oriented and cantonal factors that are linked with observed annual per-bed 
cost variations. To our knowledge, no Swiss studies have analyzed this issue using such a 
technique. 
The paper is organized as follows: a brief overview of the academic literature on long-term 
care (i.e., supply, cost functions, and demand) is cited in Section 5.2; in Section 5.3, a 
statistical model is defined, and the available data are presented; in Section 5.4, the results 
found in the estimates for three different annual per-bed cost aggregates are shown; and these 
results are subjected to comment and conclusion in Section 5.5. 
 
 
5.2 Background 
The academic literature on the long-term care market cites three domains of providers 
(Grabowski 2008). The first important supplier is the informal home care provided in the 
context of unpaid work. The second domain is composed of professional or formal care 
services (including daily activities assistance) provided to the patient in his or her home 
(Weaver et al., 2008). This professional home care is called “Spitex” in Switzerland. The 
third domain of providers consists of nursing homes, as described in greater detail below. In 
addition to inpatient care services, many nursing homes provide transitional care, daycare 
services and assisted living. 
Both nationally (FSO 2008a) and internationally (Christensen 2004), nursing homes can 
differ enormously in size. Researchers have intensively analyzed the most efficient size for 
nursing homes in terms of economies of scale. For Switzerland, one group of authors (Crivelli 
et al. 2002) argued that the most efficient size was 70 to 80 beds. Another group (Farsi et al. 
2008) concluded that the most efficient size was 75 to 95 beds. Yet another Swiss author 
(Marti 2007) concluded that 130 to 180 beds was optimal. 
Researchers have also investigated the effects of ownership arrangements and the 
entrepreneurial orientation of nursing homes on production processes and outcomes. To this 
end, a distinction can be made between public nursing homes, which are regulated in 
Switzerland by public administrative law and operate without exception on a non-profit basis, 
and private nursing homes, which are regulated by private company law and by public 
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administrative law and operate both as for-profit and as non-profit facilities (see Appendix, 
Table 18). In Switzerland, 20 percent of the nursing homes are organized on a for-profit basis, 
and 80 percent are organized on a non-profit basis (FSO 2008b). In the United States, 
ownership arrangements seem to affect the characteristics of a nursing home’s clientele 
(Spector, Selden, and Cohen 1998). In Switzerland, no differences between private and public 
nursing homes are found in terms of cost efficiency (Crivelli et al. 2002; Farsi et al. 2008).  
Furthermore, the funding structure of nursing homes depends on ownership arrangements and 
legal regulations. In addition to payments per person, such as health insurance payments, 
social contributions and resident out-of-pocket payments, there are payments to non-profit 
nursing homes from public funds in the form of subsidies and payments to help cover deficits 
(Briesacher et al. 2009). A variable measuring the size of these subsidies was tested in the 
model presented in this paper. However, because this variable never showed a significant 
correlation with variations in cost, it was never actually included into the model. 
In 2006, of the total costs of nursing homes in Switzerland of CHF 6.8 billion, CHF 1.4 
billion (20 percent) was borne by mandatory health insurance (MHI). The costs of subsidies 
and payments to cover deficits for the cantons and communes were CHF 0.6 billion (9 
percent). CHF 4.7 billion (69 percent) were privately funded by residents (FSO 2008c)—a 
share that seems very high by international standards (OECD/WHO 2006, 2011). One 
important reason for this high share is that it includes tax-financed supplementary benefits to 
Swiss old-age insurance (EL): CHF 1.7 billion of EL was provided to nursing home patients 
in 2006, and nursing home patients use a large portion of EL to finance the costs of 
accommodation and assistance. In the healthcare statistics reported by the Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office (FSO 2008a, 2008c), EL is categorized as “private healthcare expenditures.” 
In contrast, most of the statistical systems of other Western countries treat similar funds as 
social-related and not as health-related expenditures, making such funds disappear from 
those countries’ official health statistics. 
The literature on healthcare economics has intensively explored ways to model the functional 
form of the costs generated by nursing homes. In general, the costs per nursing home bed 
depend on quantitative factors (e.g., nursing volumes), input prices (e.g., capital employed 
and wages), regulatory measures (e.g., payments to cover deficits or required staffing 
qualifications) and different technologies or production processes (e.g., the ratio of personnel 
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expenses to production) (Lee and Birnbaum 1983). Some authors (Vitaliano and Toren 1994) 
explicitly incorporate ownership arrangements and entrepreneurial orientation into their cost 
functions, or they define a variable for the quality of the output provided (McKay 1988). 
Another author (Christensen 2004) takes account of the fact that nursing homes do not 
function independently from their environments. Although a nursing home does not have a 
direct effect on long-term costs, it can vary the inputs of the short-term cost function. 
Three important studies were found that model specific cost functions for Swiss nursing 
homes. In the first study (Filippini 1998), the total nursing home costs were found to be a 
function of output (number of patient-days), prices for capital, labor and electricity, the 
average degree of physical dependence of the residents, the number of medical personnel 
employed compared to the number of personnel required by cantonal guidelines, the existence 
(or not) of apartments with limited support besides the main building (i.e., assisted living), 
and time trends.  
The second study (Crivelli et al. 2002) included the following variables in the cost function: 
the number of patient-days, the prices for capital and labor, and the existence (or not) of 
apartments with limited support. The average degree of physical dependence in the older 
work of (Filippini 1998) was “replaced” by the average assistance time given to a nursing 
home’s patient, which includes daily activities and medical care. Moreover, instead of using a 
relative number of medical personnel, a dummy variable expressing low or high average 
ratios of medical and nursing staff compared to patients was used. The list was complemented 
by three dummy variables that expressed the average ratios of expenditures of MHI to total 
expenditures, the (small or large) variety of services provided to patients, and the general 
individuality of cantons. 
The third study from Switzerland (Farsi et al. 2008) proposed a cost function very similar to 
that defined in the study by Crivelli et al. (2002). The total costs of the nursing home in this 
work depended on the number of patient-days, the prices for capital and labor, the average 
assistance time given to a patient, and the average amount of MHI expenditures. Again, using 
dummy variables, the existence of apartments with limited support and low or high average 
ratios of medical and nursing staff to patients was used. Finally, a linear time trend was 
added. Compared to the cross-sectional approach by Crivelli et al. (2002), the main novelty of 
this study was its use of the panel econometrics approach. 
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The demand for long-term inpatient care is directly associated with the requirements for 
nursing care (Norton 2000). The worse the patient’s state of health and the more the patient’s 
daily ability to function independently is restricted, the greater the requirements for nursing 
care are. Because physical and mental complaints or restrictions occur more frequently with 
older age, the demand for long-term care is increasing in demographically aging societies 
(Spillman and Lubitz 2000). However, the greater demand for nursing care can also be 
triggered in younger generations by diseases or risk factors that are increasingly encountered, 
such as mental disorders or obesity (Höpflinger and Hugentobler 2005). 
When choosing a service provider, patients and third-party funding bodies (e.g., health 
insurers, the state) prefer informal or professional home care for qualitative and monetary 
reasons. However, if the requirements for nursing care increase, a point will be reached at 
which (formal) home care becomes either too expensive or unfeasible (Borgetto 2003). At 
present, it is normally only at this point that those in need of nursing care are institutionalized 
in Switzerland (Jaccard-Ruedin et al. 2010).  
Moreover, regional topographical differences must be considered in Switzerland. Admission 
to a nursing home can take place at an earlier stage for people who live in remote locations 
than for those living in an urban environment (Bayer-Oglesby, Höpflinger, and Camenzind 
2007). Moreover, the policy of accommodation in regional acute care hospitals also 
influences the demand for beds in nursing homes. If hospitals are able or willing to keep 
chronically ill patients in acute, geriatric or rehabilitation wards, the regional demand for 
nursing homes is reduced. The opposite outcome occurs when there is great pressure to 
reduce the time spent in more expensive hospitals—for acute wards in particular. 
For those with a potential demand for beds in nursing homes, such as those individuals in 
need of nursing care and their families, the distance between the residence and the nursing 
home location is a decisive factor in the choice of a particular facility (Norton 2000). 
Proximity to a nursing home usually stimulates regional demand. These decisions are closely 
associated with simultaneous considerations regarding a nursing home’s quality (Grabowski 
2008). This choice may, however, be restricted by regulatory authorities. Thus, admission is 
sometimes only possible by a hospital or must be approved by an admission authority. Such 
restrictions are necessary because, in Western countries, the demand for nursing home beds 
exceeds the supply in many markets (Crivelli et al. 2002; Grabowski 2008; Norton 2000). In 
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Switzerland, this excess demand has partly been caused by moratorium on building new 
nursing homes in certain cantons during certain periods of time (e.g., between 1992 and 2000 
in the canton of Geneva). 
 
 
5.3 Methods and materials  
5.3.1 Methodological approach 
The central data source used in this work, SOMED statistics on nursing homes (see Section 
5.3.2), is the result of an extensive revision with a new series of data starting in 2006. On the 
one hand, this revision made direct comparisons with older data difficult, and, for several 
indicators, the FSO experts advised against making such comparisons. On the other hand, no 
data more recent than 2006 were available for the research project at the time of its 
conception. Hence, it was decided to work in this study with only one single year (2006) of 
SOMED data and to gain experience by working with a cross-level setting and its 
limitations72. 
Clear evidence shows that the average annual per-bed costs of Swiss nursing homes do not 
only depend on demand and supply factors on the level of the individual institution, but also 
on structural factors on the regional or cantonal level. Thus, to explain the variations of 
annual per-bed nursing home costs in Switzerland, it seemed reasonable to utilize statistical 
models that are able to incorporate data at varying hierarchical levels. Such multilevel models 
are advantageous because data do not need to be aggregated; thus, information is not lost on 
lower levels (Christensen 2004; Hox 2002).  
Normally, multilevel regression analyses focus on models in which the dependent variable is 
measured at the lowest hierarchical level (DiPrete and Forristal 1994). For this work, the 
variation of three cost items (designated hereinafter as Cij) was investigated at the level of 
1,186 facilities (i = 1, 2, …, 1,186) located in 25 cantons (j = 1, 2, …, 25) (see Table 16). All 
three cost items are considered to be linear and normally distributed (see Appendix, Figure 
                                                 
72
  Compared to panel data analysis, the cross-sectional approach that this article uses has several disadvantages: 
among others, cross-level models cannot consider unobserved heterogeneity in the model. Neglecting such 
individual effects often produces biased estimates. And, in general, because (time-)dynamic processes cannot 
be modeled, causal interpretations of two simultaneous events are excluded. 
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13). Xij is a vector of variables at the nursing home level. In algebraic notation (Hox 2002), 
the following model results: 
Cij = β0j + β1j Xij + eij,    where eij ~ N (0, σe
2) (1) 
In this regression model, each of the 25 cantons J has an individual coefficient for axis 
intercept β0j and an individual coefficient for slope β1j; index j expresses this in Equation (1). 
Across all cantons J, these coefficients have their own mean values, variances and error terms, 
and they are dependent on a set of Q variables Zqj that vary across the cantons. In a simplified 
notation with only one variable Zj at the cantonal level, this can be expressed as follows: 
β0j = γ00 + γ01 Zj + u0j,    where u0j ~ N (0, σu0
2) (2a) 
β1j = γ10 + γ11 Zj + u1j,    where u1j ~ N (0, σu1
2) (2b) 
In Equation (2a), the level of annual average costs per nursing home bed in canton J—axis 
intercept β0j of Equation (1)—depends on the canton-specific variable Zj. The strength and 
direction of the correlation between the annual costs per nursing home bed in the same canton 
J—slope β1j in Equation (1)—depends on Zj as well. The regression coefficients γ00, γ01, γ10 
and γ11 do not vary across cantons (i.e., they are fixed regression coefficients). If equations 
(1), (2a) and (2b) are combined and a number P of explanatory variables Xp at the level of 
nursing homes and of Q explanatory variables Zq at the grouped level of cantons are taken 
into consideration, then the following two-level regression models can be defined (Braun et 
al. 2010; Snijders and Bosker 1994): 
Cij = γ00 + γp0 Xpij + γ0q Zqj + u0j + eij (3a) 
Cij = γ00 + γp0 Xpij + γ0q Zqj + upj Xpij + u0j + eij (3b) 
Cij = γ00 + γp0 Xpij + γ0q Zqj + γpq Xpij Zqj + upj Xpij + u0j + eij (3c) 
Equation (3a) describes a random intercept model containing variables at the individual and 
group levels. Equation (3b) adds the random slope term upj Xpij to model (3a) and is called the 
random slope model, containing variables both at the individual and group levels. If the term 
γpq Xpij Zqj is added in Equation (3c), it is possible to introduce cross-level effects into the 
(random slope) model. The last of these can model a possible interaction of the variables 
between the first level of nursing homes I (vector Xpij) and the second level of cantons J 
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(vector Zqj). The term [upj Xpij] in Equations (3b) and (3c) shows that, in random slope 
models, the vectors Xpij are not independent of error terms upj, and the total error in the 
estimations is dependent on the magnitude of the values for the vectors Xpij. This results in 
heteroscedasticity, which is why the application of ordinary least squares (OLS) estimators is 
eschewed in favor of using maximum likelihood (MLE) estimators in random slope 
multilevel models (Bryan 2008; Hox 2002). For random intercept models (3a), a generalized 
least squares (GLS) estimator with its practical calculations of within- and between-group 
variances is still feasible (see Section 5.4.1). 
For the multilevel regression estimates in this work, the STATA11® software was run with 
“xtreg” and “xtmixed” orders to execute GLS and restricted maximum likelihood regressions 
(REML) for the random intercept models (3a); only REML was used for the random slope 
models (3b). The Likelihood-Ratio-Test (LRT)73 (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2005) was used 
to check whether the randomization of the group slopes brought a statistical gain to the 
models. Furthermore, the independent variables were centered on their overall (grand) means 
in the calculations (see annex _C in the STATA outputs in the Appendix, Table 19). 
Then, cross-level effects in random slope models (3c) could be calculated simply by creating 
linear combinations (i.e., multiplying) of two variables at two different levels and applying 
REML afterwards (Braun et al. 2010). However, as will be shown in the Results Section (5.4) 
of the article, randomization of the group slopes brought only a small statistical gain (in two 
models) or even a tendency toward decreasing quality (in one model). Accordingly, such 
interactions were not examined further in the model; thus, the step described in Formula (3c) 
was not executed in the study. 
 
5.3.2 Data 
Cost indicators 
The central data source for empirical analyses on nursing homes in Switzerland is SOMED, 
which is compiled by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (FSO 2008a, 2008b). SOMED also 
contains information on homes for the elderly, facilities for the disabled, and facilities for 
                                                 
73
  The Likelihood-Ratio-Test (LRT) compares the (REML-)estimated random intercept model results with the 
(REML-)estimated random slope model results by performing a statistcal test to show whether the 
randomization of a level 2 variable (WAG) results in a statistically significant improvement in model fit. 
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people with addiction or psycho-social problems. All of this information is excluded, with 
only SOMED data on nursing homes being used. In the SOMED data on nursing homes, two 
main cost items were distinguished: “costs for accommodation and assistance” and “costs for 
mandatory nursing and medical services under the Federal Health Insurance Law” (FHIL, i.e., 
services covered by MHI). 
According to Figure 12, the total average annual per-bed nursing home costs (CTOT) were 
CHF 80,000 in Switzerland (CH) in 2006. These costs consist of “annual per bed costs of 
accommodation and assistance” (CASS) of CHF 44,000 and “annual per bed costs of 
mandatory services under FHIL” (CMHI) of CHF 36,000. These costs in the dataset reflect 
both public and private nursing homes and consist of wages, employee benefits and material 
costs. The last are the expenses to maintain the daily activities of the nursing home and also 
include the interest on capital. However, other capital costs (i.e., depreciation) are not 
included. 
 
Figure 12: Annual per-bed costs in nursing homes, by type of cost and canton, 2006, in CHF 
 
Source: SOMED (FSO 2008a); calculations by the author. 
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Using a regional (i.e., cantonal) comparison, CTOT varies from CHF 51,000, on average, in the 
least expensive canton (Glarus, GL) to CHF 123,000 in the most expensive canton (Geneva, 
GE). The same cantons, GL and GE, show the minimum and maximum values for the two 
cost components: CHF 31,000 and CHF 66,000 for CASS and CHF 19,000 and CHF 57,000 
for CMHI. 
 
Determinants of nursing home costs 
Supported by the cited Swiss literature (Crivelli et al. 2002; Farsi et al. 2008; Filippini 
1998)74, the following function determining all three annual per-bed cost items (i.e., CTOT, 
CASS, and CMHI) is proposed. To simplify matters, all three of them are designated as “C” in 
Equation (4): 
C = f (DAY, INT, SIZ, SIQ, QUP, AUX, REG, WAG, RNT, BED) (4) 
In accordance with proposed total cost functions of the Swiss authors, the annual per-bed cost 
function for nursing homes in Equation (4) contains an output variable: the number of patient-
days invoiced per nursing home bed (DAY, i.e., the occupancy rate of the nursing homes). As 
a proxy for the average case mix of the patients, the variable INT is introduced to the model 
(i.e., the average time per patient day spent for nursing under FHIL; the minutes measured 
were recorded to integers varying between 1 and 13). INT was calculated by the FSO for the 
first time in 2006 (FSO 2008b), and it should be interpreted with caution. There are different 
cantonal requirements-for-care assessment systems, and INT can either be an ex-post account 
for concrete services delivered or an ex-ante classification of requirements-for-care time. 
Similar to what was reported in the aforementioned Swiss articles, in this study, the size of 
the nursing home, measured by the number of available beds (SIZ), was tested as a proxy 
indicator of the service provision structure. Larger nursing homes are usually able to offer a 
                                                 
74
  The cited literature actually considers the estimations of a stochastic translog frontier cost function that is 
based on economic production theory (i.e., with properties such as a cost function that is concave and linearly 
homogeneous in input prices and non-decreasing in input prices and output; the functional form of such a 
cost function is specified as a translog cost function).  
The approach of our model is much simpler and makes use of just one element of the models proposed in the 
above-mentioned econometric literature: the variables (output level, relative input prices, etc.) used in the 
long-run cost functions that represent a nursing home’s total operational cost. Our simple model can be 
called a “hedonic cost function model.”  
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greater numbers of different and more specialized services to their clientele than smaller 
nursing homes (Crivelli et al. 2002). Moreover, the economies of scale posit a negative link 
between the size of nursing homes (SIZ) and per-bed costs, at least until the optimal size of 
the nursing home is reached. For even larger nursing homes, per-bed costs are expected to rise 
again. This type of U-form cost curve is modeled by adding the square of the size variable 
(SIQ) to the equation.  
The ratio of qualified personnel (QUP; i.e., the number of medical doctors and qualified 
nursing personnel per 100 available beds) is introduced. QUP serves as an indicator of the 
nursing home’s level-of-care quality. However, QUP might be also a proxy variable for the 
average case mix of a nursing home’s patients75. Moreover, a variable for the hospitality 
standard of the nursing homes must be identified. The ratio of patient-days spent to the 
number of non-medical personnel is calculated (variable AUX) for this purpose.  
As a cultural indicator of the location of nursing homes, the dummy variable REG (i.e., 
identifying the official language as being German or not) is introduced. Unlike the other 
Swiss authors, who use cantonal dummies, the indicator REG is used at the nursing home 
level. Several Swiss cantons, such as Fribourg (FR), Valais (VS), Berne (BE), and 
Graubünden (GR), have German and one of the three other official Latin languages (French, 
Italian, or Romansh) inside their territory. In canton FR, for example, 28 nursing homes 
indicate French and eight nursing homes indicate German as the official language; variable 
REG takes this into account. SOMED is the underlying data source for all seven indicators at 
the nursing home level in Equation (4) (see Appendix, Table 18). 
With regard to the correlational hypotheses, theoretical and literature-supported positive links 
are expected for the first four indicators. A higher occupation (rate) of available beds (DAY) 
should lead to higher annual per-bed costs. The same is true for INT: more time spent per 
patient on average means more per-bed costs. The economies of scale anticipate a negative 
link between the size of the nursing homes (SIZ) and per-bed costs, at least until the optimal 
size of the nursing home is reached. For even larger nursing homes, per-bed costs are 
expected to increase again, and this is taken in consideration by introducing the square of the 
size variable (SIQ) to the equation. For the indicator QUP, a positive relationship with per-
bed costs is expected, because a highly qualified medical staff represents the best-paid 
                                                 
75
  The variables QUP and BED are poorly correlated with one another (see Appendix, Table 20). 
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personnel group in a given nursing home. A negative link is expected for the indicator AUX: 
the more days that are provided by non-medical employees are invoiced per nursing home 
bed, the lower the hospitality standard should be. Finally, it is not possible to derive clear 
assumptions from the national literature for the correlation between REG and annual per-bed 
costs. Public discourse in Switzerland rather assumes a positive link between per-bed costs 
and nursing homes in Latin-speaking areas. 
The other three variables in Equation (4) are at the cantonal level and pertain to the average 
monthly gross wages in the healthcare sector (WAG), the average rental fee indices (RNT), 
and the density of nursing home beds (BED). In accordance with the Swiss studies mentioned 
above, WAG and RNT represent the cantonal factor prices in the model. The cantonal density 
of nursing home beds (BED) is introduced as a proxy variable for the supply structure in the 
cantonal long-term care markets. BED is a new variable compared to the other Swiss models 
mentioned above. It is defined as the number of nursing home beds in the canton in relation to 
the population of (1,000) individuals who are 65 years and older. The three indicators at the 
cantonal level, WAG, RNT, and BED76, are based on the following data sources provided by 
the FSO: “Swiss labor census,” “National index of consumer prices,” and “SOMED and 
population statistics” (see Appendix, Table 18). 
Based on theory and the literature, one would expect WAG and RNT to positively correlate 
with annual per-bed nursing home costs. Correlations with a better-developed cantonal supply 
of nursing home beds (BED)77 are less clear. Theoretically, a greater availability of nursing 
home beds should relieve the demand and prices of such beds. At the same time, in a 
functioning market, one would expect a reduction in the average annual per-bed costs. 
However, no such effect can be expected if the actual demand in cantonal nursing home 
markets exceeds supply, as is the case in many Western countries (Crivelli et al. 2002; 
Grabowski 2008; Norton 2000). Thus, in reality, a smaller supply of beds in a Swiss canton 
                                                 
76
  These 3 independent variables introduce risks of provoking ecological inference fallacies. These are logical 
fallacies in the interpretation of statistical data where inferences about the nature of individuals (i.e., 
individual nursing homes) are deduced from inferences for the groups (i.e., cantons) to which those 
individuals belong (see Kramer, G. H. 1983. “The Ecological Fallacy Revisited: Aggregate- versus 
Individual-level Findings on Economics and Elections, and Sociotropic Voting.” The American Political 
Science Review 77(1): 92-111.). 
77
  Aside from the problem of ecolocical fallacy, endogeneity problems must be suspected for the variable BED 
for reasons including omitted variables and variable selection bias. 
  
120
might merely result in—on average—sicker patients occupying these fewer available beds in 
the cantonal nursing homes. 
 
Data cleaning 
Of the 1,490 nursing homes that were active in 2006, statistical information is available on 
1,463 facilities because 27 nursing homes did not supply details to the FSO that year. This 
dataset was cleaned with the objective of eliminating facilities with missing or implausible 
values for the variables of relevance (see Appendix, Table 18). This cleaning procedure 
resulted in 1,186 nursing homes; 304 facilities were excluded because of missing or defective 
data, indicating a loss of 15 percent with respect to the total number of beds offered. The 
1,186 remaining nursing homes were divided among 25 location cantons, with a minimum of 
5, a maximum of 199 and an average of 47 facilities per canton. No nursing homes were 
located in the canton of Appenzell Innerrhoden (AI). For the interpretation of the regression 
results, it should be noted that small cluster sizes create no (or only limited) problems when 
testing fixed regression coefficient models (Snijders 2005). 
 
 
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Overview 
The descriptive statistics in Table 16 show the number of observations (OBS), mean values 
(MEAN), standard deviations (STD.DEV.), minimal values (MIN) and maximal values 
(MAX) of the variables. The national means of per-bed cost variables CTOT, CASS, and CMHI in 
2006 were CHF 79,000, 44,000, and 36,000, respectively (see Figure 12). The MIN and MAX 
per individual nursing home ranged from CHF 21,000 to 162,000 for CTOT, from CHF 6,000 
to 108,000 for CASS, and from CHF 2,000 to 97,000 for CMHI. Moreover, the three dependent 
variables CTOT, CASS, and CMHI are all continuous, approximately normally distributed78 (see 
Appendix, Figure 13), and do not contain any outliers; thus, the use of a parametric linear 
model seems appropriate. 
                                                 
78
  To obtain a better fit to the normality assumption of the dependent variable, the natural logarithms of HOS 
(i.e., LHOS) and AMB (i.e., LAMB) were used in the regression equations. 
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The variable DAY shows that Swiss nursing home beds were occupied 346 days a year on 
average. The MAX of 401 days demonstrates that it was possible to invoice more than 365 
days for one bed. INT shows the recoded average time level indicator ranging from 1 to 13 
entities; its mean value was six entities, indicating an average nursing time per patient per day 
of 101 to 120 minutes. The size of the nursing homes measured via the number of available 
beds (SIZ) varied between six beds and 318 beds in 2006; the mean value for the entire 
country was 61 beds. SIQ is the variable containing the squares of SIZ and is not further 
discussed here.  
 
Table 16: Descriptive statistics 
 
    Variable |       OBS        MEAN     STD.DEV.       MIN        MAX 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
        CTOT |      1186       79397       21566      20978     162286 
        CASS |      1186       43880       13325       5860     108192 
        CMHI |      1186       35518       14415       2375      96578 
         DAY |      1186       345.8        25.6      202.9      400.8 
         INT |      1186       5.871       2.118          1         13 
         SIZ |      1186        61.1        41.8          6        318 
         SIQ |      1186      5479.1      9099.8         36     101124 
         QUP |      1186       29.64       13.67        0.6       88.1 
         AUX |      1186       737.1       236.0      154.7     1652.9 
         REG |      1186       0.278       0.448          0          1 
         WAG |        25      5688.3       214.8       5402       6137 
         RNT |        25      1093.0       123.5        810       1480 
         BED |        25        72.7        12.0        49.6      96.7 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
Sources: See Appendix, Table 18. 
 
The variable QUP indicates that approximately one-third (MEAN = 0.30) of personnel were 
qualified medical personnel. The variation in QUP between nursing homes was large (from 
0.6 to 88.1). The variable AUX shows that the average Swiss nursing home invoiced 737 
patient-days per non-medical employee. The variation for AUX is large as well and ranged 
from 155 days to 1,653 days. The average monthly gross wage level in health care (WAG) 
was CHF 5,700 and varied from CHF 5,400 to CHF 6,100 between cantons. The 2003 private 
home rent index averaged 1,093 points and varied between 810 points (-25.9 percent under 
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the national average) and 1,480 points (+35.4 percent above the national average). Finally, the 
average supply of nursing home beds compared to the population aged 65 years and older 
(BED) was 73 beds per 1,000 persons. The cantonal variation was important for BED as well 
and ranged from 50 up to 97 beds. 
 
Table 17: Regression estimates (random intercept model, GLS estimator) on cost variations in 
Swiss nursing homes, 2006 
 C
TOT
 C
ASS
 C
MHI
 
CONS 79,457*** 43,595*** 35,956*** 
DAY 112.3*** 60.2*** 54.9*** 
INT 2,807.2*** 355.2 (n.s.) 2431.1*** 
SIZ 0.29 (n.s.) -41.3** 37.2** 
SIQ 0.07 (n.s.) 0.12 (n.s.) -0.03 (n.s.) 
QUP 581.6*** 201.4*** 380.4*** 
AUX -22.7*** -13.3*** -9.7*** 
REG 2,898.7 (n.s.) 1,157.6 (n.s.) 3,739.9*** 
WAG 27.4** 18.4** 8.3* 
RNT 9.4 (n.s.) 10.7 (n.s.) 0.88 (n.s.) 
BED -169.7 (n.s.) -86.6 (n.s.) -49.2 (n.s.) 
R
2
 within 53.9 % 14.8 % 48.3 % 
R
2 
between 75.5 % 48.6 % 87.5 % 
R
2 
overall 61.5 % 25.6 % 61.5 % 
*** Positive or negative correlation significant at the 99 percent level or higher; 
** Positive or negative correlation significant at the 95 percent to 99 percent level; 
* Positive or negative correlation significant at the 90 percent to 95 percent level; 
(n.s.) Not significant (positive or negative) correlations at the 90 percent level or lower. 
 
Table 17 shows the results for the random intercept model calculated with GLS estimators 
(see also Appendix, Table 19, with a comparison of GLS and REML estimator results). 
Therefore, the regression coefficients and constants (CONS), with their significance levels 
and their proportions of the explained variance, can be shown for each cost variable. These 
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variances include the within variance (R2within; i.e., the explained share of variance between 
the individual nursing homes within every canton), the between variance (R2between; i.e., the 
explained share of the variance of cantonal means with respect to the national mean), and the 
overall variance (R2overall; i.e., the explained share of the sum of the within and the between 
variances). 
For CTOT and CMHI, the models’ overall explanatory contributions (R2overall) are quite high, at 
61.5 percent for both cost indicators; however, with CASS, it is only 25.6 percent, primarily 
due to a small contribution of the explained variation of the values within the cantons (R2within, 
14.8 percent) in the regression equation to CASS. With CTOT and CMHI, the R2within is 53.9 
percent and 48.3 percent, respectively. With all three cost items, the explained variations 
between the values grouped by cantons (R2between) are high. The explained variations are 75.5 
percent for CTOT, 48.6 percent for CASS, and 87.5 percent for CMHI. Particularly with CASS, but 
also with CTOT and CMHI, the model can clearly explain more variation between the values 
grouped by cantons than between the individual nursing home values within the 25 cantons. 
The Wald test is performed to review the individual and combined linearities of the estimated 
parameters, and it shows high values in all three estimating equations, confirming the 
accuracy of the linearity assumptions.  
 
5.4.2 Variations in the total costs (CTOT) 
With regard to the CTOT, positive correlations with the four independent variables (and 
CONS)—occupancy rate (DAY), average case mix of the patients (INT), personnel quality 
(QUP), and monthly gross wages in the healthcare sector (WAG)—are observed. The positive 
link between a higher CTOT and a greater number of days of residence invoiced per nursing 
home bed (DAY) is in line with expectations. Concretely, one more patient-day per bed and 
year coincides with a supplementary CTOT of CHF 112. The same is true for INT, for which 
one level point (i.e., 20 minutes) more of nursing time needed per patient day means CHF 
2,807 more total annual costs on average. One more person of qualified personnel per 100 
nursing home beds reflects supplementary CTOT of CHF 582. Additionally, one index point of 
the higher monthly gross wage level (WAG) corresponds to an average of CHF 27 greater 
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annual per-bed costs79. Furthermore, the expected negative correlation between AUX and 
CTOT is confirmed. One more patient-day invoiced in relation to non-medical personnel 
reduces the annual per-bed total costs by CHF 23. The coefficients for DAY, INT, QUP, and 
AUX (including the constant term) are statistically significant at the 99 percent level, and 
WAG is significant at the 95 percent level; all other variables (SIZ, SIQ, REG, RNT, and 
BED) show insignificant coefficients. 
Estimating CTOT with the STATA11® “xtmixed” order to execute a REML estimation (instead 
of a “xtreg” order to execute a GLS estimation) generates almost identical results (see 
Appendix, Table 19). Moreover, a random slope model (the slope of group-significant 
variable WAG is randomized for this purpose) again produces very similar results to those of 
both variants of the random intercept approach (see Appendix, Table 19). The only gain is the 
estimation of a somewhat larger influence (viz., a coefficient of CHF 61 instead of CHF 28) 
and an increased significance of the coefficient of WAG (from 95 to 99 percent). The LRT 
also indicates that the use of a random slope model for CTOT could be a good choice. 
 
5.4.3 Variations in the costs of accommodation and assistance (CASS) 
For the second cost item investigated (i.e., CASS), four variables at the nursing home level and 
one variable at the cantonal level (and the constant term CONS) are significantly correlated 
(see Table 17). At the nursing home level, the same three variables are involved as in the case 
of CTOT: namely, those for occupancy rate (DAY), quality of personnel (QUP), and hospitality 
standard (AUX). However, unlike with CTOT, it is not INT but SIZ that significantly regresses 
onto CASS. Interestingly, SIZ is negatively related to CASS and can be interpreted as follows: if 
the size of a nursing home is increased by one bed—at the average size of Swiss nursing 
homes of 61 beds—than the average costs for accommodation and assistance of this home are 
expected to be CHF 41 lower. The links of DAY, QUP, and AUX with CASS are again 
evident. For the negative correlation of AUX and CASS, a stronger link was actually expected. 
One additional invoiced day in relation to the number of non-qualified medical personnel 
(AUX) reduces the per-bed costs by only CHF 13 on average.  
                                                 
79
  This result is certainly “polluted” by an ecological fallacy. 
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The three variables at the cantonal level, WAG, RNT, and BED, show the expected links with 
CASS, but only the coefficient for WAG is statistically significant. Calculating the regression 
to CASS with a REML estimator again produces almost identical results to the GLS estimator 
(see Appendix, Table 19). Moreover, calculation of CASS was attempted using a random slope 
model. All three group variables—WAG, RNT, and BED—were tested for this purpose. 
Unfortunately, the software could not estimate such a model80, and no results can be given. 
 
5.4.4 Variations in the mandatory costs of nursing under FHIL (CMHI) 
For the variation in CMHI, Table 17 shows significant correlations with six variables at the 
nursing home level and with one variable at the cantonal level (in addition to the constant 
term CONS). Four of the six indicators at the nursing home level, DAY, INT, QUP, and 
AUX, show the expected links. The other two significant variables, SIZ and REG, require 
some additional comment. In contrast to the case of CASS, SIZ is positively related to CMHI: for 
Swiss nursing homes of 61 beds (the average size for the country), a nursing home that is 
larger by one bed averages CHF 37 higher annual costs per bed for nursing under FHIL. The 
variable REG (i.e., the official language being German or not) that had been introduced as 
cultural indicator of the location of a nursing home shows a significant positive coefficient in 
the regression for CMHI. If the nursing home is located in a Latin-speaking environment, the 
expenses for MHI services are, on average, CHF 3,740 higher than in a German-speaking 
environment. Finally, in the regression results of the three variables at the cantonal level for 
CMHI, the variable WAG shows a positive and significant coefficient at the 90 percent level. 
The other two canton-level variables, RNT and BED, indicate insignificant coefficients, as 
occurred in the other two equations for CTOT and for CASS. 
In the regression for CMHI calculated with a REML estimator, results almost identical to those 
calculated using a GLS estimator are obtained (see Appendix, Table 19); however, the 
coefficient for WAG becomes insignificant. Moreover, for CMHI, a random slope model was 
calculated (see Appendix, Table 19). Again, the slope of the group variable WAG was 
randomized. The results obtained were quite similar to the results of both variants of the 
random intercept model. The coefficient of WAG surpasses a significance level of 99 percent 
                                                 
80
  Either the standard error calculations or preformance of the gradient-based optimization in the REML routine 
failed. 
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in the random intercept model. The LRT produces a rather small chi2-value at the limits of 
significance (a probability of 6 percent); hence, the quality of the model is not really 
increased. 
 
 
5.5 Discussion 
This study explicitly takes into account the heterogeneity of the federalist structure of the 
Swiss healthcare system in the specification of a statistical estimation model. When applying 
such a multilevel technique, it is demonstrated that characteristics on both levels (cantons and 
individual nursing homes) can be significantly correlated with the variation in different per-
bed cost indicators. Moreover, this model can reflect the shares of cost variations attributed to 
the ten variables that are introduced for the two levels in the model. 
The model is able to explain a substantial part (between 49 percent and 88 percent) of the 
variation between the grouped cost values (i.e., between cantons). However, the model is less 
useful for explaining the large per-bed cost variations within cantons—in particular, for CASS. 
The unexplained intra-cantonal parts of CMHI are less important in the model, which is in line 
with expectations, because the benefits chargeable to FHIL are clearly defined in the national 
MHI benefit basket, and they should have a homogenizing effect on CMHI. In contrast, CASS is 
primarily financed by out-of-pocket payments and is not subject to such regulations. 
The model attempts to capture different hospitality standards among the individual 
institutions using the variable AUX. The extent of the correlation between AUX and the three 
cost items—in particular, for CASS—proves to be less important than expected. A better 
variable than AUX might be found outside the SOMED; for example, an indicator for the 
average per capita surface of patient rooms, most likely available in the annual reports of the 
individual nursing homes, would fit this need. Moreover, a cross-sectional multilevel model is 
certainly not the best choice to explain the heterogeneity in terms of costs of nursing homes 
operating in a given canton. A fixed-effect panel data model would have better controlled for 
such unobserved heterogeneity. The years after 2006 in SOMED should now be accessible for 
such an analysis.  
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Other limitations of the results are associated with the limitations of the data. With regard to 
the quality of the data, SOMED is a comprehensive survey and is not subject to distortions. 
However, 2006 was the first year of data collection after the statistics were revised, and a 
revision is always associated with certain coding changes and other uncertainties. Moreover, 
15 percent of the nursing homes needed to be removed because of missing or defective data. 
The potential bias that results from this selection method is inevitable.  
Because of data limitations, no analyses were conducted at regional levels smaller than the 
canton. Because Swiss cantons vary enormously in size, the formation of sub-cantonal 
regions with greater homogeneity could have brought additional stability to the model, as 
would a greater number of observations. Moreover, expanding the model in the direction of 
individual nursing home clients could have been interesting. Because SOMED was revised in 
2006, data are available at the individual level. Unfortunately, SOMED does not include any 
details on the costs to these individual residents. Such an expansion has been suggested by an 
investigation on treatment in Swiss acute care hospitals, where a substantial part of the cost 
variation is accrued at the patient level (Matter, Widmer, and Busato 2009). 
In conclusion, it is considered whether some of the results in this study can be used to make 
recommendations for the authorities in cantonal or federal government entities. With respect 
to the future increased demand for nursing home beds, attention is focused on cost-
containment strategies for cantons.  
Concerning the seven indicators analyzed at the nursing home level, large occupancy of beds 
(DAY) and highly qualified personnel (QUP) are identified to be important “drivers” for all 
three cost items. Faced with the problem of a demand that exceeds the supply (Crivelli et al. 
2002; Grabowski 2008; Norton 2000), such expensive, intensively used, and highly quality-
staffed nursing home beds should be in the interest of government authorities (Lyons et al. 
2008; Zuniga et al. 2010), even in the case of cantons with an explicit cost-containment 
mandate for nursing home care. For CMHI in particular, more nursing time employed per 
patient (INT) and location in a Latin-speaking region (REG) are other significantly correlated 
factors on the individual level. A higher intensity of nursing is more costly for MHI, and—
given identical medical practices of nursing services and their coding in Latin- and German-
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speaking regions—patients in nursing homes in the Latin-speaking regions81 of Switzerland 
show larger case loads on average.  
Moreover, the estimation models show significant coefficients for the number of non-medical 
employees (AUX) in the equations for all three cost items. Unfortunately, only a small part of 
the varying intra-cantonal “hospitality standards” captured by this indicator could be 
explained by the models. It seems rather difficult to derive recommendations for policy 
makers from this result. Furthermore, the motivation of cantonal authorities to intervene in 
“intra-cantonal sub-markets for accommodation and assistance” is limited, excepting that 
large deficits in nursing home budgets would demand an increase of cantonal subsidies. 
Therefore, it is still recommended that cantonal authorities continuously monitor these costs 
of accommodation and assistance in the nursing homes of their cantons. If an increasing 
number of people among those with chronic illnesses and daily limitations (OECD/WHO 
2011) are unable to pay these costs out of their own budgets, then market interventions by the 
cantons could become necessary. 
The influence of healthcare policy is also very limited with respect to the three variables that 
were modeled at the cantonal level: WAG, RNT, and BED. If—with a cost containment 
focus—wage levels in the (public) healthcare sector were to be reduced, public nursing homes 
would be at risk of losing some of their staff to private nursing homes, to other economic 
sectors or to better paying cantons. Finally, the two indicators for the cost of private housing 
(RNT) and for the density of nursing home beds (BED) in the cantons never showed 
significant coefficients in the calculations. Hence, they are unlikely to be useful for policy 
recommendations. In summary, it can be said that further research—using panel data 
indicators and methodologies, searching for better indicators of hospitality standards of the 
nursing homes, and attempting to model the different cantonal regulations at the second 
level—is highly recommended. 
                                                 
81
  Latin-speaking regions in Switzerland show higher population densities on average than German-speaking 
regions. Hence, it is highly probable that the variable REG (introduced as a ”cultural location factor”) is 
partly a proxy for the remoteness of a region with a larger share of (less intense) inpatient care in the total 
long-term care milieu.  
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Appendix, Chapter 5 
• List of abbreviations used (see Table 18 for the acronyms of the tested 
variables) 
FHIL: Federal Health Insurance Law; CHF: Swiss francs; FSO: Swiss Federal Statistical 
Office; SOMED: Swiss federal statistics on socio-medical facilities; MHI: Mandatory health 
insurance; OECD: Organization of Economic Co-Operation and Development; WHO: World 
Health Organization; EL: Supplementary benefits to the old age and the invalidity insurance; 
CONS: Constant term; OBS: Observations; MEAN: Mean value; STD.DEV.: Standard 
deviation; MIN: Minimum value; MAX: Maximum value; OLS: Ordinary least squares 
(regression); GLS: Generalized leased squares (regression); MLE: Maximum likelihood 
(regression) estimator; REML: Restricted maximum likelihood (regression) estimator; LRT: 
Likelihood-ratio-test. 
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• Additional Tables 
Table 18: Description of variables 
Variable 
Variable label Meaning/description of 
indicator 
Data source Formula/indicator 
see (FSO 2008b) 
KTNR Canton 
Sequential number of the Swiss 
cantons (without Appenzell 
Innerrhoden AI) 
FSO 2008a KTNR = 1, 2, …, 25 
C
TOT
 
Per bed total 
costs  
Annual per-bed total costs in CHF; 
OBSs under CHF 20,000 and over 
CHF 170,000 excluded as “outliers” 
SOMED 2006 E1.300.01 / B03 
C
ASS
 
Per-bed costs of 
accommodation 
and assistance  
Annual per-bed costs in CHF for 
accommodation and assistance 
SOMED 2006 (E1.300.02 + E1.300.03) / B03 
C
MHI
 
Per-bed costs of 
MHI care 
services 
Annual per-bed costs in CHF for 
mandatory services under FHIL 
SOMED 2006 
(E1.300.04 + E1.300.05 + 
E1.300.06 + E1.300.07 + 
E1.300.08) / B03 
DAY 
Patient-days per 
available bed 
Output: number of annual patient-days 
accounted per available bed; OBS 
under 183 days excluded 
SOMED 2006 (D16 + D16.0) / B03 
INT 
Average intensity 
of nursing 
Case-mix: average intensity of nursing 
under FHIL (average time per patient 
day; minutes recorded into integers 
varying from 1 (1 to 20 minutes) 
to 13 (> 240 minutes);  
SOMED 2006 V11 (FSO 2008b, p. 27) 
SIZ 
(SIQ) 
Size (square of 
size) with respect 
to number of 
beds 
Structure: size (square of size) of 
facility with respect to the number of 
available long-term and short-term 
beds 
SOMED 2006 B03 
QUP 
Qualified 
personnel per 100 
beds 
Quality: Number of qualified 
employees (medical doctors, qualified 
nurses) per 100 beds (full-time 
equivalents); OBS without qualified 
personnel excluded 
SOMED 2006  (C.09.0 = 31 or 32) * 100 / B03 
AUX 
Patient-days per 
non-medical 
employee 
Standard: Number of patient-days 
accounted per non-medical qualified 
employee; OBS over 1,825 days 
excluded as “outliers” 
SOMED 2006 
(D16 + D16.0) /  
(C09 – (C.09.0 = 31 or 32)) 
PUB 
Legal form 
(dummy 
variable) 
Funding: Legal form, private 
(regulated exclusively by company 
law) or public (regulated by 
administrative and company law);  
SOMED 2006 
0 < A17 < 11 ≥ private (= 0);  
19 < A17 < 35 ≥ public (=1) 
REG 
Linguistic region 
(dummy var.) 
Linguistic region of the nursing home: 
0 = German; 1 = French, Italian or 
Romansh 
SOMED 2006 
A19 (A19 = 1 => REG = 0; 
A19 = 2 or 3 => REG = 1) 
WAG 
Wage level in 
canton 
Monthly gross wage sector 85: 
healthcare and welfare in CHF 
SAKE 2006 
Assumption: cantons have same 
wage level as the “greater region”  
RNT 
Rent index in 
canton 
2003 rent index by canton 
Statistical 
Yearbook of 
Switzerland 
See www.bfs.admin.ch 
BED 
Density of 
nursing home 
beds in the 
canton 
Number of nursing home beds per 
1,000 inhabitants aged 65 years or 
older 
SOMED 2006 and 
ESPOP 2006 
B03 and ESPOP at 
www.bfs.admin.ch 
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Figure 13: Histograms and normality tests for the per-bed costs items (viz., C
TOT
, C
ASS
, C
MHI
) in 
nursing homes, 2006 
histogram CTOT 
 
pnorm CTOT 
 
histogram CASS 
 
pnorm CASS 
 
histogram CMHI 
 
pnorm CMHI 
 
Source: SOMED (FSO 2008a); calculations by the author. 
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Table 19: Regression results (detailed) 
a) Dependent variable CTOT 
CTOT: Random intercept multilevel regression: xtreg command (GLS) 
xtreg CTOT DAY_C INT_C SIZ_C SIQ_C QUP_C AUX_C REG_C WAG_C RNT_C BED_C, i(KTNR) 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =      1186 
Group variable: KTNR                            Number of groups   =        25 
R-sq:  within  = 0.5392                         Obs per group: min =         5 
       between = 0.7551                                        avg =      47.4 
       overall = 0.6146                                        max =       199 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(10)      =   1427.86 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        CTOT |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       DAY_C |   112.3049   13.62704     8.24   0.000     85.59639    139.0134 
       INT_C |   2807.231   247.0718    11.36   0.000     2322.979    3291.483 
       SIZ_C |   .2866974   21.24321     0.01   0.989    -41.34922    41.92262 
       SIQ_C |   .0698282   .0951322     0.73   0.463    -.1166274    .2562839 
       QUP_C |   581.6223   29.39826    19.78   0.000     524.0028    639.2419 
       AUX_C |  -22.75336   1.609602   -14.14   0.000    -25.90812    -19.5986 
       REG_C |    2898.68   1881.723     1.54   0.123    -789.4294    6586.789 
       WAG_C |   27.40342   11.28798     2.43   0.015     5.279389    49.52745 
       RNT_C |   9.402718   10.91221     0.86   0.389    -11.98482    30.79025 
       BED_C |  -169.7376   112.5556    -1.51   0.132    -390.3426    50.86739 
       _cons |   79456.81   1585.764    50.11   0.000     76348.77    82564.86 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  6555.8727 
     sigma_e |  11123.546 
         rho |  .25780554   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
CTOT: Random intercept multilevel regression: xtmixed command (REML) 
xtmixed CTOT  DAY_C INT_C SIZ_C SIQ_C QUP_C AUX_C REG_C WAG_C RNT_C BED_C || KTNR: , variance 
Performing EM optimization:  
Performing gradient-based optimization:  
Iteration 0:   log restricted-likelihood = -12716.848   
Iteration 1:   log restricted-likelihood = -12716.848   
Computing standard errors: 
Mixed-effects REML regression                   Number of obs      =      1186 
Group variable: KTNR                            Number of groups   =        25 
                                                Obs per group: min =         5 
                                                               avg =      47.4 
                                                               max =       199 
                                                Wald chi2(10)      =   1408.45 
Log restricted-likelihood = -12716.848          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        CTOT |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       DAY_C |   111.5419   13.56983     8.22   0.000      84.9455    138.1383 
       INT_C |   2812.049   247.1215    11.38   0.000       2327.7    3296.398 
       SIZ_C |   1.459467   21.16204     0.07   0.945    -40.01737    42.93631 
       SIQ_C |   .0643149   .0947101     0.68   0.497    -.1213135    .2499433 
       QUP_C |   580.6592   29.28147    19.83   0.000     523.2685    638.0498 
       AUX_C |  -22.69443   1.603281   -14.15   0.000     -25.8368   -19.55206 
       REG_C |   2178.378   1929.938     1.13   0.259    -1604.232    5960.988 
       WAG_C |   27.60917   14.53217     1.90   0.057    -.8733581     56.0917 
       RNT_C |   8.482337   13.55464     0.63   0.531    -18.08428    35.04895 
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       BED_C |   -183.014   140.8143    -1.30   0.194    -459.0048    92.97688 
       _cons |   79407.24   2023.412    39.24   0.000     75441.43    83373.05 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  Random-effects Parameters  |   Estimate   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------------------+------------------------------------------------ 
KTNR: Identity               | 
                  var(_cons) |   7.35e+07   2.42e+07      3.85e+07    1.40e+08 
-----------------------------+------------------------------------------------ 
               var(Residual) |   1.24e+08    5146378      1.14e+08    1.34e+08 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
LR test vs. linear regression: chibar2(01) =   322.35 Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000 
 
 
CTOT: Random slope multilevel regression: xtmixed command (REML) 
xtmixed CTOT  DAY_C INT_C SIZ_C SIQ_C QUP_C AUX_C REG_C WAG_C RNT_C BED_C || KTNR: WAG_C, 
variance covariance(unstructured) 
Performing EM optimization:  
Performing gradient-based optimization:  
Iteration 0:   log restricted-likelihood =  -12713.23   
Iteration 1:   log restricted-likelihood = -12711.354   
Iteration 2:   log restricted-likelihood = -12711.014   
Iteration 3:   log restricted-likelihood =  -12711.01   
Iteration 4:   log restricted-likelihood =  -12711.01   
Computing standard errors: 
Mixed-effects REML regression                   Number of obs      =      1186 
Group variable: KTNR                            Number of groups   =        25 
                                                Obs per group: min =         5 
                                                               avg =      47.4 
                                                               max =       199 
                                                Wald chi2(10)      =   1487.76 
Log restricted-likelihood =  -12711.01          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        CTOT |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       DAY_C |   111.6951   13.54325     8.25   0.000      85.1508    138.2394 
       INT_C |   2784.401   243.2617    11.45   0.000     2307.616    3261.185 
       SIZ_C |   1.710444   21.00877     0.08   0.935    -39.46599    42.88688 
       SIQ_C |   .0629845   .0942816     0.67   0.504    -.1218041    .2477732 
       QUP_C |   579.8541   29.13341    19.90   0.000     522.7536    636.9545 
       AUX_C |  -22.61019   1.599583   -14.14   0.000    -25.74532   -19.47507 
       REG_C |   1788.546   1862.481     0.96   0.337    -1861.849    5438.941 
       WAG_C |   61.06459   22.96623     2.66   0.008     16.05162    106.0776 
       RNT_C |  -13.26339   11.24912    -1.18   0.238    -35.31127    8.784483 
       BED_C |  -57.43818   94.85999    -0.61   0.545    -243.3603     128.484 
       _cons |   82360.73   3184.886    25.86   0.000     76118.47    88602.99 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  Random-effects Parameters  |   Estimate   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------------------+------------------------------------------------ 
KTNR: Unstructured           | 
                  var(WAG_C) |   4701.522   3170.448      1253.819    17629.58 
                  var(_cons) |   1.54e+08   7.05e+07      6.27e+07    3.78e+08 
            cov(WAG_C,_cons) |   850572.8   474700.1     -79822.16     1780968 
-----------------------------+------------------------------------------------ 
               var(Residual) |   1.24e+08    5135530      1.14e+08    1.34e+08 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
LR test vs. linear regression:       chi2(3) =   334.03   Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Note: LR test is conservative and provided only for reference. 
  
  
134
b) Dependent variable CASS82 
CASS: Random intercept multilevel model: xtreg command (GLS) 
xtreg CASS DAY_C INT_C SIZ_C SIQ_C QUP_C AUX_C REG_C WAG_C RNT_C BED_C, i(KTNR) 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =      1186 
Group variable: KTNR                            Number of groups   =        25 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1484                         Obs per group: min =         5 
       between = 0.4857                                        avg =      47.4 
       overall = 0.2557                                        max =       199 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(10)      =    229.40 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        CASS |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       DAY_C |   60.22444   12.66393     4.76   0.000     35.40359    85.04529 
       INT_C |   355.2498    227.761     1.56   0.119    -91.15354    801.6532 
       SIZ_C |  -41.34839   19.72391    -2.10   0.036    -80.00655   -2.690241 
       SIQ_C |      .1205   .0884313     1.36   0.173    -.0528221    .2938222 
       QUP_C |   201.4407   27.30412     7.38   0.000     147.9256    254.9558 
       AUX_C |  -13.34217   1.494838    -8.93   0.000      -16.272   -10.41234 
       REG_C |   1157.589   1660.776     0.70   0.486    -2097.472    4412.649 
       WAG_C |   18.40148   7.772107     2.37   0.018      3.16843    33.63453 
       RNT_C |   10.70352    7.98815     1.34   0.180    -4.952968       26.36 
       BED_C |  -86.59288   81.41559    -1.06   0.288    -246.1645    72.97875 
       _cons |   43594.59    1108.77    39.32   0.000     41421.44    45767.74 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  4420.3021 
     sigma_e |  10348.837 
         rho |  .15429134   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
  
                                                 
82
  Calculating the regression to C
ASS
 with a random slope model (all 3 group variables WAG, RNT, and BED 
were tested for this purpose) could not be managed by the software. Either the standard error calculations or 
performance of the gradient-based optimization in the REML routine failed. 
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c) Dependent variable CMHI 
CMHI: Random intercept model: xtreg command (GLS) 
xtreg CMHI DAY_C INT_C SIZ_C SIQ_C QUP_C AUX_C REG_C WAG_C RNT_C BED_C, i(KTNR) 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =      1186 
Group variable: KTNR                            Number of groups   =        25 
R-sq:  within  = 0.4834                         Obs per group: min =         5 
       between = 0.8752                                        avg =      47.4 
       overall = 0.6153                                        max =       199 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(10)      =   1259.25 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        CMHI |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       DAY_C |   54.88216   10.20671     5.38   0.000     34.87737    74.88695 
       INT_C |   2431.129   181.5665    13.39   0.000     2075.266    2786.993 
       SIZ_C |   37.19282    15.8718     2.34   0.019     6.084671    68.30097 
       SIQ_C |   -.032054   .0712775    -0.45   0.653    -.1717554    .1076474 
       QUP_C |   380.4247   21.98124    17.31   0.000     337.3423    423.5071 
       AUX_C |  -9.729753   1.203299    -8.09   0.000    -12.08818    -7.37133 
       REG_C |   3739.918   1253.892     2.98   0.003     1282.336    6197.501 
       WAG_C |   8.327369   4.776436     1.74   0.081    -1.034274    17.68901 
       RNT_C |   .8760432   5.300129     0.17   0.869    -9.512019    11.26411 
       BED_C |  -49.18894   53.22646    -0.92   0.355    -153.5109    55.13301 
       _cons |   35956.49   694.6487    51.76   0.000        34595    37317.97 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  2638.0013 
     sigma_e |  8374.3676 
         rho |  .09027284   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
 
 
CMHI: Random intercept model: xtmixed command (REML) 
xtmixed CMHI  DAY_C INT_C SIZ_C SIQ_C QUP_C AUX_C REG_C WAG_C RNT_C BED_C || KTNR: , variance 
Performing EM optimization:  
Performing gradient-based optimization:  
Iteration 0:   log restricted-likelihood = -12373.099   
Iteration 1:   log restricted-likelihood = -12373.099   
Computing standard errors: 
Mixed-effects REML regression                   Number of obs      =      1186 
Group variable: KTNR                            Number of groups   =        25 
                                                Obs per group: min =         5 
                                                               avg =      47.4 
                                                               max =       199 
                                                Wald chi2(10)      =   1195.94 
Log restricted-likelihood = -12373.099          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        CMHI |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       DAY_C |   53.41107   10.18114     5.25   0.000      33.4564    73.36573 
       INT_C |   2436.053   183.2546    13.29   0.000     2076.881    2795.225 
       SIZ_C |   39.49194   15.85859     2.49   0.013     8.409674     70.5742 
       SIQ_C |  -.0402588    .071093    -0.57   0.571    -.1795984    .0990809 
       QUP_C |   382.1199    21.9526    17.41   0.000     339.0936    425.1462 
       AUX_C |  -9.524077   1.201863    -7.92   0.000    -11.87969   -7.168469 
       REG_C |   2861.187   1341.831     2.13   0.033     231.2459    5491.127 
       WAG_C |   8.668279   6.402232     1.35   0.176    -3.879866    21.21642 
       RNT_C |   .1245653   6.541797     0.02   0.985    -12.69712    12.94625 
       BED_C |  -62.15998   66.74992    -0.93   0.352    -192.9874    68.66747 
       _cons |   35929.32   911.9993    39.40   0.000     34141.83     37716.8 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  Random-effects Parameters  |   Estimate   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------------------+------------------------------------------------ 
KTNR: Identity               | 
                  var(_cons) |   1.35e+07    5096149       6430267    2.83e+07 
-----------------------------+------------------------------------------------ 
               var(Residual) |   7.01e+07    2916061      6.46e+07    7.60e+07 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
LR test vs. linear regression: chibar2(01) =    90.05 Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000 
 
 
CMHI: Random slope model: xtmixed command (REML) 
xtmixed CMHI  DAY_C INT_C SIZ_C SIQ_C QUP_C AUX_C REG_C WAG_C RNT_C BED_C || KTNR: WAG_C , 
variance covariance(unstructured) 
Performing EM optimization:  
Performing gradient-based optimization:  
Iteration 0:   log restricted-likelihood = -12370.872   
Iteration 1:   log restricted-likelihood = -12370.344   
Iteration 2:   log restricted-likelihood = -12370.285   
Iteration 3:   log restricted-likelihood = -12370.284   
Iteration 4:   log restricted-likelihood = -12370.284   
Computing standard errors: 
Mixed-effects REML regression                   Number of obs      =      1186 
Group variable: KTNR                            Number of groups   =        25 
                                                Obs per group: min =         5 
                                                               avg =      47.4 
                                                               max =       199 
                                                Wald chi2(10)      =   1277.25 
Log restricted-likelihood = -12370.284          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        CMHI |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       DAY_C |   52.68882   10.17517     5.18   0.000     32.74584    72.63179 
       INT_C |   2425.882   179.7479    13.50   0.000     2073.582    2778.181 
       SIZ_C |   39.43091   15.77495     2.50   0.012     8.512577    70.34924 
       SIQ_C |  -.0415911   .0708699    -0.59   0.557    -.1804936    .0973114 
       QUP_C |   381.1631   21.85468    17.44   0.000     338.3287    423.9975 
       AUX_C |  -9.492116   1.201396    -7.90   0.000    -11.84681   -7.137423 
       REG_C |   2813.769   1277.005     2.20   0.028     310.8862    5316.653 
       WAG_C |   27.99028   9.101732     3.08   0.002     10.15121    45.82934 
       RNT_C |  -4.821852   6.302097    -0.77   0.444    -17.17373     7.53003 
       BED_C |   27.88011   56.15244     0.50   0.620    -82.17664    137.9369 
       _cons |    37830.4   1327.269    28.50   0.000        35229     40431.8 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  Random-effects Parameters  |   Estimate   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------------------+------------------------------------------------ 
KTNR: Unstructured           | 
                  var(WAG_C) |   551.5017   511.2225      89.64233    3392.974 
                  var(_cons) |   2.54e+07   1.31e+07       9252989    6.98e+07 
            cov(WAG_C,_cons) |   118385.2   82876.34     -44049.39    280819.9 
-----------------------------+------------------------------------------------ 
               var(Residual) |   7.01e+07    2915029      6.46e+07    7.60e+07 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
LR test vs. linear regression:       chi2(3) =    95.68   Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Note: LR test is conservative and provided only for reference. 
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Table 20: Correlation matrix of regressors 
 
corr  DAY_C INT_C  SIZ_C SIQ_C QUP_C AUX_C REG_C WAG_C RNT_C BED_C (obs=1186) 
 
      |   DAY_C   INT_C   SIZ_C   SIQ_C   QUP_C   AUX_C   REG_C   WAG_C   RNT_C   BED_C 
------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
DAY_C |  1.0000 
INT_C |  0.0286  1.0000 
SIZ_C |  0.0774 -0.0364  1.0000 
SIQ_C |  0.0404  0.0171  0.9173  1.0000 
QUP_C |  0.0555  0.4819  0.0349  0.0667  1.0000 
AUX_C |  0.0416 -0.3587 -0.0609 -0.0387 -0.0425  1.0000 
REG_C |  0.2012  0.5139 -0.0865 -0.0794  0.1172 -0.2879  1.0000 
WAG_C | -0.0783 -0.0599  0.0834  0.0903 -0.0007  0.0610 -0.1731  1.0000 
RNT_C | -0.0632 -0.1905  0.1298  0.0998 -0.0192  0.1544 -0.3985  0.6298  1.0000 
BED_C | -0.1552 -0.3605  0.0048  0.0303 -0.1470  0.1779 -0.5719  0.0621  0.0039  1.0000 
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6 Demography and the future requirements of inpatient 
acute care in Swiss hospitals 
 
Abstract 
An aging population may have a strong influence on future acute care hospital use in Western 
countries. Such concerns also exist for Switzerland and its 26 cantons. This article aims to 
empirically predict the range of national and cantonal acute care hospital volumes (i.e., 
hospital cases and hospital days) through 2030. A projection model is presented that makes a 
systematic link between Swiss hospital medical statistics and canton-level population 
scenarios. Medical technology and organizational progress are simulated in the model by 
making different assumptions about future lengths of stays in hospitals. Despite the aging of 
the Swiss population, the projections find that the increase in hospital days required through 
2030 is not (or is only slightly) expected to exceed population growth. Although an increase 
in hospital days between 5 percent and 13 percent is predicted in the model, the Swiss 
population will grow 11 percent in the “average” demographic scenario. 
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6.1 Background 
Switzerland is a small Western European country with a population of 7.9 million people (as 
of 2010) and a total area of 41,000 km2. The country consists of 26 cantons, which differ 
considerably in area, population size, population density, and socioeconomic conditions (see 
Figure 2 and Table 12). The Swiss inpatient acute care hospital sector that is discussed in 
more detail in this article is well developed. It has costs of 17.3 billion CHF in 2010; this 
corresponds to a 28.3 percent share of the country’s 61.0 billion CHF healthcare expenditure 
total. Compared to other (Western) OECD countries, Switzerland shows a rather average 
supply of 5.0 acute care hospital beds per 1,000 population83 but traditionally measures an 
above-average length of stay (LOS) of 9.6 days in such hospitals84. 
The federalist political system in Switzerland delegates many public responsibilities to the 
canton level, including the implementation of healthcare policies and the provision of a 
sufficient supply of inpatient care services for their populations. To accomplish this task, the 
cantons should seek the best possible statistical information about the structure and the future 
trends in their populations and their actual and future patterns of hospital utilization.  
In recent years, the Swiss cantons have increasingly used statistical information for making 
projections and for planning future hospital capacity (Weaver et al. 2009a). They often make 
use of the available data sources and calculate hospital capacity projections for their service 
area. However, many cantons still lack sufficient information about themselves and their 
neighboring regions (OECD/WHO 2011). 
To introduce, this article provides a comparative overview of canton populations with regard 
to their demographic structures in 2010 and presents a short overview of projections of these 
structures through 2030; these are figures calculated by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
(FSO, 2012e). Moreover, an short overview of current inpatient acute care hospital utilization 
will be given for each canton. Finally, the estimates of future hospital utilization will be 
presented following different scenarios based on a projection model.  
                                                 
83
  The corresponding indicators (2010) for selected countries are as follows: Germany: 8.3; Austria: 7.6; 
France: 6.4; OECD average: 4.9; UK: 3.0; New Zealand: 2.7; and Sweden: 2.7 (see OECD. 2013. “OECD 
Health Data Base.” OECD. Paris.). 
84
  The corresponding indicators (2010) for selected countries are as follows: Finland: 11.6; Germany: 9.5; 
Belgium: 8.1; OECD average: 7.1; US: 4.9; Denmark: 4.6; Norway: 4.5 (see ibid.). 
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This projection model (see Section 6.2.2) had originally been developed by researchers at the 
Swiss Health Observatory and the Statistical Office of Canton Vaud (VD) (Cerboni and 
Camenzind 2006; Weaver et al. 2009a) for the statistical support of the hospital planning 
process in individual cantons. It uses an optimal combination of the two data sources, the 
Swiss hospital medical statistics (MS) (FSO 2011c) and the Swiss population statistics 
(STATPOP) (FSO 2010a, 2012e). Hence, the future requirements for inpatient hospital care is 
presented for each medical branch at the canton level.  
As most of the cantonal healthcare authorities normally use these projections for their internal 
planning process, they are not available for the public. Therefore, this information about 
future requirements of inpatient acute care for all 26 individual cantons in Switzerland is 
presented the first time in this article. The other contribution of the article is a result of the 
simultaneous application of the model for the 26 Swiss cantons: direct comparisons of the 
results between cantons and the country as a whole as well as calculations of national-level 
results for medical branches are made available to the reader.  
 
 
6.2 Materials and methods 
6.2.1 Data sources 
The Swiss population statistics (STATPOP) were used to measure the canton-level age 
structures of the resident population in 2010 and to project population trends through 2030 
(FSO 2012e). For these purposes, the population was divided into younger (0 to 64 years) and 
older (65 years and older) residents. The year 2010 was the base year for the analysis, in 
alignment with the hospital data for 2010 (FSO 2012c), which was the most current data that 
was available upon the commencement of this work.  
Three different projection scenarios are typically calculated in STATPOP. Only the middle 
scenario, the so-called “average” scenario, has been used throughout this article. This average 
STATPOP scenario assumes a continuation of the demographic trends of recent years and 
takes several factors into account, such as the introduction of free movement of persons 
within Europe (FSO 2010a). Moreover, STATPOP was used to calculate hospitalization rates; 
hospitalization numbers were set in relation to population numbers (Breslow and Day 1975). 
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The second data file, MS, consists of discharges from the Swiss national hospital discharge 
master file from 2010 (FSO 2012c). The 2010 file contains 1.1 million discharges (i.e., 
hospital cases) from acute care hospitals of individuals residing in the 26 Swiss cantons. The 
statistical units are individual hospital cases.  
Discharges of patients who were not residents of Switzerland at the time of their treatment 
were excluded from the analysis, as were patients who had been discharged from psychiatric, 
geriatric, or rehabilitation hospitals and newborn children in obstetrics wards—the latter to 
avoid “double-counting” the hospital stays of mothers and children for births. Only inpatients 
who spent at least one night in the hospital in 2010 were included; all outpatient hospital 
cases were excluded from the analysis. Moreover, anonymous hash codes were used to 
identify hospital cases as returning individuals (i.e., “patients”; 0.8 million persons compared 
to 1.1 million hospital cases in 2010).  
 
6.2.2 Statistical analyses 
Descriptive analyses 
The target variable of this article was the acute care hospital volume, which is the product of 
hospital cases and the average lengths of stay (LOSs). Thus, for the calculation and 
interpretation of LOS in hospitals, concepts very similar to those used to identify the number 
of patients and cases were adopted. The LOS for every case was calculated as the difference 
in days between the date of discharge and the date of admission plus one day. Because LOS 
data usually exhibit wide variance, are unevenly distributed, and can be distorted by certain 
individuals with excessively long hospitalizations when calculated in this manner, the median 
and percentile values (5, 25, 50, 75, and 95 percent) were used in the descriptive analyses (see 
Figure 17) instead of the arithmetic mean values (as for the model calculations). To achieve 
more robustness, the top 5 percent of cases with the longest LOSs are presented separately 
(see Appendix, Figure 21). 
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Estimation model 
The statistical projection model for the future utilization of hospitals requires a systematic 
link between the MS (FSO 2012c) and the canton-level data from STATPOP (FSO 2012e). It 
is important to highlight that, for both the patient and population dimensions, the canton of 
residence is always the focus. In the projection model, hospitalization rates (Ta,k,j,2010) for age 
group “a,” canton of residence “k,” and All Patient Diagnosis Related Groups (AP-DRG) “j” 
in the base year 2010 were calculated first. These hospitalization rates (Ta,k,j,2010) were 
obtained by dividing the number of cases (Sa,k,j,2010) for every age-canton-DRG-group in 2010 
by the resident population of this same age-canton-group (Pa,k,2010) in 2010.  
Ta,k,j,2010 = Sa,k,j,2010 / Pa,k,2010 (1) 
Intra-cantonal and extra-cantonal hospitalizations were handled separately, but the ratios of 
these intra- and extra-cantonal hospitalizations (i.e., the patient flows) were held constant 
between 2010 and 2030; it is difficult to speculate about the development of these patient 
flows in the coming years85. Theoretically, 20 age groups, 26 cantons, and over 600 AP-DRG 
combinations result in more than 300,000 different Ta,k,j,2010 per base year (2010). In fact, 
most of the strata are empty, because many diagnoses are never coded by Swiss hospitals. 
Next, the Ta,k,j,2010 were extrapolated using population coefficients (Pa,k,p,2030). The latter are 
estimates of the population trends according to the average population scenario “p” (FSO 
2012e) through 2030 for each age group (“a”) and canton of residence (“k”). Again, the intra-
cantonal and the extra-cantonal population trends were considered separately. By 
subsequently summing these products across all age groups, the number of estimated cases 
(Sk,j,p,2030) of each AP-DRG (“j”) in each canton (“k”) was obtained according to the applied 
population scenario (“p”) for the projected year (e.g., 2030): 
                                                 
85
  Until 2011, acute care hospital use was basically restricted to the canton of residence (except in medically 
indicated cases, in emergencies, or in the case of a policyholder having bought a particular complementary 
insurance). Since 2012, this “territorial” restriction has been suspended and, consequently, larger patient 
flows in the inpatient acute care hospital market can be expected. Centralization of highly specialized 
medicine is another point with an expected impact on acute care hospital patient flows in Switzerland in the 
years to come.  
When using the model as tool for individual canton-level projections of future utilization and, particularly, 
when comparing these results with actual and future supply structures, hypotheses about the possible changes 
of patient flows have to be considered thoroughly. However, in the calculations presented in this article, this 
aspect is less important. The analyses here are limited to the demand side (i.e., the future utilization) of the 
acute care hospital markets. Whether patients will be treated in hospitals of their own residential canton or in 
another canton has no direct importance here. 
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Sk,j,p,2030 = ∑ ( Pa,k,p,2030  *  Ta,k,j,2010 ) (2) 
Keeping the Ta,k,j,2010 constant in the projection period using the age, canton, and AP-DRG 
values for the base year (2010) is an implicit application of the hypothesis of the extension of 
morbidity (Seshamani and Gray 2004). Therefore, the model is at clear risk of overestimating 
future hospitalizations. Moreover, the model has not yet been programmed to distinguish 
between hospitalizations of female and male patients. Varying developments for each sex can 
be taken into account neither in canton-level population trends nor in morbidity and mortality 
trends.  
Various hypotheses on LOS trends are simulated in the model. These trends include changes 
in the time needed for medical treatment based on new therapies, new technologies, new 
medications, or more efficient processes. To this end, inlier and outlier cases are treated 
separately in the model. Inliers are the cases with LOS that do not exceed a given lower and 
upper limit for each AP-DRG in 2010. These limits are derived from the given definition of 
inliers and outliers in the FSO dataset of 2010: 78.5 percent of the cases are defined as inliers, 
16.1 percent are low outliers, and 5.4 percent are extreme outliers (Schenker et al. 2008).  
Concerning inliers, their average LOS, MLSj,2010, is calculated as the sum of the LOSs of all 
inliers of individual AP-DRG “j” (∑ LOSj,2010) divided by the number of inliers (mj,2010) of 
this particular AP-DRG “j” in 2010. The average LOS of the outliers (21.5 percent of the 
cases of each AP-DRG) is calculated as well. In contrast to the inlier cases, the outliers are 
kept constant concerning their number and their LOS in all scenarios presented below. The 
hypothesis here is that these outlier cases will exist in the same form in 2030 as in 2010. 
Thus, there is speculation in the model neither about their future numbers nor about their 
average future LOSs. All results for the MLS, for inliers, and for outliers used in the 
following scenarios, reflect the exact average LOS values86. 
MLSj,2010 = ∑ ( LOSj,2010 / mj,2010 ) (3) 
                                                 
86
  In the projection model, calculations of exact arithmetic mean values (not rounded integers!) are used. In 
contrast, the descriptive presentations of LOSs in Figures 16 and 20 show median and percentile values (i.e., 
integers for the 5, 25,50, 75, and 95 percentiles) were used (see Section 6.3.2).  
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Various hypotheses can now be adopted with regard to the future trends of the MLSj,2010 for 
inliers per DRG-group “j”. Four of these hypotheses are presented here. In the first 
hypothesis, the MLSj,2010 for inliers (as is the case for outliers in all four scenarios) was kept 
constant for each DRG-group from the base year 2010 until the chosen projection horizon 
2030 (MLSj,2010 = MLSj,2030). Therefore, no technological or organizational progress occurred. 
This “constant scenario” was regarded as the upper limit for the estimates. 
In the second hypothesis, MLSj,2010 evolved in such a way that it was the same length in 2020 
in all hospitals of all cantons as the 2010 value for the corresponding DRG-group in the 
hospital that had the shortest MLSj,2010 in the country in 2010. Only the DRG-groups from 
hospitals with at least 25 inlier cases were taken into account for this purpose. It is important 
to emphasize that this assumption implies that the caseloads of the inlier cases within all 
DRG-groups of every hospital are identical. In other words, the differences in LOS between 
hospitals are not caused by differences in the health status of patients (within DRG-groups of 
inliers); they result only from the differences in the “production processes” of the hospitals. 
After 2020, MLSj,2010 (resp. MLSj,2030) for inliers did not evolve any further, and only 
population trends were taken into account between 2020 and 2030. This “best scenario” was 
regarded as the lower limit for the estimations. 
The third hypothesis assumed that the MLSj,2010 in all hospitals would be the same length in 
2020 as the second-shortest MLSj,2010 in a Swiss hospital in 2010 for the corresponding DRG-
group (“j”). This circumstance was called the “second-best scenario”. Again, only the 
hospital groups containing at least 25 inlier cases were taken into account. As in hypothesis 2, 
MLSj,2010 resp. MLSj,2030 did not evolve any further after 2020.  
Finally, the fourth hypothesis assumed that the MLSj,2010 in all Swiss hospitals in 2020 will be 
the same length as the MLSj,2010 in the Swiss hospital that had an MLSj,2010 corresponding to 
the 25th percentile for the corresponding DRG-group in the base year 2010 (“quarter-best 
scenario”). Again, only hospital groups with at least 25 inlier cases were taken into account, 
and MLSj,2010 (MLSj,2030) did not evolve any further after 2020. 
When converting the number of projected cases into the number of hospital days, the actual 
effects of these various LOS scenarios can be shown. Thus, the number of projected hospital 
days Js,k,j,p,2030 was calculated by multiplying the number of cases Sk,j,p,2030 by the average 
LOS MLSs,j,2030 according to the length scenario “s” and summing the products: 
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Js,k,j,p,2030 = ∑ ( Sk,j,p,2030  *  MLSs,j,2030 ). (4) 
If the models were used to support concrete canton-level hospital planning, further 
assumptions about trends for the cantons’ or the hospitals’ specific bed occupancy rates 
would have to be made next. Again, various scenarios could be used for these purposes 
(Weaver et al. 2009a). After integrating specific occupancy rates into the model, estimates of 
the additional requirements (compared to actual beds) in the projected period can be made. In 
the present paper, however, this step has not been taken.  
 
 
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Structures of and trends within the Swiss population 
Figure 14: “Young” (0−64 years) and “old” populations (65+ years) by canton: shares of the 
total population in percentages, 2010 
 
Source: Swiss Population Statistics STATPOP (FSO 2012e), personal calculations. 
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were 65 years old or older (see Figure 14). The proportion of older residents varied across 
cantons and ranged from 14 percent to 21 percent. 
The official demographic projections (FSO 2012e) indicate that the Swiss population will 
increase by 0.9 million people (11 percent) from 2010 to 2030. The group of young residents 
will grow by approximately 2 percent, and the number of older residents will grow 
considerably more, by 57 percent (see Figure 15). Major differences are also expected for 
individual cantons. In some of the smaller cantons (Obwalden OW, Fribourg FR, and 
Nidwalden NW), the older population will increase by 85 percent or more, while increases 
between 40 percent (20 percent in BS) and 80 percent can be expected in the other cantons 
(see Figure 20 in the Appendix for the projected distribution of the cantonal populations in 
2030). 
 
Figure 15:  “Young” (0-64 years) and “old” (65+ years) populations by canton: change index, 
2010−2030 
 
Source: Swiss Population Statistics STATPOP (FSO 2012e), personal calculations. 
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6.3.2 Utilization of Swiss inpatient acute care hospitals, 2010 
A total of 209 somatic acute care hospitals were in operation in Switzerland in 2010 (FSO 
2012c). These hospitals treated 1.1 million cases of illness, accident and maternity and 0.8 
million different patients. In relation to the resident population, 104 patients were treated for 
every 1,000 inhabitants in 2010 (see Figure 16). Clear differences were found between the 
cantons, with unadjusted hospitalization rates ranging from 88 to 119 patients per 1,000 
residents. Age and gender standardization did not have a strong influence on these 
hospitalization rates across the cantons (see Figure 15).  
Reviewing the LOS data for Swiss acute care hospitals reveals three cantons (Valais VS, Jura 
JU, and Ticino TI) with a six-day median LOS, which is an above-average LOS. The values 
for almost all other cantons match the national median (CH) of 5 days, and one canton 
(Schwyz SZ) has a median LOS of 4 days (see Figure 17). When the cantons are ordered by 
the median LOS and by the duration of the 75th percentile as the second priority—as shown 
in Figure 17—six other cantons (Geneva GE, Vaud VD, FR, Schaffhausen SH, Basel-
Landschaft BL, and Solothurn SO) are ranked above the Swiss average (CH). 
 
Figure 16: Acute care hospitalizations by canton: patient frequencies, 2010 
 
Source: MS (FSO 2012c) and STATPOP (FSO 2012e), personal calculations. 
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Figure 17: Inpatient acute care hospital cases* by canton: length of stay, 2010 
 
 * Inpatient acute care (A-) cases in 2010 (N = 1,104,128 cases) 
Source: MS (FSO 2012c), personal calculations. 
 
The 5 percent of the hospital cases with the longest LOS in Switzerland include 
approximately 51,000 cases. The average LOS for these cases is 23 days, with a median value 
of 33 days (see Appendix, Figure 21). In individual cantons, the median values for the top 5 
percent of length-intensive hospital cases vary between 30 days (TI, St. Gallen SG, and Bern 
BE), and 37 days (GE and OW). Three-quarters of these “long-term” hospital cases 
(approximately 38,000 cases nationwide) have a LOS between 23 and 45 days. The remaining 
quarter of cases (75th percentile; 13,000 cases) were in the hospital for 46 days or more. 
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and 2030 is approximately 20 percent, an increase from 1.06 million to 1.27 million hospital 
cases. 
Differentiation by canton shows that some Swiss cantons (NW, Appenzell Innerrhoden AI, 
Zug ZG, FR, and SZ) will be confronted with an above-average increase (30 percent to 34 
percent) in hospitalizations of their resident population by 2030. This result coincides with the 
fact that these cantons will experience relatively strong increases in their older populations 
between 2010 and 2030 (see Figure 15). Most of these cantons had relatively moderate 
hospital utilization rates in the base year 2010 in terms of frequency and LOS. But there is a 
rise in utilization rates after age-standardizing the rates in most of these cantons (see Figure 
16).  
Nearly all Swiss cantons with relatively small forecasted increases (15 percent or less) in 
hospital cases (Basel-Stadt BS, Glarus GL, GE, Neuchâtel NE, SH, and BE) were among 
those with the smallest expected increases in the size of the older population in the next 20 
years (see Figure 15). However, hospital utilization in the base year 2010 was less uniform 
than the age structure for these cantons (see Figures 16 and 17). NE had both relatively low 
hospitalization rates and relatively short LOSs, while GE and SH had relatively low 
hospitalization rates but relatively high LOSs. Finally, there were cantons (BE, BS, and GL) 
with relatively high hospitalization rates, but LOSs in 2010 that were “average” (BS and GL) 
or quite short (BE). 
Regarding the projection of hospital days required in 2030, Figure 18 indicates the results of 
the four scenarios: “constant,” “best,” “second-best,” and “quarter-best.” The two scenarios 
“best” and “constant” had been introduced as lower and upper limits for the hospital day 
projections (see Section 6.2.2). For the entire country (CH), these lower and upper projection 
limits correspond to a 1 percent and 23 percent increase, respectively, in hospital days 
between 2010 and 2030. 
The two other scenarios—the more optimistic “second-best” scenario and the less optimistic 
“quarter-best” scenario—predict increases in hospital days of 5 percent and 13 percent, 
respectively, for the entire country (CH) by 2030. Across the 26 cantons, the results for the 
estimates of hospital days in the “second-best” and the “quarter-best” scenarios are almost 
uniformly 8 percentage points apart. Only the latter scenario is discussed in the following 
Section.  
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Figure 18: Hospital cases and days (four scenarios) by canton: percentage change, 2010−2030 
 
Source: MS (FSO 2012c) and STATPOP (FSO 2012e), personal calculations. 
 
The “quarter-best” scenario predicts an increase from 8.20 million to 9.23 million hospital 
days (13 percent) for the entire country (CH) between 2010 and 2030. The greatest canton-
level increases in hospital days are 25 percent or more (in rather small cantons, such as FR, 
NW, AI, SZ, and ZG). For other cantons (BS, GL, SH, and GE), the reverse holds true; they 
can expect a change in their future requirements for hospital days between -11 percent and 5 
percent.87  
The relatively large difference between hospital cases and hospital days predicted by the 
model indicates good potential to shorten the future LOS in hospitals. Appenzell 
Ausserrhoden AR, BS, Thurgau TG, and ZG are cantons for which this potential had not been 
visible in the “isolated” observation of LOS in Figures 17 and 21 (Appendix).  
 
                                                 
87
 In the “second-best” scenario, all these cantons could expect a decrease in their future requirements for 
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6.3.4 Estimates of hospital cases and days by medical branch through 
2030 
If the nationwide trend in hospital cases is stratified according to 27 different medical 
branches (Gesundheitsdirektion 2009), the influence of demography on these branches 
becomes apparent (see Figure 19). With an overall increase of 20 percent in the number of 
hospital cases, medical branches with predominantly elderly patients, such as cardiology and 
vascular medicine, nephrology, ophthalmology, pneumology, rheumatology, or 
cardiovascular surgery, can expect increases of 30 percent or more. At the other end of the 
scale, medical branches with exclusively very young patients, such as neonatology and 
obstetrics, show decreases in hospital cases between 4 percent and 7 percent. 
 
Figure 19: Hospital cases and days (“quarter-best” scenario) by medical branch: percentage 
changes, 2010−2030 
 
Source: MS (FSO 2012c) and STATPOP (FSO 2012e), personal calculations. 
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The volume of inpatient care that will actually be required in different medical branches of 
the Swiss somatic acute care hospitals through 2030 can be better described with the 
projections for required hospital days. For these projections, the “quarter-best” scenario88 is 
used to predict trends in LOS. The number of overall hospital days (CH) increases by 13 
percent (see also Figure 18).  
Relatively large increases in hospital days (between 32 percent and 26 percent) can be 
observed in the aforementioned branches of cardiology and vascular medicine, nephrology, 
and pneumology (see Figure 19). Ophthalmology, however, does not remain in the group. 
Although the model forecasts an increase of 33 percent in the number of cases, the number of 
hospital days is estimated to grow only 14 percent by 2030 in the “quarter-best” scenario. 
This result indicates—under the assumption that the patients grouped in the DRGs of this 
medical branch create similar caseloads across all hospitals—relatively high potential to 
shorten the LOS in this medical branch in the future. Finally, medical branches with very 
young patients, such as neonatology and obstetrics, remain at the low end of the scale. The 
expected reduction in the number of hospital days in these two medical branches is estimated 
to be -8 percent to -13 percent in the “quarter-best” variant.  
 
 
6.4 Discussion 
6.4.1 Population: canton- and age-specific structures in 2010 and 2030 
Considerable differences are present in the age structures of the cantons’ populations. In 
2010, the national share of the older population (aged 65 years or older) was 17 percent, but 
the rates varied distinctively among the cantons from 14 percent to 21 percent. In addition, the 
older population will increase more in the future than will the younger population (under 65 
years old). Between 2010 and 2030, the older population will increase 57 percent for the 
whole country and between 19 percent and 92 percent among the 26 Swiss cantons. 
Consequently, in 2030, more than 24 percent of the Swiss population will be people aged 65 
                                                 
88
  See Section 6.2.2. The “quarter-best scenario” assumes that the average LOS of every individual DRG in all 
Swiss hospitals in 2020 will be the same length as the average LOS corresponding to the 25th percentile for 
the corresponding DRG-group in the base year 2010 (for hospital groups with at least 25 inlier cases). 
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years and older. In the individual cantons, this proportion will vary between 20 percent and 29 
percent.  
 
6.4.2 Hospital utilization in 2010: frequency, age structure, and LOS 
The descriptive analysis of hospital utilization across the cantons in 2010 indicates strong 
regional variations. The canton with the highest hospitalization rate (BL, standardized by age 
and gender) registered approximately one-third more hospitalizations per capita in 2010 than 
the canton with the lowest rate (NE). In addition to epidemiologic reasons, these variations 
can be associated with socioeconomic characteristics of the population, such as social 
deprivation and poverty (Camenzind 2012; Reich et al. 2011; Schleiniger et al. 2007; Strunk 
et al. 2002). Regionally varying healthcare provision structures and medical practice 
variations (Borowitz 2010) of different healthcare providers are other important factors that 
may influence the utilization of acute care hospitals (Wennberg 1987). 
As for the relationship between higher age and healthcare utilization and costs, it should be 
remembered that economists have warned for almost three decades about being naïve in 
interpreting the connection (Evans 1985). Because chronic illnesses are more likely to 
accompany old age, it is reasonable to assume higher utilization of healthcare services and 
higher healthcare costs as a nation’s population ages. However, older age does not have a 
uniform influence on the utilization of healthcare service domains such as ambulatory care, 
hospital care, pharmacy services, or long-term care (Bayer-Oglesby and Höpflinger 2010; 
Mangano 2010). Other authors have shown that an aging population has a large effect on 
long-term care but less of an effect on the utilization of acute inpatient care (Spillman and 
Lubitz 2000). Second, the time remaining before individuals’ deaths has been reported to be a 
much stronger explanatory factor of varying individual healthcare costs than simple age 
(Felder et al. 2000; Felder and Werblow 2008; Seshamani and Gray 2004; Weaver et al. 2008; 
Werblow et al. 2007). It can be shown that this “proximity to death effect” can influence 
hospital costs as far out as 15 years before death (Seshamani and Gray 2004). 
For a better understanding of what these concerns mean for the estimates presented here, the 
actual causes of population aging must be specified (Weaver et al. 2009b). First, a population 
can become older if its life expectancy increases. In the estimation model used in this study, 
the middle scenario from STATPOP (FSO 2010a) assumes an increase in life expectancy at 
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birth from 79 to 85 years for men and from 84 years to 89 years for women between 2010 and 
2050. Because such growth is certainly not negligible, the argument about “proximity to 
death” could be partially valid for the projections calculated here. If this type of population 
aging does not lead to more illnesses and disabilities (i.e., if the hypothesis of “healthy aging” 
or “compression of morbidity” is valid), the future utilization of hospital inpatient services 
predicted by this study might be overestimated (Seshamani and Gray 2004). 
On the other hand, an aging population is a result of large age cohorts (e.g., the “baby boomer 
generation”) becoming older and being followed by smaller cohorts of young people (i.e., a 
shrinking society in the long run). In these cases, the “proximity to death argument” is not 
valid. As the demographic reality in Switzerland indeed reflects this pattern as well, the 
overestimation of the future hospital utilization in the presented projections due to neglecting 
“healthy aging” is less important. 
In addition to hospitalization frequency, LOS is the other important indicator for describing 
the volume of acute care consumed by a resident population. For 95 percent of all Swiss 
hospital cases, the LOS indicator did not practically vary across cantons in 2010. Three-
quarters of all hospital stays lasted no longer than nine days at the national level and no longer 
than 11 days at the level of individual cantons. The most interesting hospital cases are the 5 
percent (i.e., 51,000 cases) with the longest LOSs in 2010. Their share of the total volume of 
hospital days in 2010 was 25 percent or 2.30 million of the 8.72 million days spent in Swiss 
acute care hospitals. This “inequality” is even more pronounced at the canton-level. In the 
most “unequal” canton (GE), the 10 percent of cases with longest LOSs (of more than 23 
days) were responsible for 49 percent of the total acute care hospital days. An additional, 
more precise empirical analysis of these cases could show whether all these patients are 
rightly being treated in acute hospital care. For suitable patients, preference could be given to 
treatments in nursing homes or to outpatient services. 
 
6.4.3 Future utilization of acute care hospitals in Switzerland  
The baseline scenario for the model calculations (i.e., hospital days being held constant), for 
which LOS remains unchanged from 2010 to 2030, shows a 23 percent increase in hospital 
days for the country as a whole. If “corrected” for the expected population increase of 11 
percent in the same period, this result corresponds to an increase of 12 percent in hospital 
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days as a result of the predicted demographic changes (i.e., the population aging). However, 
the underlying assumption that the LOS will remain unchanged between 2010 and 2030 is 
hardly realistic. With technological or organizational progress and changes in the funding 
structure for hospitals (Busato and von Below 2010; Widmer and Weaver 2011), shorter 
LOSs are likely.  
If the more realistic but rather conservative “quarter-best” scenario is applied, then hospital 
days will increase 13 percent by 2030 at the national level. Nevertheless, some cantons (FR, 
NW, AI, and SZ) will still face increases of approximately 30 percent in hospital days, 
whereas other cantons (GL, SH, and GE) can expect an increase of less than 5 percent in 
hospital days under the “quarter-best” scenario. One canton (BS) is in an even better position, 
expecting a decline of 11 percent by 2030 in the “quarter-best” scenario. 
The detailed projection results also show varying, age-specific changes in the utilization of 
medical branches. Specialties that typically serve older patients, such as cardiology and 
vascular medicine, will clearly be more necessary in 2030 than medical branches with very 
young patients, such as neonatology or obstetrics. The prediction model is capable of showing 
these varying trends for medical branches or even individual AP-DRGs for each canton 
separately. 
 
6.4.4 Strengths and limitations 
Regional-, age-, and gender-specific variations in hospital utilization have been extensively 
described in the literature (Fisher et al. 2003; Fisher et al. 2000). In Switzerland, variations 
have been demonstrated for specific treatments (Matter-Walstra, Widmer, and Busato 2006; 
Schöni-Affolter, Widmer, and Busato 2008; Widmer et al. 2009). Compared to this previous 
research, the major innovation of this study is that the presented model describes and projects 
future regional variations in overall somatic acute care hospital utilization. It takes into 
account the individual diagnoses of the patients (AP-DRGs), existing (and time-invariant) 
patient flows between cantons, and estimates of technological and organizational progress. 
The model combines this information with age- and canton-specific population structures and 
trends on the most detailed level possible. The results show how hospital utilization in one 
canton will develop in comparison with other cantons and with the country as a whole.  
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Nevertheless, this study has several limitations. More intense canton-level future hospital 
utilization may be a consequence of above-average hospital utilization in 2010, above-
average growth in the older population between 2010 and 2030, or both. The above-average 
canton-level growths of the population 65 years or older dominate the calculations of hospital 
days in the favored “quarter-best” scenario. The “second-best” or even the “best” scenario 
gives more influence to the changes in medical treatment caused by new therapies, new 
technologies, new medications, or more efficient processes. Moreover, if a shorter prediction 
period is chosen—until 2020 instead of 2030, for example—the influence of demographic 
trends is less dominant. Hence, appropriately balancing the two main influencing effects in 
the model, demography and changes in medical technology and treatment, is not a simple 
task. 
Another weakness of the present work reflects the limitations of its data. The MS do 
constitute an exhaustive survey; therefore, they are not subject to any distortions, but the data 
only reflect reality when the coding is correct. The quality of the data and the possible 
presence of errors are constant issues in these statistics, just as they are in other countries’ 
data. Moreover, demographic projections and scenarios are of limited value, because they will 
only become reality if the proposed hypotheses (FSO 2010a) actually occur. 
In addition to the general difficulty mentioned above in balancing demographic and medical 
technology trends, various other assumptions (Weaver et al. 2009a) that may influence the 
results had to be made to produce the presented estimates. For example, an identical caseload 
was assumed for every DRG-group across every Swiss acute care hospital. Moreover, the 
hospitalization rates were held constant over time, whereas medical and technical progress 
was only taken into account in terms of LOS and not in terms of the prevalence of certain 
illnesses. One of the consequences of this latter limitation, which certainly overestimates the 
future requirements for acute care hospital services in the results of the model, has already 
been mentioned. Finally, future preferences and the future structure of the demands for acute 
care hospital services among the population were left completely unchanged through 2030. 
More generally, these limitations may differentially contribute to an endogeneity problem89 in 
the projection model. The model is certainly oversimplified, with just two “independent” 
variables—viz., the actual hospital utilization rates and the population trend coefficients. It is 
                                                 
89
  See also Chapter 1 of the thesis. 
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quite obvious that—aside from these 2 factors—many other variables will influence future 
hospital utilization as well. Moreover, the analysis also suffers from an inherent selection 
bias: omitting relevant regressors and selection bias are both important sources of 
endogeneity. The other two important causes of endogeneity—simultaneous causalities and 
measurement errors in independent variables—seem less important. 
 
6.4.5 Conclusions 
Although this work only addresses consequences on the acute care hospital sector, the 
existence of cantons with pronounced aging population trends raises questions about whether 
such population trends should be “corrected” with instruments of family support, tax, 
immigration, or other regional policies. The Swiss cantons that will suffer relatively large 
declines in their younger populations are mostly small cantons in peripheral regions. Thus, it 
should be decided at the Confederation level whether these cantons can be left alone with 
their demographic problems or whether policies should be developed at the national level. It 
should also be carefully examined whether the concerned cantons excessively attract wealthy 
older people with particular tax policies, thus contributing to their own problem. 
Cantons with above-average frequencies or above-average LOSs of actual and future 
hospitalizations should conduct more detailed empirical analyses to determine the precise 
reasons for their “heavy use” of inpatient acute health care. A search at the level of individual 
AP-DRGs like the one presented in the projection model could be helpful toward this end. 
Moreover, such an analysis might compare the acute care hospital utilization of the canton’s 
population with actual health indicators and health behavior in the canton, as well as with the 
structure and practices of the canton’s healthcare system. Precisely for this purpose, regional 
health reporting (Heeb et al. 2011) has been developed over the last few years in Switzerland. 
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Appendix, Chapter 6 
• List of abbreviations used 
OECD: Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development; WHO: World Health 
Organization; MHI: mandatory health insurance; CHF: Swiss francs; FSO: Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office; (AP-) DRG: (All patients) diagnosis related groups; LOS: Length of stay 
(in hospitals); MS: Swiss medical statistics of hospitals; STATPOP: Swiss population 
statistics; CH: Switzerland; AG: Aargau; AI: Appenzell Innerrhoden; AR Appenzell 
Ausserrhoden; BE: Bern; BL: Basel-Landschaft; BS: Basel-Stadt; FR: Fribourg; GE: Geneva; 
GL: Glarus; GR: Graubünden; JU: Jura; LU: Lucerne; NE: Neuchâtel; NW: Nidwalden; OW: 
Obwalden; SG: St. Gallen; SH: Schaffhausen; SZ: Schwyz; SO: Solothurn; TG: Thurgau; TI: 
Ticino; UR: Uri; VD: Vaud; VS: Valais; ZG: Zug; ZH: Zurich. 
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• Additional material 
Figure 20: “Young” (0−64 years) and “old” (65+ years) populations by canton: shares of the 
total population in percentages, 2030 
 
Source: Swiss Population Statistics STATPOP (FSO 2012e), personal calculations. 
 
Figure 21: Inpatient acute care hospital cases* by canton: lengths of stay, 2010 (5 percent of all 
cases with the longest lengths of stay in 2010) 
 
* 5 percent of all inpatient acute care (A-) cases with the longest LOSs at national level, 2010 (N = 51,072 cases) 
Source: MS 2010 (FSO 2012c), personal calculations. 
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Part III: Concluding remarks 
 
7 Concluding remarks 
Part I of this thesis provides an introduction to the institutional and empirical framework 
referring to cantonal variations in costs and utilization of healthcare services in Switzerland 
Therefore, a short theoretical introduction is offered by presenting important aspects of the 
meaning of health care in the framework of health economic theory. This is followed by a 
presentation of the main components comprising the construction, functioning and funding of 
the Swiss healthcare system. Part I continues with an overview on Switzerland’s health data 
situation and ends with a presentation of the literature overviewing international and national 
differences in regional healthcare costs.  
In Part II of the thesis, three models on cantonal variations in actual and future utilization or 
costs of health service domains in Switzerland are presented. The utilization differences of six 
individual MHI service domains (Chapter 4), the per-bed cost differences in the nursing home 
sector (Chapter 5), and the future requirements of inpatient healthcare days in acute care 
hospitals (Chapter 6) are analyzed. Varying statistical methods (panel econometrics, multi-
level regressions, and model simulations / projections) are used for these analyses. Finally, a 
synthesis of these detailed analyses is presented in the form of a discussion of the results 
obtained for two exemplary cantons (see Excursus after Section 7). 
Investigating these manifold aspects of regional variations in utilization and costs of 
healthcare services in Switzerland generated interesting answers and insights to the research 
questions on the subject. However, as is normal in such a process, many more questions arose 
during the work. Rather concrete propositions, made in the discussions or conclusions of the 
three empirical articles in Part II of the thesis, are briefly repeated in the following 
paragraphs. 
In the first article about variations in the utilization of services in six provider domains, more 
sophisticated methodological approaches were proposed to better address the serious, extant 
endogeneity problems. Instrumental variables and two-stage least squares estimation are the 
key words for these approaches (Stadelmann 2011). Another possibility could be the 
aggregation of several individual variables to form more general indices (e.g., creating an 
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index for “social deprivation” instead of solely using the unemployment rate). A step towards 
more interpretative possibilities in the form of direct causal inferences could thus be taken. 
Concerning data, a closer look at more detailed domains of health service providers would be 
possible, whereas analyses of variations on more detailed geographical levels—districts or 
municipalities—would be productive, but not possible for data (protection) reasons.  
In the second article about per-bed costs in Swiss nursing homes, it had been admitted that 
the use of a cross-sectional multilevel model was not the best choice and that better variables 
for the hospitality standard and different cantonal regulations in the nursing home branch 
should be modeled. Moreover, data at the level of individual nursing home clients (but 
without cost indicators) could be used. A (fixed-effects) panel data model with additional 
regressors of this nature would contribute to better control for unobserved heterogeneity of 
the cantons. Finally, a new variable for hospitality standard of the nursing homes could be 
proposed to the FSO, the producer of the SOMED data.  
The third article implicitly applied the hypothesis of the extension of morbidity in the model 
(i.e., holding hospitalization rates constant over time with risk of overestimating future 
hospitalizations). Moreover, it reflected the impossibilities of taking into account varying 
developments for each sex with respect to canton-level populations, morbidity and mortality 
trends (taken into account only in terms of the LOS); future changes in patient flows were 
mentioned as further limitations. It would actually be possible to program the model in a way 
that these additional variables could be integrated and that simulations of different variants 
could be calculated. It would be much more difficult to integrate potential changes in 
preferences of the population for future acute care hospital services. Finally, the hospital cases 
with very long LOSs could be analyzed more precisely to see whether these patients are 
rightly being treated in acute hospital care. 
One important societal phenomenon that was present across all articles of the thesis was the 
effect of an aging population on healthcare costs and utilization. It would be interesting to 
learn more about the reasons for the differences in actual and future age structures of cantonal 
populations. Without political countermeasures, shares of up to 29 percent of the population 
being 65 years and older are to be expected in some Swiss cantons until 2030. This could lead 
to increases of up to 30 percent in required acute care hospital days depending upon the 
specific canton. Apart from such increases, all cantons must consider large structural changes: 
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acute care treatments typically serving older inpatients will clearly be in greater demand in 
2030 than those serving younger patients. Moreover, an aging population certainly not only 
affects (inpatient) acute health care but also more inpatient and outpatient long-term care. 
This trend underlines the importance—particularly for cantonal authorities—to know more 
about the concrete consequences of such regional population (age) structure changes for 
future healthcare utilization. A possible contribution could also come from more research 
efforts on the effects of health prevention and promotion measures on health behavior and the 
future health status of elderly people. Promising models90 for simulating such quantitative 
calculations are being developed in Western countries. The data situation seems to allow an 
application of these models to the contemporary Switzerland. 
 
  
                                                 
90
  See, for example: ArchimedesInc. 2012. "The Archimedes Model" [accessed on 2012]. Available at: 
http://archimedesmodel.com/archimedes-model, DYNAMO-HIA. 2010. "DYNAMO-HIA: a Dynamic 
Model for Health Impact Assessment" [accessed on 2010]. Available at: http://www.dynamo-
hia.eu/root/o14.html, StatisticsCanada. 2012. "The Population Health Model (POHEM)" [accessed on 2012]. 
Available at: http://www.statcan.gc.ca/microsimulation/health-sante/health-sante-eng.htm#a2. 
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Excursus: an applied synthesis of the results for two exemplary 
Swiss cantons 
The analyses in Chapters 4 to 6 were limited in their validity either to one single funding 
source (MHI) or to an individual health service provider domain (nursing homes and acute 
care hospitals). Moreover, these results were presented and discussed as universally valid 
results for all Swiss cantons. In contrast, the aim of this Excursus is to gain a synthetic and 
concrete understanding for what these results could mean for two exemplary cantons. 
Obwalden (OW) and Geneva (GE) are selected for this purpose because of their extreme 
positions91 of aggregated healthcare expenditures92 per capita. 
 
Canton Obwalden (OW) 
OW is situated in the central, German-speaking part of Switzerland. It is a small and rural 
canton with quite limited economic resources compared to the country’s average. In spite of 
this relative “poverty,” the rates of unemployed persons and those on social benefits are 
among the lowest in the country93. The actual age structure of OW is rather favorable: the 
percentages of those over 65 years and over 85 years are smaller than the national averages 
(see Figure 14). However, the share of persons suffering from chronic health problems—one 
out of three persons as of 200794—was the highest in Switzerland. The mortality rates are 
around the country’s average. 
Canton OW’s healthcare supply system is characterized by an average density of GPs, only a 
few specialists being active in the canton, a large share of drugs self-dispensed by physicians 
in private practice, a high share of outpatient hospital costs relative to total outpatient costs, 
just a few acute care hospital beds, and few pharmacies in its territory. A relative large share 
                                                 
91
  Canton GE shows the highest per-head costs of all cantons in 2007 (CHF 7,500; see Figure 5 & Table 4); 
OW (CHF 3,600) is in the second-to-last position behind the canton AI; because AI has no nursing home on 
its territory (see Chapter 5), OW was selected instead of AI. 
92
  Sum of MHI costs, state subsidies, and out-of-pocket expenditures, per capita (see Table 4). 
93
  Unemployment: annual average in 2007 of 1.3 percent in OW, compared to a 2.8 percent average across 
Switzerland (see SECO. 2011. “AVAM – System der Arbeitsmarktvermittlung und der 
Arbeitsmarktstatistik.” Bern: Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft (SECO).). Socail benefit recipients: Annual 
average 2007 of 1.1 percent in OW, compared to 3.0 percent for Swiss average (see FSO. 2013c. 
“Schweizerische Sozialhilfestatistik.” BFS Aktuell. Neuchâtel: Swiss Federal Statistical Office (FSO). 
94
  Source: FSO. 2011f. “Schweizerische Gesundheitsbefragung.” BFS Aktuell. Neuchâtel: Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office (FSO). 
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of MHI services is bought in other cantons. The price index for MHI services inside the 
canton (Schleiniger et al. 2007) is around the national average.  
Out-of-pocket funds for healthcare services in OW are—compared to other cantons—low in 
absolute numbers and in relation to MHI expenditures (see Table 4). The amount of state sub-
sidies corresponds to the expected number with respect to the MHI expenditures (see Figure 
6). Instead, more people than in other cantons hold a CHF 300 standard deductible, and a very 
small but growing number of policyholders are participating in managed care plans.  
The general trends for the entire country—increasing trends for outpatient drugs, nursing 
homes, and outpatient hospital services and declining trends for inpatient hospitals, GPs, and 
specialists in private practice (see Table 9)—are only partly observable in OW. Utilization 
has intensified for drugs and for outpatient services of GPs and hospitals. However, utilization 
of specialists, hospital inpatient consultations, and nursing home services has remained stable.  
The detailed analysis of the nursing home branch shows that, institutions situated in OW are 
characterized by an above-average bed occupancy rate and a relatively large share of privately 
owned nursing homes. Other indicators, such as the size of the nursing homes, the 
qualifications of the personnel, the share of women in the cantonal population, and the 
cantonal private home rent index, are more or less at the Swiss average level (FSO 2011d).  
One finds a below average nursing intensity in OW’s nursing homes, a relatively low-level 
supply of formal outpatient long-term care (Spitex) and—in accordance with its young 
population—a relatively small share of women in the population. These cantonal healthcare 
supply and demand structures are associated with per-bed costs in OW’s nursing homes that 
are close to the Swiss average for all three analyzed cost items: the annual per bed total costs, 
the annual per-bed costs for accommodation and assistance, and the annual per-bed costs for 
mandatory nursing under FHIL. 
In the analysis of the actual situation and future developments in the acute care hospital 
sector, the relatively young population structure of OW becomes visible as well. OW has 
below-average rates for both unadjusted and standardized acute care hospital utilization. The 
LOS in OW’s acute care hospitals is shorter than in the entire country, but the median value 
for the 5 percent cases with the longest LOS in OW (150 cases in 2010) is the highest in 
Switzerland (together with canton GE, see Figure 21). 
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OW’s relatively young population structure proves to be much less favorable when projected 
into the future. Up to 2030, the number of residents over 65 will almost double (+92 percent) 
while the number of residents younger than 65 will remain almost unchanged (+1 percent, see 
Figure 15). The aging population of OW also translates into future requirements of acute care 
hospital capacities. The number of acute care hospital cases is expected to increase 26 
percent, and the number of acute care hospital days is projected to rise approximately 12 
percent in the two “middle” variants of the model simulations (see Figure 18). 
 
Canton Geneva (GE) 
The second canton more concretely discussed, Geneva (GE), is situated on the border with 
France in the French-speaking part of Switzerland. Concerning population numbers, GE is a 
medium-sized canton (see Table 12). Its type of settlement is clearly urban, and GE has an 
above-average economic power (see Figure 7). This characterization does not prevent the 
canton from facing the highest unemployment rates in the country95 and high rates of social 
benefit recipients.  
In addition to its rather favorable actual age structure—the percentage of those over 65 and 85 
is smaller than in the national average—GE’s population change through 2030 will be rather 
positive as well. The number of residents over 65 will increase less than 50 percent, and the 
number of residents younger than 65 will grow by 10 percent between 2010 and 2030 (see 
Figures 14 and 15). The share of persons suffering from chronic health problems is below 
(FSO 2011f), and the mortality rate is around the national average (FSO 2011e). 
The healthcare provision system of canton GE is characterized by an average density of GPs 
and a high density of specialists. A very small share of self-dispensed drugs, an average share 
of outpatient hospital costs compared to total outpatient costs, a slightly above-average 
density of acute care hospital beds, and the second highest density of pharmacies (behind 
canton Ticino (TI)) can be observed. GE runs one of the five Swiss university hospitals. Only 
a small part (approximately 5 percent) of all MHI services for GE residents are administered 
                                                 
95
  Unemployment: Annual average in 2007 of 6.3 percent in GE, compared to 2.8 percent for Switzerland on 
average (see SECO. 2011. “AVAM – System der Arbeitsmarktvermittlung und der Arbeitsmarktstatistik.” 
Bern: Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft (SECO).). Socail benefit recipients: Annual average 2007 of 3.8 
percent in GE, compared to 3.0 percent for Swiss average (see FSO. 2013c. “Schweizerische 
Sozialhilfestatistik.” BFS Aktuell. Neuchâtel: Swiss Federal Statistical Office (FSO). 
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by providers outside the canton. The average price for MHI services is clearly above the 
national average (Schleiniger et al. 2007).  
In canton GE, the amount of healthcare services funded by out-of-pocket payments is large in 
absolute numbers and also in relation to the (high) MHI costs (see Table 4). The amount of 
state subsidy is greater than the expected number (see Figure 6). More people than in other 
cantons hold high deductibles, and only a few policyholders are participating in managed care 
plans.  
The general trends for the entire country—increasing trends in outpatient drugs, nursing 
homes, and hospital outpatient services and declining trends in inpatient hospitals, GPs, and 
specialists in private practice (see Table 9)—are partly observable in GE. Utilization has 
intensified for drugs and hospital outpatient services. It has remained rather constant for GPs, 
for specialists, and for nursing homes. Over the last few years, its inpatient hospital services 
have declined.  
The specific analysis of the nursing home branch shows for the institutions situated in canton 
GE a clearly above-average bed occupation rate. There are more privately owned nursing 
homes than public nursing homes. The average size of a nursing home is around the national 
Swiss average of 61 beds. However, the intensity of nursing and the qualification of the 
personnel in GE’s nursing homes are clearly above the national average.  
The share of women in the cantonal population and the levels of home rents and salaries are 
higher than in other parts of the country. This is in particular true as well for formal outpatient 
long-term care supply (Spitex), which is—behind Basel-Stadt (BS)—the second-best 
developed in the country. The resulting annual per-bed costs in GE’s nursing homes in 2006 
are more than 50 percent higher than the national Swiss average (CHF 126,000 for GE versus 
CHF 80,000 for CH). Annual per-bed costs for MHI care and for accommodation and 
assistance contribute to a similar extent to this large difference (see Figure 12). 
The analyses and the projections in the acute care hospital sector show for canton GE modest 
acute hospital utilization rates and LOSs beyond the national average. There is a rather 
favorable actual population-age structure and a positive development of this structure until 
2030. The five percent of hospital cases with highest LOSs (6,900 cases in GE in 2010, see 
Figure 21) are among the longest LOSs in the country. As a consequence of this situation, the 
number of hospital cases in GE will increase by relatively modest 14 percent until 2030. The 
  
168
number of hospital days will increase by 5 percent in the quarter-best variant or even decrease 
by -2 percent in the second-best variant (see Figure 18). 
 
Synthesis for the two exemplary cantons 
An attempt to assign OW and GE to a health system related typology of Swiss cantons is 
proposed to complete the applied synthesis of the two exemplary Swiss cantons. This is done 
with reference to the basic model of effects for Switzerland proposed in this work (see Figure 
1). Interrelations with cantonal healthcare costs and utilization are summarized in this model 
by four groups of influence factors on health and health care: the population and patients 
(demand), the healthcare provision system (supply), the healthcare financing system 
(funding), and the political system (decision) 96. 
Concerning the demand-side effects, rural canton OW could be named a canton with an 
“integrated population.” In other words, the residents of OW live in relatively modest 
economic conditions. However, society is able to keep the economic exclusion of 
individuals—e.g., unemployment or dependence on social benefits—on a low level. The self-
rated physical health status of the population is rather low. This might reflect more people 
being active in physically demanding jobs. The positive (i.e., young) age structure of the 
population will clearly deteriorate in the next 20 years. The tendency toward having fewer 
children will not be compensated by the immigration of young persons from other cantons or 
abroad. A relatively strong expansion of the future requirements of hospital acute care 
services has to be expected.  
The urban canton GE could be labeled a canton with a “globalized population”. This refers to 
an economic system that gives a large part of the population very good economic prosperity. 
Some share of the people—a larger part than in the “integrated population” cantons—cannot 
follow the demands of such a dynamic economic system. Higher rates of unemployment and 
social benefits collection serve as indicators for this. The self-rated physical health of the 
population is above average. However, for mental health, the opposite phenomenon occurs 
(Schuler and Burla 2012). The canton is able to keep its positive age structure for the next 20 
                                                 
96
  The political (decision) system is not discussed in the following paragraphs. 
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years, mainly because of the immigration of young people. The future requirements of 
hospital services in 20 years will be at today’s’ level.  
On the supply side, the two different types of cantonal healthcare schemes—as they had been 
described in a former Swiss study (Haari et al. 2002)—can be repeated: canton OW reflects 
the “peripheral-type scheme” of a cantonal health provision system. This is focused on 
primary care and nursing homes. Supply and utilization of specialist services is restrained and 
replaced by (partly extra-cantonal) outpatient hospital services. With its modest health 
provision infrastructure (hospitals, pharmacies) on its territory, OW allows direct distribution 
of medicines by physicians. OW buys a large share of healthcare services in other cantons. 
OW’s nursing home sector is well developed and has relatively healthy patients. Otherwise, 
the supply of Spitex services in the canton is relatively small. 
Canton GE shows the “center-type scheme” of a regional healthcare provision system. A 
university hospital—or a large principal hospital in similar cantons—is surrounded by large 
numbers of independent specialists. Consequently, the share of outpatient hospital costs on 
total outpatient costs is lower than in peripheral cantons. There are many pharmacies selling 
drugs and medical devices. The share of drugs dispensed by physicians is small. Rather 
average densities of GPs and of acute care hospital beds are more characteristics of such a 
type of canton.  
Moreover, a center-type scheme canton such as GE produces most of its health services 
internally. Very few MHI-funded services are “imported” from outside the canton. The prices 
for MHI-funded services are higher than for the nation on average. The nursing home sector 
is rather underdeveloped in terms of its density of beds. The relatively few patients treated in 
the nursing homes require a high intensity of care. For healthier patients, well-developed 
Spitex services are available. 
The dimension of funding effects on costs and utilization has been less worked out in this 
thesis than the demand and supply effects. One can still try to introduce typical notions for the 
corresponding systems of cantons OW and GE: OW’s healthcare funding system could be 
called a “premium-oriented” system. In other words, the share of healthcare expenditures 
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financed by MHI premiums (i.e., by the individual policyholders) is relatively high97. GE’s 
healthcare funding system could be called “subsidy-oriented.” In addition to high MHI 
premiums, the share of state subsidies is clearly above the expected level (see Figure 6). 
                                                 
97
  The share of MHI-financed costs for OW is 64 percent of its total costs (Table 4). The corresponding value 
for GE is 50 percent, and the average Swiss value (CH) is 55 percent. 
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